Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock.

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Machine Tools

Mr. Leslie Huckfield: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will make a statement about progress in administering financial assistance to the machine tool industry by his Department.

The Minister for Industrial Development (Mr. Christopher Chataway): All orders under the special scheme for public sector purchasing of machine tools have been placed.

Mr. Huckfield: How much of this money has gone to the machine tool firm of Alfred Herbert in Coventry? How much has been spent on imported machine

tools? Since this is taxpayers' money, intended to help the British industry, is it not a ridiculous practice to spend the money on imports?

Mr. Chataway: Less than 1 per cent. has been spent on imported machine tools. I am afraid that I could not, without notice, give the proportion of the total which has been spent at Alfred Herbert's.

Mr. Rost: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the orders for machine tools in this country have risen dramatically during the last few months and that one of my constituents who has recently placed an order has had to wait three times as long as he would have done if he had placed it a couple of months ago?

Mr. Chataway: My hon. Friend is right to say that there has been a substantial increase in orders for machine tools in the third quarter of the year, but it would still be the case that there is substantial spare capacity in the majority of firms.

Mr. Benn: On the broader question, may I ask when the Minister will be commenting on the general investment outlook, in view of the forecasts for 1973 which are now well below the earlier forecasts? There is an obvious crisis of confidence and a general anxiety. Will the Government now be making an authoritative statement on investment


prospects, including those for machine tools?

Mr. Chataway: We had a debate about investment before the recess. All the indications are still of a substantial upturn in investment during this year.

Night Jet Charter Flights

Mr. Allason: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will ban night jet charter flights after 1973.

The Under Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Cranley Onslow): No, Sir.

Mr. Allason: Will my hon. Friend recognise the extreme hardship of those who have to live beneath the flight paths and who are kept awake night after night by these night jet charter flights? Will he offset this against the quite small increase in fares which would result from a ban on night jet charter flights?

Mr. Onslow: I am well aware that this disturbance at night causes hardship to a number of people, and my hon. Friend represents their case very powerfully. But I cannot believe that the step which he advocates would he justified when he remembers that this section of the industry carries 10 million passengers a year from United Kingdom airports and that it would cause grave damage to a large number of people if a total ban were placed on one-third of their potential operating time.

Mr. Jessel: Is my hon. Friend aware that the sharp reduction in the number of night jet take-offs from Heathrow, introduced for the first time in the summer season of 1972, has been warmly welcomed by communities living around Heathrow but that many people still think there are too many night jet takeoffs? Will my hon. Friend try to enforce this virtual ban more stringently in the summer season of 1973?

Mr. Onslow: I note what my hon. Friends says. The hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) has a later Question on this point and I do not think that I should seek to anticipate my reply to it.

Yorkshire and Humberside

Mr. Mason: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will

make an early official visit to Yorkshire and Humberside to discuss the changing industrial infrastructure and the need for improving communications, including the development of a regional airport.

Dr. Marshall: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make an early official visit to the Yorkshire and Humberside region to discuss the effects on the region's industry of the suggested development of a regional airport.

Mr. Chataway: I have discussed these matters on a number of visits to the region as has my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. We shall both have early opportunities to do so again. The advantages to industry of the region's good road and rail communications and ready access to the EEC will be further improved by the new east-west road. As the House knows, a study of the airport needs of the North of England, including Yorkshire and Humberside, is being initiated by the Civil Aviation Authority, which would welcome advice from hon. Members.

Mr. Mason: There is a need for an urgent decision on the future of the Yorkshire regional airport. As the Minister knows, we have only Yeadon. North-East Airlines is the main user; it intends to phase out its Viscounts from 1975 and its Trident replacements will not be able to land on the shortened runway. All this is at the time when we are entering the EEC and it will embarrass trade and stifle tourism in the county. Even if we decide to build a new airport, it will take 10 years to do it. Is there not an urgent need now for the Minister, who is responsible for regional development, to try to get the runway extended at Yeadon so that we can have an airport between 1975 and 1983, which is the earliest the new one might be built?

Mr. Chataway: The right hon. Gentleman will know that the local authorities concerned have been considering whether they would wish to reapply for an extension of that runway. While Yorkshire West Riding and Bradford Council were in favour of doing so, I understand that, at the instigation of the Labour group, Leeds Council was opposed to an extension of the runway. The Civil Aviation


Authority intends to make haste with this study and hopes that it will be ready by the end of the year.

Dr. Marshall: Given that a new regional airport for Yorkshire and Humberside would stimulate industrial development, and given the Government's policy of assistance to the regions, are they prepared to help finance the construction of such an airport?

Mr. Chataway: I should require notice of that. It is obviously not primarily a matter for me. But the hon. Gentleman will recognise that, important though the airport is, the developments of communications in the region to which we are already committed will substantially enhance its attractions for industry.

Mr. Wilkinson: In discussion of regional development matters in the West Riding textile district, will my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his Ministers bring to the attention of the Leeds Corporation, the only body which has not supported the extension of Yeadon runway, the vital necessity of good air communications for the exporting industries of the area and the fact that alternative sites, such as those in the Finningley area and in the Vale of York, are precluded from development by the flying training requirements of the Royal Air Force in those areas?

Mr. Chataway: I take note of my hon. Friend's comments. I am sure that the Civil Aviation Authority will also do so. Lord Boyd-Carpenter has specifically said that he would welcome the views of hon. Members at an early stage.

Mr. Edward Lyons: On the assumption that Yeadon does not get its runway extension, does not the Minister agree that we shall have a terrible situation in about three years' time in that there will he no commercial airport in the whole of Yorkshire? Is not that a terrible situation? What is the Minister proposing to do to speed up the introduction of a new regional airport for Yorkshire?

Mr. Chataway: There is a job to be done in looking at the airport needs of the north of England as a whole. With the development of new motorways, it is clear that some of the airport traffic from Yorkshire will be diverted to existing

airports. None the less there is a strong case, which has been powerfully made by a number of bodies, for an airport at Yeadon. I believe, therefore, that it is right that the Civil Aviation Authority should undertake this study.

Mr. Duffy: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will visit Yorkshire and Humberside to discuss the modernisation needs of industry.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Peter Walker): My right hon. Friend the Minister for Industrial Development has visited Yorkshire and Humberside on several occasions during the past few months to discuss the needs of industry in the region, and I shall be visiting Yorkshire and Humberside in the months to come. The provisions in the Industry Act to assist modernisation are an important part of our regional policy.

Mr. Duffy: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are two pressing reasons for an even earlier visit? One is the ambiguities that appear to arise from the statement given to the Press by his right hon. Friend in Manchester on 24th November in which he appeared to interpret the Act in a much narrower sense. The second is, as I think the right hon. Gentleman appreciates, the urgent need to rehouse much of industry in the Yorkshire region, notably in the South Yorkshire and Pennines area.

Mr. Walker: Both my right hon. Friend and I agree that there is considerable potential for the application of this Act to Yorkshire, and we shall be working to this end.

Mr. John Mendelson: In addition, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the suggestion put forward by his colleague in the debate on Yorkshire economic development some months ago—that all development must come from within existing firms in the Yorkshire area and that there should be no great influx of industry from outside—is wholly unacceptable to opinion in Yorkshire and that this has been proved at various conferences recently. Will he give an assurance to the House and to the county that there will be full Government support for additional industries to come to Yorkshire, particularly in replacement of jobs that might be lost?

Mr. Walker: The hon. Gentleman's remarks are a misinterpretation of my right hon. Friend's speech. Certainly our objective is to do everything possible to encourage industrial expansion in Yorkshire.

Mr. Mason: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what is the purpose of his visit, whom he intends to meet and whether he will have talks on the expansion of Yeadon airport?

Mr. Walker: When I have completed the programme I will let the right hon. Gentleman know.

Mr. Wilkinson: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will now visit the West Riding wool textile district to discuss the importance of local air transport services for trade and industry in the region.

Mr. Ford: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what discussions he is having regarding the development of a regional airport in the Yorkshire and Humberside region, and its effects on the industry of the region.

Mr. Onslow: My right hon. Friend the Minister for Industrial Development visited the wool textile industry in West Yorkshire on 9th November. Among the matters discussed was the importance of efficient air services. As I think the House may now know, the Civil Aviation Authority is about to start a study into the structure of the airport system in the North of England, including Yorkshire and Humberside.

Mr. Wilkinson: In the Secretary of State's forthcoming tour of Yorkshire and Humberside, will he visit the wool textile delegation and the Bradford Chamber of Commerce to hear their views on the importance of maintaining an air service from Yeadon, which will be possible only if Yeadon has a sufficiently long runway? Will he also bear in mind that nobody has yet explained who will finance the development of a completely new airport ab initio elsewhere?

Mr. Onslow: I am sure my right hon. Friend will have taken due note of the first point made by my hon. Friend. In reply to his second point, I must say that the criteria governing grants for airport development are strict and I am not able

to hold out any prospect of financial assistance being available for airport development in Yorkshire. Any case that is put forward will be carefully considered.

Mr. Ford: Does the Minister agree that it would be undesirable for regions such as Yorkshire and Humberside, which contains the urban area of the West Yorkshire metropolitan county, to lose scheduled air services?

Mr. Onslow: I am sure that the Civil Aviation Authority, which has a direct responsibility in these matters, will take note of that point. If any hon. Member on either side of the House has a point of view to put forward on this subject, I am sure that Lord Boyd-Carpenter will be happy to hear from him.

North Sea Oil and Gas

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will take steps to ensure greater accuracy in the statistics relating to North Sea oil production.

The Minister for Industry (Mr. Tom Boardman): I am satisfied that estimates of future production are the best that can be calculated from current information. They will be updated as more information becomes available. Actual production will be stated in the annual report to Parliament.

Mr. Hamilton: Is the Minister aware that there is a constant and almost universal suspicion that the Government and the oil companies are deliberately under-estimating the enormous potential of these natural resources? The Minister in the other place recently announced a miscalculation as to public participation in this effort of about 50 per cent. Why should that error be corrected in another place rather than in this House? Will the Minister undertake to ensure that there is an increasing element of public participation and that we get more realistic estimates of the potential than we have had hitherto?

Mr. Boardman: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman's criticism might be better directed to his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition who gave, in a speech on Saturday, more misleading statistics about North Sea oil than anything previously published. With regard


to specific percentages, the hon. Gentleman will be aware that what matters is the share of the oil reserves and that in those the British participation is great, much greater than the hon. Gentleman has represented. Indeed, the British participation in the forecast of the reserves and the four fields that have been proved commercially is 58 per cent. The hon. Gentleman should not be misled by such statements as what his right hon. Friend said about the action that the Opposition had taken, which was completely misleading.

Sir G. Nabarro: Notwithstanding the strictures put upon indigenous oil production by the Leader of the Opposition so mistakenly on Saturday, will not my hon. Friend understand that the two principal sources of fuel production in this country are coal and oil and that we ought to have in the House of Commons a statement comparable to the synopsis of weekly coal production in the context of the oil industry, so that we can all tell, week by week and month by month, what progress indigenous oil production is making?

Mr. Boardman: Yes, Sir, I understand my hon. Friend's point. I think lie will agree that we have made considerable progress. The annual report to Parliament published the other day is a step in the right direction, because we believe that Parliament should be given as much information on this as practicable.

Mr. Benn: In the light of the hon. Gentleman's last comment, is it not time that we had much fuller information made available to Parliament and a full-scale debate rather than a Press conference during the recess? There was no reason for the Press conference to be given before the House returned. The information could have been given in the House. As the Minister in the House of Lords, no doubt inadvertently, made a grave error in the account he gave to my noble Friend in answering his question, is there not now a case for a much wider disclosure and a fuller debate in the House of Commons?

Mr. Boardman: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the pressure there was that the information which became available from the International Manage-

ment and Engineering Group report should be published as soon as possible in order that industry could move on it, and this action was taken.

Mr. Redmond: Will my hon. Friend say whether the Leader of the Opposition was correct in saying that the Labour Government would have required a 50 per cent. participation in both the North Sea and the Irish Sea?

Mr. Boardman: No, the Leader of the Opposition was again short on facts.

Mr. Heffer: How do you know?

Mr. Boardman: Instead of insisting, as the right lion. Gentleman claimed on Saturday, that they would require a 50 per cent. participation, they required sonic participation only in the Irish Sea and they made no requirement for public participation in the North Sea.

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman must get his facts correct. I was responsible for the licences in 1969–70. If the hon. Gentleman reads the record aright he will see that we intended in the northern sectors of the North Sea to expand all nationalised industries' interests and, secondly, that in the Irish Sea no private interest at all would be allowed unless there was a 50 per cent. interest by public industries.

Mr. Boardman: The right hon. Gentleman said that that was his Government's intention, but in practice they made no such requirement with regard to the North Sea, and in the case of the Irish Sea, where they required a 50 per cent. participation, the result was that only eight applications were received.

Mr. Strang: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what reaction he has received from industrialists to the report of International Management and Engineering Group on the market for goods and services required for the exploitation of North Sea oil and gas.

Mr. Peter Walker: As the report was published on 16th January, I have not as yet received a wide range of comments from industrialists.

Mr. Strang: Does the Minister support the IMEG recommendation that British industry's share in the United Kingdom


offshore market should be increased from 25–30 per cent. to about 70 per cent.? Is he aware of the dismay in Scotland resulting from his decision not to establish an independent member for Scotland to sponsor the North Sea oil industry? Is he further aware that there is a feeling that under the present Government Scotland has no chance of maintaining its fair share of new jobs and investment arising from the exploitation of North Sea oil and gas?

Mr. Walker: Compared with the complete inaction of the previous Government in this respect, I am surprised at those comments. I want to see 70 per cent. and above if possible of the investment programme in the North Sea oil industry placed with firms in this country. We shall use the Industry Act. The creation of the new petroleum office in Glasgow will play a very important part, as the new office in my Department will play an important part nationwide.

Mr. Tugendhat: What proportion of the allocation of licences in the North Sea made by the present Government in the last round went to the public sector? Can my right hon. Friend compare that proportion with the proportion which went to the public sector in the last round under the previous Government?

Mr. Walker: In the last round, 34 per cent. went to British interests, 9·6 of which went to the public sector. As to the last round of the Labour Government, I find the remarks of the right hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason) rather surprising. In the round which was completed 10 days before polling day, rather than on the basis of fifty-fifty, 80 per cent. was with the private sector and 64 per cent. of it was with foreign interests.

Mr. Benn: Is it not a fact that the Industrial Expansion Act was repealed by the present Government, thus denying them an instrument by which support could have been given to British industry in the two years before their own Act was introduced? Can the right hon. Gentleman say how much money is now budgeted for in his own forward forecast under his Industry Act?

Mr. Walker: This depends upon the range of opportunities. The Industry Act of the present Government is a far better instrument to help than the legislation of

the previous Government, and will be used as such. The last Government did not even go to the point of having a report on the potentialities involved.

Mr. Douglas: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what proposals he has for early discussions with both sides of industry in Scotland regarding the implementation of the International Management and Engineering Group Report.

Mr. Peter Walker: Ministers from the Department will be having a number of discussions with both sides of industry over the coming months. The first should take place on 9th February.

Mr. Douglas: Will the Minister make clear to the industrialist Press the disparity in the estimate produced by IMEG of 150 million tons and the Government's estimate of 75 million tons? Before undertaking discussions will he produce a statement to the House showing how he will finance the high-risk protect spoken about in the Press release? Will he make clear that industry not only in Scotland but in the rest of the United Kingdom will get a fair chance to bid for all contracts in the North Sea?

Mr. Walker: Any discrepancies between IMEG and the Government on future estimates are not of the proportion the hon. Gentleman has stated. He is using different dates. The only difference is purely a matter of timing. On the best information available to as with the finds so far discovered, this is the volume of oil which can be obtained by 1980. There is no dispute between us and IMEG other than on the question of timing in terms of extraction.

Mr. Leadbitter: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the action following the IMEG report has been well received but that in practical terms there is considerable concern? Is he aware that when firms in my constituency have approached companies involved in the exploration of oil and gas, they have not been able to get anywhere near the decision-making areas, nor have they been able to break through the accepted lists of suppliers? Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that further Government intervention would be desirable?

Mr. Walker: That is why I am setting up a special office to see that the maximum contact is made between British industry and the oil producers to exploit this market to the full. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to send me details of any examples in his constituency, I shall see that they are looked into.

Mr. Douglas: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible moment.

Steel Industry

Mr. Hardy: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what is now his estimate of the productive capacity of the British Steel Corporation in 1975 and in 1980.

Mr. Peter Walker: The British Steel Corporation modernisation programme which I announced on 21st December is a flexible programme which could take the corporation's capacity to about 29 million tonnes of liquid steel by 1975, to 33 million to 35 million tonnes by the late 1970s and 36 million to 38 million tonnes in the first half of the 1980s. Together with the private sector this would mean a national capacity of some 39 million to 42 million tonnes in the first half of the 1980s.—[Vol. 848, c. 1576–8.]

Mr. Hardy: Is the Secretary of State aware that his recent statement appeared to be excessively vague about the future of the profitable Sheffield and Rotherham areas? Is he aware that in those areas there is considerable suspicion that although capacity may increase, the number of jobs which will disappear will be somewhat more than he appeared to suggest in his recent statement? We need to know a great deal more about the future of those areas. Will the right hon. Gentleman come to the House as soon as possible to give detailed information and allay the suspicion he has created?

Mr. Walker: I hope that during the first week of February a White Paper will be published giving more information.

Mr. John Morris: Has there not been yet another massive U-turn in the Government's thinking on steel, as they referred in their announcement early last

year to the bottom end of the scale as 28 million to 36 million tonnes? Had there not been a change of thinking, would the Minister seriously dispute that we would be faced with massive imports before the end of the present decade?

Mr. Walker: No. I believe that any imports we are faced with are due to a complete lack of investment in the period 1964–70. I hope that the new investment programme will ensure that there is no need for massive imports.

Mr. Ashley: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now make a statement about the employment prospects in the steel industry for the next two years.

Mr. Tom Boardman: There will be no change in the employment prospects for the steel industry in the next two years as a result of the strategy announced on 21st December. There have, prior to the strategy, been a number of closures announced which fall into this period, and on the basis of present plans by March 1975 the number of people employed in the steel industry is expected to be about 221,000 as compared with 230,000 now.

Mr. Ashley: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the whole of North Staffordshire is waiting anxiously to see whether the steel workers at Shelton will be allowed to exercise their great skills or whether they will be conscripted into the bloated army of the unemployed? Will the hon. Gentleman do all he can to ensure that those skills are not wasted and that the region does not become a depressed area?

Mr. Boardman: The figures I have quoted for the next two years do not include Shelton since it is not expected that it will close during those two years.

Sir R. Cary: When is my hon. Friend likely to be in a position to name the sites of the proposed two mini-mills which are to be established in the immediate future?

Mr. Boardman: This will take some time. My right hon. Friend has said that one will be in Scotland. The site of the other will be a matter for the decision of the British Steel Corporation after further evaluation. It will be some time before that can be decided.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what estimate he has made of the percentage adjustment in the British Steel Corporation's list prices for billets, medium plates, boiler plates, beams, steel for reinforcement, hot rolled strip and hot rolled coil, respectively, which will be required to conform to the rules and practice of the European Coal and Steel Community as soon as the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Act lapses.

Mr. Peter Walker: The Treaty of Paris does not require producers to price their products at any particular level. My hon. Friend will see from the table I gave him in my reply of 4th December both that list prices for the same products vary from country to country and that the prices actually charged in Europe are often well below the list prices.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply so far as it goes. Will he now tell us whether, as soon as the freeze ends, the British Steel Corporation will be allowed to increase its prices to the point at which it can earn its target 8 per cent. on capital employed or there will be a further extension of taxpayer subsidisation of prices? If so, how long will it be before we observe the rules of the European Coal and Steel Community?

Mr. Walker: We have made clear in our White Paper on stage 2 that steel prices are subject to our obligations as members of the ECSC, and Treaty of Paris products are exempt from control under stage 2. The British Steel Corporation is conscious of the need to act responsibly in the fight against inflation.

Mr. Varley: With reference to the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Act, what progress is being made in the discussions which the Secretary of State's Department is having with the British Steel Corporation about compensating the corporation for loss of revenue during the freeze and the period of the CBI restraint?

Mr. Walker: I cannot say at this stage, but I will keep the House informed as developments take place.

Mr. Edward Taylor: During stage 2 will any increase in steel prices preserve the principle of a common uniform de-

livered price for steel throughout the country, or will there be varying increases in different parts of the country as under the Common Market rules?

Mr. Walker: We have stated that we shall go over to the basis of basing points as under the Common Market rules.

Wool Textiles (Prices)

Mr. Ford: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will issue a directive in respect of the prices freeze enabling the wool textile industry to continue to base its own prices on the world prices of its raw materials, and taking into account the necessity of speed to maintain normal trading conditions where in some cases 87 per cent. of the cost is due to raw materials already purchased before 6th November.

The Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): In order of maintain an effective standstill on prices I believe that it is essential to require industry to absorb a significant proportion of any increases in the world price of its raw materials. We are discussing this with the wool textile industry.

Mr. Ford: When the Minister considers his view before taking part in discussions with the industry, will he recall that the industry has recently greatly increased its export earnings, that much of this is based upon quick price reaction to almost daily changes in raw materials and that, therefore, he should give more consideration to this aspect?

Sir G. Howe: I shall certainly bear that in mind alongside the over-riding necessity to ensure that the standstill is effectively observed.

Mr. Wilkinson: Does not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that this is a quite exceptional case and that rises in the cost of raw materials of about 100 per cent. in the past 12 months are quite abnormal, even in an industry such as wool textiles which is highly sensitive to price fluctuations, and that as the industry, before the recent boom, experienced very low profit margins, it cannot reasonably be expected to cut back profits now?

Sir G. Howe: I appreciate my hon. Friend's point about the scale of increases in world prices as a whole and I am taking that into account alongside the requirement for industry to absorb such increases in profit margins and to cooperate as far as possible in preserving the standstill.

Coal Production

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what has been the increased productivity in colliery undertakings in relation to capital investment; and what increases there have been as a result of expansion, over the longest practical period to the nearest practical date.

Mr. Peter Walker: As the answer contains a number of figures I will, with permission, circulate them in the OFFICIAL REPORT. They show that from January 1947 to March 1971 total capital investment, including replacement, in collieries was just under £1,500 million. Productivity rose by 105 per cent. and output declined from 185 million tons to 133 million tons.

Dame Irene Ward: I thank my right hon. Friend for that information. Can he, when he publishes the figures in the OFFICIAL REPORT, state whether we are really getting value for the immense amount of money which is being quite rightly put into the mining industry? Is he aware that quite often productivity arises not from the contribution made by the employees but from putting in new machinery? I want to know where the balance lies. I am sure that the Government believe in obtaining value for money.

Mr. Walker: The figures in my answer will give the basic facts for which my hon. Friend has asked. I will, if I may, write to her on the subject.
On behalf of both sides of the House, may I say how much we all regret the announcement that my hon. Friend made during the recess.

Mr. Harper: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that productivity in the coal mines could be increased even further if he could press the National Coal Board to sink two new pits in the East Riding of Yorkshire? Is it not a shame that men

should be crawling about in less than 3 ft. of coal when they could be mining coal 6 and 7 ft. thick, thus bringing productivity to greater heights than have ever been reached before?

Mr. Walker: I will refer the hon. Gentleman's suggestion to the Chairman of the National Coal Board.

Following are the figures:


Year
Colliery Investment £ million
Productivity Increase or Decrease Per cent.
Output Million tons


1947
14·8
(21·5 cwt. per manshift)
184·7


1948
21·3
+3·72
195·5


1949
27·5
+4·93
200·7


1950
24·6
+3·42
202·3


1951
26·6
+1·24
209·9


1952
38·0
-1·22
212·2


1953
52·4
+1·65
210·5


1954
67·9
0
211·8


1955
73·7
-0·80
207·8


1956
76·3
+0·40
207·2


1957
83·6
+0·40
207·4


1958
89·8
+2·81
201·8


1959
100·4
+5·08
192·5


1960
75·3
+3·72
183·8


1961
83·2
+3·58
179·6


1962
78·2
+7·96
187·6


1963/64 (15 months).
98·5
+6·73
237·4


1964–65
76·9
+4·50
183·7


1965–66
73·8
+3·74
174·1


1966–67
77·3
+1·39
164·6


1967–68
72·2
+6·83
166·1


1968–69
49·8
+8·70
153·0


1969–70
46·2
+2·12
139·8


1970–71
55·9
+1·84
133·3


1971–72
55·1
-4·99*
109·2*




(41·9 cwt. per manshift)




1,539·3

4,656·5


*Results affected by the strike.

Prototypes (Investment Grants)

Mr. Edward Lyons: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will reintroduce investment grants for prototypes.

Mr. Chataway: No, Sir. Investment grants for prototypes were part of the investment grants scheme which was terminated in October 1970 and the Government do not intend to reintroduce a grants system specifically for prototypes.

Mr. Lyons: I understand that the Minister will not do so yet, at any rate. Is it not the fact that he has had representations on this issue from the Managing Director of the Drum Engineering


Company of Bradford and that small firms need this additional assistance for the cost of employing high-grade designers to meet the challenge of the giants and to create new designs of machinery?

Mr. Chataway: That scheme involved a long and cumbersome administrative process. There are many ways in which research and development can be helped. As the managing director of the firm which the hon. Gentleman mentioned has now been informed, help is available by means of tax allowances and I understand that the company is seeking advice on its taxation position in this respect.

Prices

Mr. Sydney Chapman: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry how many complaints have been made to the Special Prices Unit in his Department since 6th November 1972; how many of these complaints were substantiated; and what subsequent action has been taken and with what results.

Sir G. Howe: The Department has received about 6,800 complaints. Half of these did not relate to the standstill. The other half have been or are being investigated. In about 2,300 cases where investigation is complete the complaint was not substantiated. In 250 cases prices were found to be above the level permitted by the standstill and in all these cases the firms concerned have reduced their prices.

Mr. Chapman: As it is imperative to have the co-operation of the public in trying to minimise inflationary tendencies, does not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it ought to be a statutory requirement that when value added tax is introduced and purchase tax and selective employment tax are abolished, any increase or decrease in the cost of goods or services should be indicated and the goods should be marked with the price so that the public may know the exact extent and scope of the new tax?

Sir. G. Howe: The suggestions made by my hon. Friend are amongst those borne in mind by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in putting forward the proposals to cover phase

2, during which value added tax will come into effect. My right hon. Friend will be making further announcements about the position in due course.

Mr. Alan Williams: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that as a result of the follow-up action by television in a report at the weekend that women's clothing manufacturers were considering introducing VAT in the middle of the freeze and raising retailers' profit margins by 10 per cent., at a meeting this morning some of the manufacturers have backed down and agreed to reduce their prices by 3½ per cent.? Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say what action his indolent and apathetic Special Prices Unit intends to undertake to ensure that manufacturers follow this morning's example so that women who have paid illegally high prices as a result of the premature decision of the manufacturers receive a refund of the illegal surcharge? Does not this show the absurdity of the Government's decision to convert 1½ million to 2½ million firms to value added tax in the middle of a prices and incomes squeeze?

Sir G. Howe: It does not demonstrate anything of the kind. I repudiate the suggestion that the Special Prices Unit can be described in the way the hon. Gentleman suggests. The fact that, in cases where prices are found to be above the level permitted, they have all been reduced by the firms concerned demonstrates the contrary. It is the effect of publicity in the context of a voluntary policy being overwhelmingly supported that is enabling us to achieve these results. As I have announced, special arrangements are to be made to ensure effective scrutiny in relation to the changeover to value added tax to ensure that the concurrent abolition of purchase tax and selective employment tax is also carried through to the advantage of the consumer wherever that should happen.

Mr. Rost: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that some retailers are deliberately deceiving the public already by placing in newspapers and in their shops advertisements saying "Buy now to beat VAT" on goods which will be reduced in price by the introduction of the tax? What does he intend to do about that?

Sir G. Howe: That is one of the matters at which we are also looking. However, my hon. Friend ought to take account of the fact that, when we change over and abolish SET and purchase tax and replace them by VAT, some prices will be reduced alongside others which will be increased. It is important that accurate information about both changes is made available to the public at that time.

Mr. Duffy: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that after the standstill his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister laid great stress on what he called the sanction of public opinion? Will he say why he will not allow the Special Prices Unit to reveal the names of the products and companies involved? Otherwise how can he convince the public and get their co-operation?

Sir G. Howe: Certain changes and certain reductions are being made public. The hon. Gentleman will see them from time to time in the Press. I cannot undertake to publish the name of every company because different factors have to be taken into account in different cases

Mr. Benn: Is it not a fact that when ones conies to the incomes side trade unions are named, their claims are debated and their leaders are interrogated on television, whereas when prices rise the Government extend over the company or shop concerned the protective cloak of secrecy? Is not this one of the basic injustices in the way in which these matters are dealt with? Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman look again at the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) that in cases of breakages on the prices side publicity should be used to discipline the offenders?

Sir G. Howe: I am prepared to look at the point again. But the general provisions which are being made relate to the prices of commodities marketed by a large number of firms, and when a decision is announced it is made effective by reference to those commodities just as decisions about wage increases are made by reference to the industries concerned.

Mr. Goodhart: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what plans he has for improving the monitoring of price increases.

Sir G. Howe: The Counter-Inflation Bill provides for the establishment of a Price Commission to monitor and regulate prices immediately after the standstill.

Mr. Goodhart: As the monitoring of prices is to continue on a long-term basis, is it not plain that this is a job for professionals at local level as well as at the centre? Does not this mean that the weights and measures inspectorate must be used? Will my right hon. Friend consider making funds available so that the size of that inspectorate can be expanded to take on this important task?

Sir G. Howe: Because of the importance of the point made by my hon. Friend, the Counter-Inflation Bill contains provisions to enable weights and measures inspectors to monitor retail prices locally and to investigate complaints. They will operate under the direction of Ministers, and discussions with local authority associations will be held to work out detailed arrangements.

Mr. Alan Williams: Does not the Minister realise that the weights and measures inspectorate is already overstretched in carrying out consumer protection work? How many extra staff will be needed effectively to vet the changeover by 1,500,000 firms when many millions of products have their prices changed?

Sir G. Howe: The hon. Gentleman was asking us a short time ago to take steps to see that the changeover to VAT will be properly supervised, and I must tell him that our efforts are directed precisely to that end. Weights and measures inspectors will be monitoring prices and will be looking into complaints during the transitional period. In addition they will be helped by the introduction by the Government of a list of typical items to give guidance on price changes upwards or downwards which the housewife can expect to find. Large retailers will be asked for undertakings that their price changes will be in conformity with the tax changes; and the Prices Commission will have power to obtain reports about what is happening.

Mr. Marten: Will my right hon. and learned Friend give an assurance that he will keep a close eye on this matter and


will watch to see that monitoring does not develop into snooping?

Sir G. Howe: I take my hon. Friend's point. The White Paper on the second stage makes plain the extent to which reporting will apply to firms above a certain size. Spot checking will apply at a level below that so as to ensure that the right balance is arrived at to satisfy those who want to see that prices are kept down and those who have to carry on day-to-day trading in industry.

Mr. Jay: Which commodities will be reduced in price when VAT is introduced?

Sir G. Howe: These items will be listed upwards or downwards, so that there can be no misunderstanding about them, in the guide list of typical items that the Government will bring forward.

British Airways Board

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry how many members of the British Airways Board have had airline experience as pilots.

Mr. Onslow: None, Sir.

Mr. McNair-Wilson: I am grateful for that rather surprising answer. But is not this a disturbing omission since there is a gulf between pilots and management which has been shown in the BEA inquiry? Has my hon. Friend considered involving the chairman of the British Air Line Pilots Association as an honorary member of the board while he holds that position?

Mr. Onslow: I have no evidence to suggest that the absence of a pilot from the BAB is a cause of dissatisfaction to the corporations' pilots. There are members of the boards of BEA and BOAC who are pilots of experience.
As for the Trident inquiry, it is too early to draw conclusions from that. I have already expressed my concern to the British Airways Board and to the Civil Aviation Authority that every effort should be made to improve pilot/management relations. They are well seized of the importance of this.

Mr. Tebbit: Is my hon. Friend aware that this is a problem which goes considerably wider than pilots and the Airways Board? There should be considerable thought by the Airways Board and

by many other public and private boards about the need to construct careers in their organisations which will enable men with what might be called shop floor experience to serve usefully on boards of this kind and not simply as representatives who belong to trade unions.

Mr. Onslow: I have some sympathy with what my hon. Friend says, especially in relation to this industry. I know that the BAB and the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority will be happy to explain directly to any hon. Member what is being done in this connection at the moment. I am sure that they will be happy to hear any suggestions that hon. Members have to put to them.

Aerospace

Mr. Dalyell: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement on his recent discussions with the United States National Aeronautics and Space Agency.

Mr. Onslow: My hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping and I have had discussions recently with officials of the United States National Aeronautics and Space Agency. These were general discussions covering a range of matters including the post-Apollo programme and possible opportunities for British firms arising from it.

Mr. Dalyell: On what date can NASA expect a "Yes" or "No" answer from the British Government about participation in the post-Apollo programme?

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman is mistaken in supposing that NASA wishes to set a deadline. There is no specific deadline. The United States authorities have indicated that they would still like British participation.

Mr. Tebbit: Now that we have proposed a European space authority to get these decisions more quickly, might it not be helpful if we also had a British space authority to get our decisions more quickly instead of fragmentation between half a dozen different departments?

Mr. Onslow: I think it would be easier to concentrate on getting one space authority working at a time. We have taken the view that we should start with the European space authority.

Mr. Bishop: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that concern has been expressed


about the Government merely having discussions with the United States on these matters and that the industry is concerned about the lack of policy decisions. We need decisions, because the options are running out on United Kingdom/United States participation.

Mr. Onslow: I do not necessarily accept that. When I was in Washington I represented to NASA that it was important to allow foreign firms with a unique contribution to make to participate in the post-Apollo programme. This question is still being considered.

Mr. Bishop: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what discussions he has had recently with European countries regarding post-Apollo collaboration; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Onslow: As the hon. Member is no doubt aware my hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping attended the European Space Conference on 20th December 1972. The conference gave general approval for the sortie laboratory element of the post-Apollo programme to be carried out and managed within a common European framework. Each country was left free to decide whether it will participate and, if so, the size of its financial contribution.

Mr. Bishop: Is the Minister aware that there was a great deal of procrastination by the Government last year when decisions could have been taken and that the British aircraft industry, which can make a substantial contribution in this development, is awaiting a decision from the Government on this matter? If the Minister does not take the initiative in Europe, France or another country will do so, probably to our detriment.

Mr. Onslow: I cannot accept what the hon. Gentleman says. It has been generally recognised that the agreement that was achieved at this conference on the possible formation of a European space agency and rationalisation of expenditure within Europe was an important step forward which could in the long term have considerable industrial benefits.

Mr. Tebbit: Will my hon. Friend say whether the Government will back British participation in this project, which is surely the nub of the hon. Gentleman's Question?

Mr. Onslow: Our decision on this matter must depend on the outcome of discussions on the establishment of the agency and the extent to which arrangements can be made to rationalise European expenditure. These are matters which are to be considered by a working group which is due to report on 3rd March.

Mr. Dalyell: At the conference, what time scale was proposed for the European space agency?

Mr. Onslow: I do not think that any deadline was set, but naturally all concerned understand the need for pressing on.

Maplin

Mr. Tebbit: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what progress has been made towards the opening of Maplin airport to traffic by 1980.

Mr. Wilkinson: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what is his latest estimate of when he expects the first runway of the proposed airport on Maplin Sands to become operational.

Mr. Onslow: Is is our aim that Maplin airport should be operational by 1980. Action is proceeding in various fields which is would take too long to recapitulate here: but the forthcoming debate on the second reading of the Maplin Development Bill will enable the House to be given a full account of progress to date.

Mr. Wilkinson: Bearing in mind that airport facilities in the Midlands and the North, if properly developed, could have a big impact on the requirements for air transport in the South-East and since the Civil Aviation Authority is pursuing a comprehensive review of facilities in the Midlands and the North, to reduce capacity at an airport like Luton in the South-East can surely only add to the difficulties of the civil air transport industry.

Mr. Onslow: I am sure that due attention will be given to my hon. Friend's remarks, though I do not necessarily accept either of the bases on which he puts them forward.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Will my hon. Friend ensure that £1,000 million of public money is not committed to this project before he has good grounds for believing that the bird strike problems can be obviated? Is he aware that there are as


yet no grounds for believing this and that, in the absence of such knowledge, this project compares unfavourably with the Charge of the Light Brigade as an economic use of resources?

Mr. Onslow: I am sure that that was the last thought in the Earl of Cardigan's mind as he went down the valley. [HON. MEMBERS: "Birds?"] The economic use of resources. This is a point on which there is clearly room for disagreement, but my hon. Friend is mistaken in supposing that all the evidence necessarily lies one way. I am sure that my hon. Friend who answers from the Government Front Bench will look forward to hearing my hon. Friend's speech in the Second Reading debate.

Mr. Ford: I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop). Is the Minister aware that he and his Government might be more popular if they were to consider alternative solutions such as that now being considered by Japan in Osaka Bay for a floating airport or, alternatively, the development of an airport to serve the Midlands and the North as a third national airport in the East Midlands?

Mr. Onslow: I look forward to receiving a supplementary question from the hon. Gentleman on his Question No. 29 on the latter subject if we reach it. In reply to his suggestion of a floating airport, I think we had better make up our minds to stick to Maplin.

Mr. Adley: Is it not clear that the non-airport part of the costs, such as road and rail communications and the destruction of homes, will outweigh the cost of the construction of Foulness airport? Is it not strategic planning madness to take this decision before a final decision has been made on the Channel Tunnel?

Mr. Onslow: I think my hon. Friend is mistaken in believing that the decision on the airport could or should have been further postponed.

Mr. Mason: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House what is the latest total estimated cost of the development of the airport, the adjacent facilities and the communications?

Mr. Onslow: No doubt the right hon. Gentleman will be able to repeat that question in the Second Reading debate, when he will receive as accurate an

answer as can be given to him at that time.

Mr. Mason: What is the answer?

Mr. Onslow: The right hon. Gentleman must contain his impatience. If he is telling the House that he prefers not to take part in that debate, we shall understand his reluctance to stand up.

Ship Repairing (Southampton)

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he has completed his consideration of the matters raised at his meeting on 7th November with representatives of the Southampton ship-repair industry; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Chataway: As was announced to the House on 21st December, my Department is commissioning consultants to carry out a study of the United Kingdom ship-repair industry.—[Vol. 848, c. 446–7.]

Mr. Mitchell: When does the Minister expect to receive the report of that study? Is he aware of the special and immediate problems facing the ship-repair industry in Southampton, and will he ensure that any remedy his consultants suggest is not too late for Southampton?

Mr. Chataway: Certainly we will ensure that no time is wasted. We shall have the report by late May or early June.

Rolls-Royce

Mr. Whitehead: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry why the Government have not yet agreed with the liquidator a purchase price for the assets of Rolls-Royce Limited.

Mr. Onslow: Under the heads of agreement for the sale of the assets, the determination of the price is a matter between the receiver of Rolls-Royce Ltd. and Rolls-Royce (1971) Ltd. which have referred it to an independent expert.

Mr. Whitehead: I am sure that the Minister has seen Press reports that although the liquidator's asking price for assets was around £170 million, the latest offer from the company was only one quarter of that sum, too little to allow the shareholders to expect any return whatever. As we are at the second anniversary of the bankruptcy and as many creditors have not been paid, will not the Government acknowledge that the gap


is so wide that the independent assessor has a task which is almost beyond him?

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman has no right to draw that conclusion. The procedures which are now being followed were those agreed by all the parties to the selling of the assets, including the receiver. An independent expert has been appointed by the two sides to determine a fair price for the assets. Even though delay must involve hardship to outstanding creditors and shareholders, I cannot accept that the Government should intervene so that more than a fair price is paid. The size of the gap shows how inappropriate it would be for the Government to influence the matter.

Mr. Redmond: Is my hon. Friend aware that many firms, some in my constituency, are owed money by Rolls-Royce, which they require for investment in machine tools? Cannot this process be speeded up in the interests of the economy?

Mr. Onslow: There are firms which are in such a position in many constituencies throughout the country. My general experience is that they have been able to obtain assistance from banks and other sources in bridging the situation. If my hon. Friend has any cases which he wishes to draw to my attention. I shall be glad to meet him.

Heavy Water Reactors (Electricity Generation)

Mr. W. H. K. Baker: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what progress has been made with regard to the design and feasibility study of the use of steam generating heavy water reactors by electricity generating boards in the United Kingdom and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Tom Boardman: The nuclear design and construction companies have recently made joint proposals to my Department which are being urgently examined in consultation with the Atomic Energy Authority and the electricity generating boards.

Mr. Baker: Will my hon. Friend tell the House when the decision will be taken on the considerations which are being undergone at the moment? Does he agree that in view of the undoubted success of the prototype SGHWR, it would be better to press ahead with that rather than to

buy American, as some sources have suggested?

Mr. Boardman: The object of the review announced on 8th August was to enable all these matters to be evaluated over the 18-month period. I hope we shall be able to keep to that target, although it will depend on the number of generating boards wishing to place an order.

Mr. Palmer: Does the Minister agree that the steam generated heavy water reactor at Winfrith Heath as a prototype has been working satisfactorily for a number of years and could be used by any of the generating boards if there were the will to do so?

Mr. Boardman: Yes, it has been working very satisfactorily, but the hon. Gentleman will agree that further work is needed before it can be translated into a commercial reactor.

Motor Industry (Research)

Mr. Leslie Huckfield: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what proposals he has for increasing financial assistance for research in the car industry.

Mr. Chataway: I have no firm plans for increasing the financial assistance for specific research work in the car industry but my Department will continue to cooperate with the industry by financially supporting joint venture projects in appropriate circumstances.

Mr. Huckfield: As the Governments of many countries, including the United States, Japan and Sweden, seem to be using exhaust emission and safety regulations as a means of keeping British cars out of their markets, and as the British car industry makes a substantial contribution to the balance of payments, what endeavours does the Minister intend to make to help British car manufacturers to comply with these increased foreign regulations?

Mr. Chataway: There have been a number of grants to joint research projects from my Department. The Department of the Environment has also stepped up its work with the Motor Industry Research Association. We shall be prepared to look at further projects by that association. I believe that that is the best way to proceed.

CONCORDE AIRCRAFT

Mr. Benn: (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to make a statement on the current state of negotiations with Pan Am and other United States airlines which have taken out options to purchase Concorde; about the conversion of these options to firm orders; and on the discussions Her Majesty's Government have had with the United States Administration about landing rights for this aircraft in the United States of America.

The Minister for Aerospace and Shipping (Mr. Michael Heseltine): The manufacturers are in detailed negotiations with Pan American. Negotiations are also proceeding between the manufacturers and other American option holders. The manufacturers hope to convert these options into firm orders as soon as possible. The negotiations are, however, as the right hon. Member will appreciate, inevitably complex and detailed and it is not possible for me to indicate when they will result in firm decisions.
There has been a continuous series of discussions between British, French and American officials on Concorde matters. I also took the opportunity during my recent visit to the United States to discuss Concorde operations with members of the United States Administration. The United States authorities are now considering any further noise rules that should govern the operation of commercial aircraft in the United States of America.

Mr. Benn: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that answer, which obviously satisfies us that the statements that appeared in the Observer yesterday were quite inaccurate. The Opposition wish Sir George Edwards well in his mission and also hope that the negotiations with the American Government will be successful.
May I put two questions to the hon. Gentleman? First, as it would be absurd for temporary financial difficulties of Pan American or TWA or any other American airline to threaten the success of the project, are the Government ready to consider sympathetically special arrangements? Secondly, will the Minister represent in the strongest terms to the American Government that the British Government would not accept bans on

the landing of Concorde in the United States that were motivated either by the interests of the United States aircraft industry or as a by-product of a domestic American campaign to prevent them from building their own SST?

Mr. Heseltine: I can confirm to the right hon. Gentleman that the statements made in one of yesterday's newspapers to the effect that the negotiations had come to an end were a fabrication. The whole House will wish all the best of good fortune to Sir George Edwards and the team from British Aircraft Corporation and Rolls-Royce who are now in New York having discussions with Pan American. The temporary financial difficulties of Pan American are for the board of Pan American, and I do not think that I can give the sort of assurance that the right hon. Gentleman seeks.
As to the right hon. Gentleman's second question about the position of the United States Government, I said in my main answer that I had had discussions with various parts of the United States Administration and that I had made quite clear the importance that the British Government and the French Government attach to the Concorde project. The United States Administration are now considering their position in regard to any further noise regulations they may wish to introduce, and it is for them to reach their own decisions.

Mr. Adley: How far is my hon. Friend prepared to go with our European partners to defend the future of the European aerospace industry? Following his recent visit, does my hon. Friend think that if Concorde were an American aircraft the attitude of the United States airlines and of the financial institutions in America would be the same towards it or different?

Mr. Heseltine: It is not at all helpful to the team from the British Aircraft Corporation for us to become involved in speculation of that type. There is a commercial discussion going on, and I would rather leave it in the hands of the manufacturers.

Mr. Pardoe: In the Minister's discussions in America did he have discussions about the regulations governing overflying at supersonic speeds of the American airspace? Will the hon. Gentleman now give a categoric assurance that Concorde in service will never be allowed to fly


over any part of the United Kingdom at supersonic speeds?

Mr. Heseltine: The question of overflying American territory at supersonic speeds is a matter entirely for the American Government, who would have to make their own decisions in the light of any applications made to them by airlines that wished to do it. There is no intention on the part of the British flag carrier to do it. We have made it clear that in plenty of time for the introduction of commercial service by Concorde we will make up our minds about supersonic overflying in this country.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: Would it not be a distortion to suggest that whether Pan American delays its options will somehow cast a complete shadow over this project? Is it not true that this airline is in considerable financial difficulty which it has to see its way out of before it can place orders?

Mr. Heseltine: It is very helpful for my hon. Friend to make that point, but he will no doubt understand that it is unhelpful for me as the Minister responsible for the company involved in these negotiations to become involved in the details of wider discussions at this time.

Mr. Palmer: Will the Minister tell the House whether the United Kingdom is likely to manufacture Concorde in the future at the same rate as is proposed in France, the figures for which were recently given to the French Chamber of Deputies?

Mr. Heseltine: That is a totally different question.

ICELANDIC FISHERIES

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement.
The House will recall that during the ministerial talks on 27th and 28th November we suggested to the Icelandic Government that an interim settlement to our dispute about fisheries jurisdiction might be based on the reduction of the actual fishing effort by British vessels in the disputed waters. Full details of the negotiations have been given to the House, and the principal documents are available in the Library.
When I saw the Icelandic Foreign Minister at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 6th and 8th December, he said we had been talking of a total catch reduction of the order of 25 per cent. and asked me whether I could let him have a combination of effort limitation and area limitation having that effect. After consultations I provided him with a proposal, the effort limitation part of which would have in itself provided a 25 per cent. reduction in the 1971 level of catch, combined with restrictions on areas from which we normally take some 9 per cent. of our catch. I said that if the Icelandic Government were prepared to conclude an interim arrangement on this basis we would still be prepared to incorporate in any agreement our willingness not to fish in the proposed Icelandic nondiscriminatory conservation areas and, on a seasonal basis, small areas where there were concentrations of fixed gear.
I had had no reply to these proposals when harassment of our trawlers was resumed. On 29th December I sent the Icelandic Foreign Minister a message reminding him of the serious view we took of such interference with our vessels. I said that I hoped he would shortly be able to let us have a date for the resumption of negotiations and that there would meanwhile be no further harassment.
I regret to tell the House that the situation on the fishing grounds continued to deteriorate. Finally, on 19th January, six weeks after I had responded to Mr. Agustsson's request for effort limitation proposals, Her Majesty's Ambassador in Reykjavik was informed that the proposals had been discussed by the Icelandic Government which concluded that they were not acceptable and that a resumption of negotiations would not therefore be helpful, although the Icelandic Government would be ready to discuss new proposals. This message was accompanied by a memorandum restating the earlier Icelandic proposals, and commenting on their effect. I instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador in Reykjavik to see the Icelandic Foreign Minister and record my surprise that an offer which corresponded exactly with the request that he had himself put forward should have received this response. Her Majesty's Ambassador carried out these instructions this morning. In doing so he set out once more our view of the attempts


which the Icelandic Government have made to secure their objectives by the use of force in defiance of an interim order by the International Court of Justice and the responsibility which they bear for the dangerous situation which exists on the fishing grounds.
At the same time we recognise that there is room for doubt about the precise effect of either the British or the Icelandic proposals, and, in view of the Icelandic Government's expressed readiness to consider new proposals, I have suggested that discussions be resumed at an early date with the task of devising an arrangement which could reasonably be expected to leave us with 75 per cent. of our 1971 catch. I made it clear that our efforts to solve the dispute by the due process of law before the International Court of Justice would continue.
After consultations with the industry the Government have provided increased civilian support to our trawlermen and are ready to implement further measures if necessary. I should like to take this occasion to pay tribute to the exemplary behaviour of the commanders of our support vessels and of the skippers, officers and crews of British trawlers operating in extremely trying conditions. We will persevere in getting them a fair deal.

Mr. Crosland: May I first warmly endorse the tribute that the Foreign Secretary has paid to the skippers and crews of our trawlers? To say that they are operating under extremely trying conditions is something of an understatement. Conditions are extremely dangerous and are now nearly intolerable, as can be seen from the explosive reaction by the trawlermen at the end of last week at Grimsby, Hull and the other fishing ports. May I warmly welcome the statement that the Government are actively studying further measures by which they might give support, because it must be clear that the most immediate priority is to protect the trawlers from harassment. As I have said before in the House, there will be a serious loss of life if the harassment continues.
The sending of the tug "Statesman" has aroused some scepticism in the fishing ports, as the Foreign Secretary knows. I am prepared to reserve judgment on it, but is it not a curious and undignified feature that the "Statesman", intended

to protect our trawlers, is under Liberian registration? Will the Foreign Secretary explain how this comes to be the case?
As to the main part of the statement, the central point, if I read it correctly, is the apparent refusal of the Icelandic Government to continue negotiations for an interim settlement. The right hon. Gentleman quotes the Icelandic Government as saying that the resumption of negotiations would not be very helpful. In spite of this extraordinarily curt and cold reaction, the Foreign Secretary can count on the support of the Opposition in his attempt to resume negotiations because at the end of the day we want a peaceful settlement. If his attempt to resume negotiations fails and if we are faced, as we shall be, with a "cod war" likely to last over a year until after the Law of the Sea Conference, we shall then face a completely new situation in which the House will have to reconsider once again the question of full naval protection.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. Our first task is, as he says, to protect our fishing boats from harassment. I believe the best way to do so as of today, because the situation may change tomorrow, is to send the support ship "Statesman". It is registered under the Liberian flag but it is chartered by a company in this country and we are acting in this strictly in accordance with the international rules of seamanship. This vessel was the only one which we had available at short notice. It can be replaced but if necessary, of course, the Navy will have to intervene. I believe this course of action to be the best at present, however. We have unequivocally condemned the Icelandic Government's behaviour. They have refused to take part in the proceedings at the International Court. They are trying to achieve their object by force, and I find it hard to believe that a responsible Western European Government and a NATO ally should behave in this way. We are behaving strictly in accordance with international law.

Mr. W. H. K. Baker: What is the position with regard to West Germany and its vessels off Iceland? What co-operation is there with West Germany? Will my right hon. Friend not agree that the overriding essential requirement is a just and equitable settlement achieved as soon as


possible and will he say what support the industry will be given next before the Navy is called in? There is a great deal of what I believe to be justifiable uneasiness at the present state of affairs off Iceland.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Our cooperation with the Germans is very close, and we shall continue to keep in the closest touch with them and to act together where possible. We are proceeding in consultation with, and with the agreement of, the industry, and up to today it has approved the action we have taken. We will if necessary send the Navy to the support of our vessels, but I think that everybody in the industry is conscious of how dangerous it would be to start another "cod war". There may be no alternative but we must try to avoid it if we can.

Mr. Grimond: We welcome the Foreign Secretary's attempt to secure a negotiated agreement with the Icelandic authorities, and we regret their rejection of these attempts. Will he tell us more about the tug? To whom does it belong? Who has chartered it? What is the nationality of the crew, and what is its job? Are there no British naval vessels capable of doing the job?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Yes, there are British naval vessels capable of doing the job, but once we begin to use the Navy for protection that is the beginning of what, for short, I would call a "cod war". The vessel, which is under the Liberian flag, is chartered; but it is chartered, controlled, crewed and captained by Britons. The task of the vessel is to interpose itself between the Icelandic gunboats and the British vessels and to protect them as best it can. It is very well suited for this task, according to the information we have. If necessary the Navy will have to be used.

Mr. James Johnson: I accept completely the Minister's good faith and sincerity in all his actions. Is he aware, however, that there is not a single skipper or deckhand sailing out of the Humber who is not sad, to put it politely, about the stagnation of the Government's policy in this matter? Is he aware that even if these men last out in the 21 hours of darkness in the Arctic day over the next six weeks until better weather comes, they will still be in exactly the same position if nothing is done? So they want to

know what the Government intend to do. Either the skippers will come out, as they have threatened by cable today, which would be a concession to Iceland and an acceptance of the 50-mile limit, or if they stay and if the Navy does not go in to protect them, that is also a de facto concession under international law to the Icelandic case.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The House can understand the position of the skippers. As the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland) said, they are being subjected to horrible harassment by the Icelandic gunboats. It is very difficult for them to take the appropriate decision themselves. All we can do is to keep in the closest touch with the industry, which we are doing from day to day. The industry has supported the decision that we are taking. We will, if necessary, send the Navy in——

Mr. George Cunningham: When?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: —and we have warned the Icelandic Government that we will send the Navy in if necessary. The hon. Member asks when we will do this. The answer must be: when the industry and the Government together are agreed that the right moment has come.

Mr. Wellbeloved: Is it not quite disgraceful in the face of a blatant attempt to hound British seafarers off the high seas that all that this pathetic Government can do is to send a foreign-owned tug to try to maintain the interest of one of the greatest seafaring nations in the world? Will the Foreign Secretary recall that at least the policemen sent to Anguilla took their truncheons with them?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: May I recall to the hon. Gentleman that when the British policemen took their truncheons to Anguilla the peace was kept and the operation was successful? I hope that we shall not have to resort to naval intervention, but it may come. The hon. Gentleman talks about "this pathetic Government", but I do not know that his own party if it were in Government now would take any different position. We are in consultation with the industry, which has agreed with our policy. We had better stick to that for the moment.

Mr. McNamara: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a lot of this prospective


cutlass-rattling that we are hearing this afternoon is giving part of the game to the Icelandic Government? Does he agree that we should seek, as far as possible, the support of a civilian peacekeeping force on the lines that the industry owners, Government and the unions have agreed upon?
Following from that, a number of points arise. The first is this. If the "Statesman" should prove successful, will there be sufficient vessels to shadow the five Icelandic gunboats? Secondly, if the men's earnings are adversely affected by the policy being adopted, can the Government give them a guarantee, even in these times of high settlings, that their wages will be protected?
I return to the Liberian vessel. I am surprised we have not got one on the Beira patrol. If, as we understand is the case, the charterers are responsible for the safety and security of the crew what happens if a Liberian ship under charter to Her Majesty's Government is involved in an incident with an Icelandic gunboat? Who deals with the incident first, the Liberian Government or the British Government? Is it not pathetic that the best that we can do is to charter from a flag of convenience one little tug with which to protect our fishermen?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: There are other vessels, but we had to take action speedily and this was the vessel best suited for the purpose nearest at hand. Although the vessel technically sails under the Liberian flag it is controlled and managed in this country and is British crewed. We are in touch with the Liberian Government about this. I see no reason why this vessel should not act in the capacity in which it has been sent.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. James Prior): Following exchanges through the usual channels, the business for Wednesday and Thursday has been re-arranged as follows:
WEDNESDAY, 24TH JANUARY—Debate on the second stage of the Programme for Controlling Inflation, on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
THURSDAY, 25TH JANUARY—Supply (5th allotted day). The Question will be

proposed on outstanding Winter Supplementary Estimates.
A debate on Steel, which will arise on an Opposition motion.
It may be helpful, Mr. Speaker, if I mention some other matters.
First, on Monday 29th January it is proposed to take the Second Reading of the Counter-Inflation Bill and an Order in Council made under the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Act.
Second, I hope to include the Bill and motions previously announced for Thursday in the business for the next two weeks.
Third, the House will wish to know that the Supplementary Estimates published in December will be the subject of an additional Consolidated Fund Bill, which I expect to bring before the House next week.

Mr. Harold Wilson: Since we have tabled a motion on steel for the Supply Day on Thursday, will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that this announcement in no way affects the undertaking of the Government to provide Government time for a debate on steel as soon as the long-awaited White Paper is published? Is he aware that the House had to wait a long time because of successive postponements of both the oral statement and the White Paper? Does he accept that we shall expect an early White Paper and a debate in Government time immediately thereafter?

Mr. Prior: I hope that the White Paper will be published within a reasonable period. I fully accept the undertaking I gave to the House that there will be a debate on this subject in Government time.

Mr. Marten: Does my right hon. Friend recall that on 20th December last year he told me in the Adjournment debate that the European Communities legislation which affected this country under Section 2 of the Act would be available in the Vote Office before the House re-assembled? Is he aware that I went there at 10 o'clock this morning to find that there is not one piece of paper available from the European Community? May we have a statement from him, perhaps this week or, if not, early next week, explaining how this has happened and what steps we are taking to get that material—which must have been ready in Europe on 1st January—to this


country? Could he also incorporate in that statement a statement on the legal situation whereby we are subjected to the laws and regulations of the Community but do not know what they are? How can we obey them?

Mr. Prior: My hon. Friend gave me notice that he would go to the Vote Office on, I believe, 1st January. I said that I thought 2nd January might be more appropriate. A number of texts have been delayed, first of all by a strike in Luxembourg—[Laughter]—but, unfortunately, much more so by a strike here. Although the majority of texts are now available in Luxembourg, their general distribution in this country has been prevented by industrial action in Her Majesty's Stationery Office distribution centre in London. We are endeavouring to get round that, at least for the House, by arranging for a number of copies of the relevant authentic English texts to be sent straight from Luxembourg to the House. Unfortunately, until the industrial dispute is over these will not be readily available for the country as a whole. I would like to consider the legal implications further and perhaps make a statement later on.

Mr. Mackintosh: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Standing Committee dealing with the Scottish Local Government Bill is due to meet tomorrow and that we would appreciate a delay? The right hon. Gentleman will be aware from correspondence that there is considerable disquiet in Scotland in that three of the eight regions being set up and legislated for in greater detail in the Bill are unrepresented on the Committee. Is he aware that some regions have three, four, five, even seven, members on the Committee, yet three regions have no members at all? Does he appreciate that this will mean that a Bill of great detail will not be adequately discussed if this membership is persisted in?

Mr. Prior: This is a matter for the Committee of Selection. The actual number of Members attending the Committee is a different issue which was dealt with before Christmas.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Does my right hon. Friend recall assuring us before Christmas that he would try to ensure that we had a debate on the Public Expenditure White Paper before Christ-

mas? While we understand why it was desirable to delay this, may I ask him to accept, in view of the early date announced for the Budget, that we need to have at least one day for debate well in advance of the Budget?

Mr. Prior: I accept what my hon. Friend says. I hope that we shall have one day to start with in the next week or two and perhaps a second day later on, which would meet the wishes of the Expenditure Committee.

Mr. Grimond: May I strongly support what has been said by the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh)? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this should be a matter of concern to him? Is he further aware that people outside this House do not understand the subtleties about Committees? All they know is that this is a vital matter for Scotland and that three of the most important regions are not represented at all. Does he realise that it does this House no good whatever to allow this to continue?

Mr. Prior: While I accept what the right hon. Gentleman has said, I must point out that there will be plenty of other occasions for hon. Members in all parts of the House and from all the regions of Scotland to put their views. This is particularly so with the Report stage.

Dr. Dickson Mabon: May I ask whether on Monday 29th January the right hon. Gentleman or his colleagues intend to put down a motion that the Counter-Inflation Bill be referred to a Committee of the whole House, and may we be assured that there will be no guillotine on the Bill?

Mr. Prior: We shall have to decide this matter in the next few days. My view at the moment is that this is a suitable Bill for taking upstairs.

Mr. Tugendhat: Does the Leader of the House agree that all the precedents of the Labour Government suggest that this kind of Bill is usually taken upstairs, and that certainly they did so on comparable occasions?

Mr. Prior: Yes, that is true.

Mr. Dalyell: What has become of the Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Bill, which was scheduled for Thursday? If it is to be delayed, will the right hon. Gentleman ask the Secretary of State for Defence to reconsider his


refusal of the request of some of us to visit the non-classified parts of Aldermaston before discussion of the Bill, because if we are to consider the Bill at all it would at least seem sensible that some of us should see on the ground the non-classified parts of Aldermaston which have been refused to us?

Mr. Prior: I shall certainly refer the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's question to my right hon. Friend. On the first part, I have announced in my statement that the business which would have been taken on Thursday will be taken within the next two weeks.

AFRICAN ASIANS

Mr. Iremonger: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
the imminent advent into this country of further numbers of Asian British passport holders from African nations.
In determining whether the matter is proper to be so discussed, Mr. Speaker, the Standing Orders of the House require you to have regard to the extent to which it concerns the administrative responsibilities of a Minister of the Crown. I respectfully submit that this criterion is doubly satisfied.
First, the Home Secretary has, and will continue to have, responsibility for the reception and accommodation of refugees when they arrive; and, secondly, the Foreign Secretary has a grave and urgent responsibility, since it is for him to try, through the United Nations or in direct negotiation with other Governments, to get responsibility for refugees from African nations accepted as an international responsibility comparable to that which is accepted in respect of refugees from other oppressive régimes.
In determining whether the matter is urgent, the Standing Order requires you, Mr. Speaker, to have regard to the probability of the matter being brought before the House in time by other means. In considering that point it might be helpful to ask how much notice and how much chance the House had of discussing the sudden decision taken by the Ugandan Government on a previous occasion when African Asians were catapulted

into our land. There are clear and serious warnings in national newspapers published over the weekend to the effect that similar sudden action is in contemplation by the Government of Kenya, and there is nothing in the Business Statement to suggest that the matter will be brought before the House in time.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member was kind enough to give me notice of his intention to make this application.
I have said in many similar situations before that my decsion does not reflect on the merits of the matter. It is purely a procedural decision whether I should give the application precedence over the business of the House already announced.
I am afraid that I cannot accede to the application.

TELEVISION INTERVIEW

Mr. Biggs-Davison: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
the Independent Television interview of yesterday with Mr. David O'Connell, a leading member of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army contrary to the Television Act and to the detriment of good relations with the Irish Republic.
I shall explain my application in the space of about a minute. The matter specifically discloses the failure of the Independent Broadcasting Authority to discharge the duty laid upon it by Parliament, under Section 3(1) of the Television Act 1964, in that the programme was clearly offensive to public feeling, particularly among those who have served and suffered in Northern Ireland.
The matter is urgent from the point of view of British policy and interests because it is damaging to our relationship with Dublin at the outset of the new European partnership and at a time when Mr. O'Connell, a leader of an illegal organisation, is sought by those who are responsible for the security of the Irish Republic and, therefore, share the concern of this House for the peace of the British Isles.

Mr. Speaker: I have listened carefully to what the hon. Member has said. The Standing Order forbids my giving my reasons for acceding to or rejecting an application of this sort. Sometimes I


regret that fact. However, I have considered very carefully what the hon. Member has said, but I cannot accede to his application.

STANDING COMMITTEES (MEMBERSHIP)

Mr. David Steel: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I seek your guidance on the activities of the Committee of Selection under Standing Order No. 62(2) which provides:
In nominating such Members the Committee of Selection shall have regard to the qualifications of those Members nominated and to the composition of the House.
As has already been stated, the Standing Committee dealing with the Local Government (Scotland) Bill was published on the eve of the Christmas Recess and there has been no opportunity to make representations direct to the Committee of Selection since then. Apart from the point which has already been made, that three of the eight regions are not represented on the Committee—nor, for that matter, are the island districts set up under the Bill—there is a party point, that of the 30 Scottish Members out of the 71 Members serving on the Committee there is not one of the three Liberal Members. There is also an individual point in the case of my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Mr. Russell Johnston), the only Member of this House who served on the Royal Commission on Local Government, who is still available to serve on the Committee and has, I should think, exceptional qualifications so to serve. My point is to ask how Members who feel a distinct grievance in this matter can seek redress.

Mr. Mackintosh: Further to that point of order. I hoped it would be possible to obtain this redress or an opportunity of raising it between the resumption of the House today and the first meeting of the Committee tomorrow. As the hon. Gentleman said, the selection was not announced until the Christmas Recess. Therefore, we have only 24 hours in which to make our points before the Committee starts to operate. In reply to the point mentioned by the Leader of the House, I have here a series of letters from Ministers which say "These are points which we hope you will raise during the Committee stage of the Bill". Yet we are not able to do so because

Members representing the entire region are not on the Committee.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) gave me notice that he would raise this point of order. I have had an opportunity of considering it. It is not a matter for the Chair. My predecessors have deprecated the habit of the Chair being asked to give public guidance. I have considered the Standing Orders carefully, but there is nothing I could have done under them about this matter. If the hon. Gentleman needs private advice on how to proceed, we will, of course, do our best. However, it is not a matter for the Chair in public session of the House.

CARLISLE AND DISTRICT STATE MANAGEMENT SCHEME

Mr. Ron Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. One of the characteristics of the present Government is their continued success in bypassing this House and its Members.
On Thursday 4th January I received a telephone call asking whether I would be at home on Friday 5th January to receive a very confidential and important letter from the Home Office. I replied that I would be at home, and I looked forward to receiving this letter on the Friday. Unfortunately, no letter came. I waited for the second post to arrive, but still no letter came.
In the meantime I received several telephone messages asking whether I would care to comment on the Home Office's decision to sell off the Carlisle State Management Scheme. I replied that I could not comment because I had not seen any details.
My point of order is whether it is possible—I am glad the Prime Minister is here, because I have written to him about this matter—when anything like this happens, although I hope that it will not happen again, for Members of this House to be treated in the same way as the Press; that is, that they will receive a copy well in advance with the embargo that the Press has received. That would certainly have saved me considerable embarrassment. Unfortunately, it took two days for a first-class letter to reach my home, which is about 150 miles from here. This is absolutely shocking and disgraceful and certainly an insult to my constituents.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member has raised what he describes as a point of order and I have listened patiently to him. He treats me with courtesy, and I try to do the same to him, but the matter that he has raised is not a point of order. It is a matter which should be raised with those in authority. It has nothing to do with the Standing Orders which I have to administer. The hon. Member has made his point, but it is not a point of order.

Later——

Mr. Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I gave notice to your office that I wished to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 in order to discuss the important matter of the sale of the Carlisle and District State Management Scheme.

Mr. Speaker: We are long past that stage, I am afraid. The hon. Member chose to raise a point of order. He did not make his application at the proper time.

Mr. Lewis: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I gave your office due notice that I wished to raise a point of order and also to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9. Something has gone wrong.

Mr. Speaker: Something certainly went wrong, because I am told that the hon. Member gave notice at 2.20 p.m. If the hon. Gentleman looks at the Standing Order he will find that the notice must be given before 12 o'clock.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

4.11 p.m.

Mr. Airey Neave: I beg to move,
That this House takes note of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Reports from the Select Committee on Science and Technology in the last Session of Parliament and of the relevant Government Observations (Command Paper Nos. 5176 and 5177).
I should like to thank my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House for finding time for this debate today because the Select Committee, of which I am Chairman, heard evidence over a long period and worked very hard to produce these four reports. I thank also all my colleagues for the part that they played. I shall refer to some of them individually in a moment, and I regret that some of

them are prevented from taking part in this debate.
It is an important precedent that we are debating these reports within a reasonable period after their publication. The last occasion on which I took part in a debate on a report from a Select Committee—it was on defence research—was two-and-a-half years after the event, and on that account all of us have found it rather difficult to make our speeches.
This inquiry into research and development began a long time ago with the evidence of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science—whom I am glad to see in her place—in May 1971 and the then Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Mr. David Price). The evidence, which we took over a period, lasted until May 1972. Altogether we published six reports on research and development—four in the last Session, which are the subject of this motion, while the other two, which were published in 1971, are history.
Besides thanking my colleagues, I should like to thank the witnesses for all the information that they provided to the Select Committee. I do not think that all of them enjoyed the experience. Indeed, judging from the debate in another place, they certainly did not, because there I was described by a noble earl as a modern Torquemada, and there have been references to the Nuremburg Trial. But I assure the House that we are as courteous as possible to our witnesses and that we do not employ the methods employed at Nuremburg.
I should like also to take this opportunity of thanking the two Clerks who had to work very hard over a long period of fairly intensive investigations into this wide-ranging subject of research and development.
At the same time as the Committee was studying the subject of the reports being debated today it was studying the computer industry and the prospects for the nuclear industry, and this it will continue to do in this Session. I should like in this connection to accord particular thanks to the hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer), my predecessor, who laid the foundations for what I think has been the success of this Select Committee, as he was the first Chairman when it began in 1967.
The House will be sad today not to see in his place my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke). There has been good news of his progress, and I saw him last week. He is held in great affection by both sides of the House, and his views are respected. I have consulted him about the Government's observations on our four reports. He agrees with a number of the things that I am going to say, and I wish to put his point of view on a number of matters. In particular, he profoundly disagrees with the Government's decision on the Nature Conservancy. He regards it as an extraordinary decision. Like the hon. Member for Bristol, Central, my hon. Friend was a founder member of the Select Committee.
This Committee has a number of purposes to which I should like to refer shortly before I deal with the reports and the Government's observations. First, it seeks to form non-scienific judgments based on the best evidence, which it hears in public, and to provide information to Parliament and to the public and, above all, a dialogue with the Government on scientific subjects. On research and development we sought also—perhaps for the first time in this form—to give an opportunity to all scientists and research workers to state their views on the proposals put forward in the Green Paper by the Government and by Lord Rothschild on their behalf. There was a great deal of hard work in this, and I should like to thank all concerned for what they did.
The first thing that we tried to do when we began in January 1972—exactly a year ago—was to discover what processes of thought lay behind the Green Paper. Cmnd. 4814, "Framework for Government Research and Development", published in November, 1971, and generally known as the Rothschild Report. It also contained a report by Sir Frederick Dainton. The debate at that time, both in the coloumns of The Times and in scientific newspapers, surrounded the research councils, but we in the Select Committee decided to widen our inquiry to include Government policy for research and development as a whole, and in view of what has been said about the correct interpretation of Lord Rothschild's report I believe that to have been the right decision. Our comments in these four

reports, and particularly on Lord Rothschild's method of inquiry and the Government's attitude to the Rothschild Report, are outspoken—I do not think that anybody would deny that—and our recommendations cause some controvery.
No one on the Select Committee would suppose that we always ask the right questions, and we often receive some curious answers, but it has to be remembered that our proceedings are the proceedings of the House. They are the proceedings of Parliament. Our reports are the property of Parliament, and in July 1972 we were obliged to remind Ministers and civil servants in no uncertain fashion that these are reports to Parliament and that Ministers and the Civil Service are responsible to Parliament.
It could not for one moment be suggested that we are always in conflict with the Executive. We seek to provide a dialogue on scientific and technological matters. For this reason it would be best if I were to start with our second and third reports and the Government's observations in their White Paper at December 1972, Cmnd. 5176.
I should like, first, to thank my hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for setting out their answers to our recommendations in a lucid form which is easy to follow. In future it will be useful to have an index setting out these observations. I have had letters from scientific librarians asking the Select Committee to consider making an index for its own reports, which such libraries would find useful. I hope that we shall also manage to abolish the traditional method of including minutes of proceedings in our published reports. Such minutes bear no relevance to the evidence that has been taken and upon which we are reporting. The Press, especially the New Scientist, has often drawn our attention to that matter in our news conferences. An index would be useful in both cases. Otherwise the Department of Trade and Industry's observations in Command 5146 are set out in a helpful way.
Members of the Select Committee will be glad to hear that the Government agreed with their views on the non-nuclear work by the Atomic Energy Authority.


We are glad to hear that there will be an increasing amount of that work on a non-nuclear basis and that it will appear in future on a Vote. That was the main recommendation of the Committee.
There was another recommendation to which the hon. Member for Bristol, Central will no doubt wish to refer. The hon. Gentleman was the Chairman of the Sub-Committee which considered that matter—namely, the establishment of an industrial advisory committee. I am not clear why the Government have rejected the Committee's recommendation, which I consider useful. Harwell, which is in my constituency, was the centre of these considerations. I was glad that the Select Committee firmly rejected the view that we can dispense with Government research centres of that importance. Indeed, it firmly rejected the glib and uninformed view that appeared in some quarters that industry can do all its own research. That is completely untrue in any industrialised European country. It was untrue when these observations were made, some two or three years ago. A programme of Government research and development will have to be maintained by the United Kingdom if it is to remain competitive in the next 25 years. That is one of the main themes behind some of the recommendations of the Select Committee.
Paragraphs 11 to 24 of the observations of the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping seek to answer the Committee's point that industrial research establishments of his own Department—for example, the NPL, the NEL and Warren Spring—should exploit their services and be more competitive and independent. That was the view of the Select Committee.
The White Paper describes the way in which the establishments should transfer their technology in what I should describe as a useful but rather tame way. I do not find the description to be invigorating. For example, it is suggested that their work could be done through publication, personal contact and advisory and consultancy services.
I should like to see the laboratories much more enterprising than they are now. Why should they not do some hard selling? Why should they not put full-page advertisements in the Financial

Times telling industry what they can offer? That gap between industry and the establishments worried the Committee a great deal. We are told that it will be reformed by the departmental requirement boards.
The requirements boards constitute a radical change in the Department of Trade and Industry. The Select Committee will want to watch their progress. Several other Select Committees of this House are involved in their possible reports and activities. I should like to know how the requirements boards will report to Parliament. Will copies be sent to the Select Committees?
The Select Committee on Science and Technology, as the House will be aware, has been concerned about unnecessary secrecy and publicity regarding research and development. The Committee, if I may say so, did a good service in 1972 in bringing to light some unnecessary secrecy in Government Departments regarding the publication of reports that can and should be used by Select Committees, and that should be considered by hon. Members, the public and those interested in industry and science.
Publication of reports commissioned by the Government was recently highlighted by a special report which the Sub-Committee made in December 1972 when it published the Docksey Report on intervention as an appendix. It arose during the course of taking evidence on research and development—the evidence of my right hon. Friend who was then the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The failure to publish the Docksey Report is relevant to the recommendations which the Committee made in its First and Fourth reports.
I have said on several occasions that I condemn the practice of unnecessary secrecy in Government Departments. I especially condemn it in research and development, which merits the widest communication and dissemination of Government policy. The Docksey Report raises particularly important matters which should have been the subject of a separate debate. It raises issues of great constitutional moment in the Special Report. The Committee said that Select Committees of this House should be given reports unless there were unusual and compelling reasons, such as confidentiality in the commercial sense, and


security. At no time has it wished to impair the need for Ministers to receive confidential advice. It would be absurd to do so. There must be occasions when Ministers commission reports which must remain confidential. However, I feel that the issue should be developed further on another occasion.
Therefore, I welcome the Government's statement in the July 1972 White Paper. Although that is not the subject of the debate, I consider that it should take a part in the discussion. In Cmnd. 5046, the White Paper "Framework for Government Research and Development", the Government say that they agree, at paragraph 11 that
…at present neither Parliament nor the public is given sufficient information about departmental research and development programmes.
That was the view of the Select Committee over a long period.
I am glad that the Government put that into their first White Paper, Cmnd. 5046, in July 1972. The method of inquiry which they adopted in 1971 into research and development and into its organisation will, I sincerely hope, not be followed in future. The Committee deplore the way in which discussion on the Green Paper, which contained the famous Rothschild Report, was impaired and prejudiced by a Government statement of policy in advance. The Government wrote a preface to the Green Paper saying that they endorsed the customer-contractor principle without giving any reasons. I do not want to go over that ground again. I hope that the Government will not follow that practice in future.
The Government, in reply to our First and Fourth Reports, at paragraph 3, Command 5177, state the rather curious principle that some Green Papers are greener than others. This one was said in some circles to have had a white border when it was first introduced. Hon. Members will understand what that meant. The Government stated that they endorsed the principle which we were supposed to be discussing and on which they had promised consultation. However, my colleagues and I take the view that the Government should not promise consultation and then rule out discussion by their preface to the Green Paper. That is one

reason why the Select Committee decided to carry out an inquiry over a considerable period, namely a year, and to hold it in public. That was why we undertook to do that in addition to the duty which had been laid upon us to provide the Government with information and to give scientists, research workers and people in the centres the opportunity to state their views.
The White Paper, "Framework tot Government Research and Development", published in July 1972, as Command 5046, which purported to be the Government's decisions on the Green Paper, ignored the Select Committee's recommendations. I do not wish to go over this unfortunate affair for too long. The situation was only saved by the Lord Privy Seal appearing again before the Select Committee to announce that answers would be given in full—and indeed they have been. We certainly do not complain that they have not been given in full, and we are grateful for them, not that one accepts all the statements which have been made, but at least the dialogue is taking place, and this in itself is very considerable progress and a great asset to the understanding of science and technology in this House.
I now turn to the White Paper, Command 5177, containing the Government's observations on the First and Fourth Reports of the Select Committee. Again I thank my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House for the way in which the White Paper was prepared, particularly for the index. A combination of both White Papers with an index would be the best way, setting out the recommendations first and then the answers, as was done by the Department of Trade and Industry. I suggest that this could also have been done in the White Paper Command 5177.
The First and Fourth Reports of the Select Committee were controversial. So, too, to a certain extent, as my right hon. Friend will agree, are the Government's observations. They reveal a substantial difference of opinion between the Committee and the Government as to what organisation, ministerially and otherwise, and what policies there should be in the coming years for research and development, especially Government research and development.
The Select Committee was looking to the future and saw the need for coordination of research and development under a Minister. The Government, on the other hand, appear from their observations to prefer their own existing organisation. This is an important subject for debate because it has tremendous implications for the future, but before I launch into it I should refer to a number of answers to our recommendations on other questions.
The first of these concerns research councils. Again I do not want to go over the battle of the winter of 1971–72, which took place in the columns of The Times and in other places. It was very interesting but not always entirely conclusive. I refer now to paragraph 24 of the White Paper containing the Government's observations on the first and fourth reports. My hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely, with whom I spoke last week, is very displeased indeed at the decision to abolish the Nature Conservancy Committee of the Natural Environment Research Council and to establish a new Conservancy Council. Like me, he thinks this decision very extraordinary. I hope that note will be taken of what I am saying.
Two or three years ago the Select Committee—the hon. Member for Bristol, Central will recall the exact date—recommended that research and conservancy should stay together. But here we have a situation now in which the Nature Conservancy is to be separated from its supporting laboratories. I do not understand the reasons for this decision. I hope that it is not true that the chief officials of the two bodies have fallen out, if that has anything to do with it. There are rumours. I hope that this matter will be taken up during the debate and that the recommendations of my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely, which were, of course, the recommendations of the whole Committee at the time, will be seriously considered.
I turn now to the famous Table 4 of the Rothschild Report. This concerns paragraphs 27 and 28 of the White Paper. We were not able to discover what Table 4 really meant—certainly I did not. How far has implementation actually gone? What will be the final amount transferred from the Vote of the

Secretary of State for Education and Science? We were not able to find out the arithmetic on which the figures were based. We interviewed a large number of witnesses but they managed to avoid telling us. I wonder whether this was a divine inspiration of Lord Rothschild or whether there really was something behind it on which the figures were based.
I do not intend to revise the narrow battleground of last winter, when Lord Rothschild defended his position against the scientific world and did so very ably. The Select Committee would like to thank him for his assistance in coming and giving evidence. But we should ask a few questions about this subject, which is all-important in relation to future policies.
Paragraph 29 of the White Paper refers to the Advisory Board for the Research Councils. What will this board do? I have never been in favour of a board for research councils, because if the research councils are to be strengthened, as indicated in the White Paper, as a result of the recommendations of the Select Committee, and if they are to do their job properly, why do we need an advisory board for them? I hope that my right hon. Friend will look at this point.
Paragraph 33 of the White Paper refers to the reports of the research councils. We look forward with anticipation to these reports in their new form and hope that they will be more informative than in the past.
I turn now to the Fulton Report. The Select Committee had a good deal to say about the future of scientists and the need for greater interchange of scientific talents. The White Paper "Framework for Research and Development", Cmnd. 5046, refers in paragraph 39 to a small high-level task force which has been set up for this purpose and to investigate how it can best be carried out between industry and the research establishments. Will the report be published? We shall press strongly for publication because this is one issue about which the staff of these establishments and industry are most concerned. There is every need for the report to see the light of day and, if necessary, to be discussed in this House.
The White Paper containing the Government's observations on the First and Fourth Reports deals with the future reporting of research and development to


Parliament in paragraphs 40 to 46. It is suggested in the White Paper that the Departments should lump their reports together—into one consolidated report, I suppose; at least that is how I read those paragraphs. I hope that this decision will be looked at again. The reports should be separate documents. The Departments should not mix their reports with others. With the number of reports we have to read during our investigations, whether as members of the Select Committee or otherwise, we often find it intolerably difficult to trace them all. Will all these reports be laid before Parliament? We recommended that they should all be laid before Parliament in the future.
Finally, I turn to the question of reporting Government programmes to the House, to which I attach great importance in the interests of scientists and research workers all over the country. They study what we say here with great concern and interest. Paragraph 41 of the White Paper refers to a five-year rolling programme. The Confederation of British Industry, in its evidence to the Select Committee, recommended the system of five-year forecasting. We adopted that recommendation, suggesting a five-year rolling programme of research and development expenditure, and said that it should be published. The Government say in the White Paper that flexibility is required and that they do not want to lay down a hard and fast rule. But surely a five-year rolling programme is a flexible instrument, which is why we recommended it. I suggest that we should adopt this system and publish the programme.
I was also glad to see that the Government propose a wide interpretation of the customer-contractor principle. This, I think, we wish to see. We were not sure how it would apply to the research councils, and even now we are not sure how it will be done. We do not want to see bureaucratic control creeping towards the system of research in this country beyond what is absolutely necessary for accountability, especially parliamentary accountability. We do not want to see the customer-contractor principle doing any injury to, above all, university research.
Those are my views on those aspects of the White Papers, and I now come to what I regard as the really important

issue—the organisation of Government policy for research and development in the future as expressed in the Select Committee Reports.
I have already said that big research and development programmes will be needed by all advanced European industrial countries for competing in world markets in the next generation, and it is the long-term interests that the Select Committee had in mind.
Similar discussions to the one which I am initiating today, resembling the dialogue between the Committee and Her Majesty's Government, are taking place in Europe and, indeed, in all advanced industrial countries. Paragraph 17 of the White Paper agrees that the European Economic Community is seeking a
comprehensive Community policy on scientific research and technoogical development.
The Council of Europe discussed this matter last year, as those who read the report of its Science Committee will see, and it has taken the view that all industrialised nations should recognise the need to expand research in the interests of social progress and the development of technologies for economic needs.
We are in the same position. The whole discussion about whether we should have a Minister for Research and Development, supported by a Council for Science and Technology, as advocated by the Select Committee, must be considered in that context. If the Government agree that there has to be a Community policy for research and development, surely they also have to consider having a national policy themselves, which at present they do not appear to have? Surely they will ultimately need a Minister and an advisory council to initiate that policy? I put these points to my right hon. Friend in the knowledge that we cannot resolve all of them today; it is a long-term matter, but it is extremely important.
In their three White Papers the Government have replied that their system is based on the functional responsibilities of Departments, that research and development is a departmental matter, that they do not look at it as an entity or as a national matter, and that they are satisfied, apparently, with the existing machinery. This is certainly not the view of the Select Committee, and it puts its


case, as I think hon. Members will agree, pretty sharply.
Elsewhere in Europe we found the same doubts being raised as were raised by the Committee. In the German Federal Republic, the Federal Minister for Education and Science has recently drawn attention to the need for co-ordination of the main areas of research, and the German policy documents view research policy as part of their overall policy. For example, in Germany a Research Policy Advisory Committee similar to the Council advocated by the Select Committee—the Committee had Europe in mind when it made this recommendation—is presided over by the Minister I mentioned, in the same way as the Select Committee advocated that a Minister for Research and Development in this country should be Chairman of a Council for Science and Technology.
In Belgium a Minister Without Portfolio is responsible—this is important because these other countries are moving in the same direction as that advocated by the Select Committee—for co-ordinating the activities of departments involved in science policy.
I do not suggest that we should slavishly follow the system in other countries or that the circumstances are identical. I am merely saying that if we are to be a competing nation in the next 25 years, we shall have bigger and more important national and international research programmes which cannot be effectively carried out without the proper mechanism and machinery.
In France there is a Minister of Industrial and Scientific Development. This is interesting, because he is the head of an inter-departmental committee for scientific and technical research and also chairman of an advisory committee for scientific and technical research. In some ways this approximates to the idea of a central council with the Minister as chairman which the Select Committee has put forward. If there were a Cabinet Committee in this country, whether on research or on science, it would be advised by a central council such as we suggest.
I do not expect all these matters to be adopted immediately, but they are relevant, and they are becoming more and more important as time goes on.
In Italy the lack of machinery for implementing scientific policy, which has caused a great crisis in Italian science, is likely to lead to a Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research. Finally, in the Netherlands a Minister of Science and Higher Education was appointed last year with a science council.
So the pattern is there in Europe, and it is very similar to that recommended by the Select Committee subject, of course, to the objection that the Government of this country are at present making, that it would upset their existing arrangements.
But the Committee had the EEC in mind when it made the recommendations for a Minister to "examine and approve" all Government research and development, to co-ordinate Government programmes and to be Chairman of a Council for Science and Technology.
Clearly, that is not a new idea. In their reply the Government have relied on their existing set-up, which we found—we put our reasons clearly in our report—to be inadequate in a fast-changing world. We also found the absence of a strong and independent scientific voice at Cabinet level, and we felt that it could be provided only by a Minister. The Committee viewed the function of such a Council for Science and Technology as a scientific "look-out" or watchdog, with the Minister to co-ordinate and examine departmental programmes.
We found as a fact—the Government agree, to judge by their replies—that no one really performs this function. The Government say in paragraph 10 of the White Paper that a central advisory function is performed none the less, by the Chief Scientific Adviser, with the Lord Privyl Seal to co-ordinate policy on research and development issues. But is that a correct description? I do not believe that it is a sound answer to what we have recommended. Has that particular Minister really the time to do this job, having regard to the increasing size and complexity of research and development problems?
The Government's reply also strains at a gnat in describing how the Minister and the Council would work in practice. They choose the example of road research, saying that if there were a Minister to "examine and approve" the relative effort


between road and transport research, it might involve some interference with the way in which the Department of the Environment spends its money on research. Why not? The Government's function should be to have an overall policy on research, and someone should be given the job of deciding those priorities.
The Government seem quite upset—in the sense that they disapproved, not that they are angry—about the idea of the existence of an overall budget for research and development. This is not a revolutionary idea. I should have thought that, now they are in Europe, the Government will find that they will be asked by the Commission what percentage of their gross national product they devote to research and development—and they must have some idea of the answer. Their reply to this is that the Government expenditure is not structured in this way. The whole answer is "We do not do things like that. We do not agree, because the thing is not organised in that way, the Government expenditure is not structured in this way; nor should it be according to the principle of functional responsibility."
The whole question I am raising today is whether functional responsibility is all that counts in this matter and whether there are not very much wider issues at stake, as I believe there are. Do the Government make any estimates of the future size and allocation of research and development resources on a national basis? I do not think that the issue of a separate Vote for the proposed Minister which they raise is anything more than a red herring. We do not treat that very seriously. We wanted to give the Minister concerned a secretariat of about 50 and give him a Vote for that reason.
We turned our attention a good deal to the national objectives in science and technology. Paragraph 13 of the White Paper shows a curious attitude to the whole problem of long-term research, which some of my hon. Friends and other hon. Members will view with a certain amount of amazement, but this passage appears there:
In respect of national objectives the programme of nuclear fusion research at the Culham Laboratory is no way different from that for the construction of a more conventional power station.

I wonder who wrote that paragraph. It is a very extraordinary paragraph. One field is, after all, pure research—we have to use the phrase "pure research" now, according to Lord Rothschild; let us use it for fusion research—and one is engineering. What about the time scale between the two, between fusion research and the construction of a conventional power station? The Government clearly believe that research and development cannot be meaningfully looked at as a whole but that it arises from the objectives and functions of individual Departments.
That is where we disagree. I find a weakness in that approach. I am not seeking to criticise the Government, in such an abstruse field, from any other point of view except our disagreement on the basis of our evidence. The weakness of that approach is that in practice science is brought in as an appendage of policy, an ancillary to policy, and not part of policy as a whole such as is found in other countries. The Committee found quite differently about this, that science should be at the centre of the decision-making machinery. That is the difference between us: science should be at the centre of the decision-making machinery.
There are one or two other crucial points. A critical gap was that the Committee found that no mechanism existed to keep the Cabinet directly informed of major developments but for the chief scientific adviser. The ability of the present chief scientific adviser is not in doubt and no disrespect is meant to him, nor to the new chief scientists in the Departments who have been appointed since these reports were first made. But the Select Committee does not regard that as sufficient. The Select Committee feels that, however distinguished an official may be in the capacity as chief scientific adviser, the final advice to the Cabinet on major issues of research and development should be made by Ministers. That is the crucial difference of opinion that we had on that point. It is a matter well worthy of full debate.
There is a continuing dialogue here and it will have to continue. It is of great interest and value. I have not sought to go over all the ground of these reports, but I hope that during this Session the Government will be ready to


have further discussions with the Select Committee on these lines.
On 13th July the journal The Engineer said that it was wrong to leave all this responsibility for the allocation of money and the decision on priorities to a chief scientific adviser. I think that The Engineer was absolutely right. It said:
It is understandable that people in government service are against the idea of a Minister as the piercing rays of public scrutiny fall on them as well.
Perhaps that may be a little uncharitable, but that is the duty of Parliament, and the responsibility of a Minister to Parliament would be a safeguard of great importance. Parliament has to be more involved in research and development in the future if the basis of our industries is to be broadened and they are to be made more effective in the next generation.
The Select Committee's duty is to inform the House and the Government of these problems and to make Ministers accountable. As Dr. Budworth of the CBI said in the New Scientist of 7th December:
Decisions of science will in future be taken on the basis of wider considerations than those of science alone.
This surely means that the Committee must continue its work in reporting to the House and maintaining its dialogue with the Government.

4.55 p.m.

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. James Prior): I am sure that the whole House would wish me to take this opportunity of paying tribute to the very valuable work of the Select Committee on Science and Technology, under the able chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave), and, before him, under the able chairmanship of the hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer). I should like to join in the tribute my hon. Friend paid to my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke). We are delighted to hear that he is making good progress.
When it comes to replying to the debate, my hon. Friend will take up the particular point which was worrying

my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely about the transfer of the Nature Conservancy.
Not only has the Committee amassed a great deal of valuable evidence but in the four reports we are debating today it has given the House a thorough and thought-provoking review of this very important field. No Select Committee has worked harder or carved out for itself such a high reputation. As my hon. Friend said, we cannot resolve all the points raised by him today or for that matter, I suspect, by other hon. Members, but we shall consider them carefully.
These debates are never dramatic debates. Unfortunately, they are never well-attended debates. But this does not underrate their enormous importance for the future well-being of our country. Therefore, I assure hon. Members that the Government take this extremely seriously. I regard it as a very important part of my duties to see that the Government take into consideration fully the views put forward by the Select Committee.
In forming our conclusions on this particular report, the Government have very carefully considered the contributions made not only by the Select Committee but also by the scientific and technological community, particularly following the publication of the Green Paper in November 1971.
The White Paper published last July, "Framework for Government Research and Development", set out our considered views. We are not discussing that White Paper particularly today. But I know that the Select Committee felt that we did not pay sufficient attention to its views in the July 1972 White Paper. We have tried to make amends in the two White Papers we published before Christmas, and my noble Friend the Lord Privy Seal appeared before the Select Committee to give his views.

Mr. Ted Leadbitter: The right hon. Gentleman, rightly, has been dwelling upon the theme of the care which the Government have taken about the Select Committee's views. Will he bear in mind that the White Paper in July did not appear to underline that kind of assertion, and certainly the fact that the Lord Privy Seal appeared before


the Select Committee did not impress us to that extent either. Some of us are not satisfied that the views of the Select Committee have been taken into account to the extent which the Lord President is trying to imply.

Mr. Prior: That is why, if the hon. Gentleman will do me justice, I said in my speech that I realised that the Select Committee felt that we did not pay sufficient attention to its views. That is why I am now trying to make amends in stating that it is very important that we should pay attention to the Select Committee's views. I hope that my speech today will at least show where we differ, and why we differ when we do so.
The Government Research and Development Organisation is very much part of the machinery of Government as a whole. The functions of Government and the structure of Government Departments have changed a great deal since the Haldane Committee in 1918 recommended that responsibility for general research carried out by research councils should be in the hands of a Minister
free from any serious pressure of administrative duties and immune from any suspicion of being biassed by administrative considerations against the applications of results of research.
This approach was responsible for the concentration of research establishments in the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, under a non-departmental Minister, rather than in those Departments having direct need of their services. It was really the war and the surge forward afterwards that changed all that, when Departments became much more aware of what science and technology had to offer them and felt increasingly the need to back Executive functions with applied research and development. Several changes were made during those years.
Changes have also been made in the machinery of Government, with increasing emphasis on larger, more functional Departments. The two new major unified Departments—the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of the Environment—each has a major need for research and development. Between them they are responsible for 12 research establishments and spend some £200 million a year on applied research and development.
This in itself is a pointer to the extent of the Government's present involvement. Gone are the days when Government Departments might stifle science. They are now only too anxious to use it. The Government, in fact, spend in this way over £700 million a year. This is about twice what was spent a decade ago and, even allowing for price differences, well over 100 times as much as the amount spent before the First World War.
As part of the general review of functions carried out by Ministers, it became increasingly clear that, although the research establishments of the Government and those of the research councils were centres of the highest scientific excellence, their relation to the departmental policy centres was not what it should be. In some cases the relation was, of course, very close and much better than the average. The Ministry of Defence, for example, had already shown what was possible with its new arrangements for defence procurement and with its procedures for generating operational requirements, which enabled the customers in the Services and elsewhere to identify, with the scientists, the research problems crucial to their operational needs.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: It is all very well to say that the relationship is not what it should have been, but neither Lord Rothschild nor, so far as I am aware, anybody else who has taken this view has been able to give a single concrete example, when a request was made by the Department of Health and Social Security as it now is, or the old Ministry of Health or any other Government Department, of the research councils for a specific piece of research, that the research was not attempted or that at least a good answer was not given why the research could not have been done. There is no evidence, so far as I am aware, of this malfunction.

Mr. Prior: I do not want to pursue that line too far. But I could on another occasion give the hon. Gentleman a number of examples, in agriculture, where many people would have considered that research in particular aspects of agricultural policy should have been carried out and had not been carried out by the Agricultural Research Council. I cannot speak from personal experience for all


the research councils, but certainly that would be true of the relationship between the agriculture and food industry and the Agricultural Research Council.
But in other areas of Government responsibility, there was not always the same close knitting together of the policy and research sides. On the policy side it was not always realised what contributions scientists could make to the problems, or even how to call up the scientific help; and on the research side the lack of such calls meant that the scientists often had to fend for themselves in framing their research programmes. As a result, the Government asked Lord Rothschild to report on Government research and development, and also sought advice through what was then the Council for Scientific Policy on the most effective arrangements for organising pure and applied scientific research and postgraduate training. I should like to take this opportunity of paying tribute to these very valuable reports.
The resulting Rothschild and Dainton Reports were published as a Green Paper. There was quite a bit of common ground between them, and the Government were immediately able, in that Green Paper, to accept some main points. In particular—and I stress this in view of the misunderstandings—we decided firstly, to preserve the research councils under the sponsorship of the Department of Education and Science, to maintain a body of authoritative advice available to the Secretary of State for Education and Science on the allocation of her Department's Science Budget; secondly, to control all applied research and development, commissioned by the Government, in accordance with a "customer-contractor" principle.
I shall come to the "customer-contractor" principle in a moment, but before I do so I want to emphasise that the decision on the location of the research councils was an important one. In many of their research establishments, the councils are set up to do work which is, or could be, of great value to Departments, and this has led some people to consider seriously whether these establishments should be transferred generally to the relevant operational Departments, such as the Road Research Laboratory

and the Building Research Station were transferred a few years ago.
But we decided against this, in agreement with the advice given to us, principally by the Dainton Report, because we saw that the responsibility of the research councils, as embodied in their charters, went wider than applied research. In fact, as we said in our fuller statement in the White Paper of last July, the purpose of the research which the Government support through the research councils, as well as through the University Grants Committee,
is to develop the sciences as such, to maintain a fundamental capacity for research and to support higher education.
The "customer-contractor" principle is concerned entirely with applied research and development. We are thus not here involved in science policy—in questions of priority between areas of fundamental science—but with the use of research and development to help solve some of the practical problems which we face.
These problems have to be translated into clearly specified research objectives. Applied research exists only to be applied, which immediately means that there are two parties involved—those needing to apply it and those doing the research. For brevity they have been called customers and contractors respectively. We do not wish to imply by this a formal contractual relationship. It is merely a way of labelling these two groups of people according to their distinct responsibilities. The important thing is to bring them together into the right form of close and fruitful working relationship.
The researcher should then be fully aware of the policy considerations on which the priorities are based, and the policymaker equally should be familiar with the possibilities of research for overcoming his problems. This follows the general pattern in industry where it is clearly seen that industrial research and development is most effective when there are clear, strong, links between the researchers and those responsible for production, marketing and overall policy.
I believe that, on the whole, the work carried out by the research councils over the past few years has been extremely valuable. They have done a marvellous


job. What worries me, however, is that so much of the research which they have carried out, even the development which has come from research, has not been pursued through industry with the vigour that is required. I was told by someone recently that if we stopped doing any research for 10 years and merely applied the results of what had been discovered by our scientists in the past 10 years we should still achieve a high rate of growth and be a successful nation. I am not suggesting that we should do that. However, we should look carefully at how we get industry to take up the work carried out so successfully by the scientists.

Mr. Dalyell: While I agree with much of what the right hon. Gentleman has said about industry, there may be a distinction here in relation to the Medical Research Council and the way in which the discoveries of that council have got through into the National Health Service and the pharmaceutical industry very quickly. Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to make that distinction?

Mr. Prior: There is always the danger of treading into areas where one has not the necessary knowledge. Certainly the Medical Research Council has always had a very good reputation in this respect. That is one reason why, in the transfer of funds from the Medical Research Council to the DHSS, a much larger part of the funds has been left with the council and it has not been felt necessary to have the same transfer from the contractor to the customer in this respect.
Many Departments now have responsibilities in areas where science and technology have a great deal to contribute, although some were not in the past organised to exercise them. We have, in fact, broken out of this chicken-and-egg situation by making it possible and necessary for all departments to commission the research they need, but at the same time insisting that they have first-class chief scientists and scientific staffs to ensure that they are properly set up to do this.
Again, to quote from personal experience, I always felt when I was at the Ministry of Agriculture that the Ministry and the food, agriculture and fishing industries should have a bigger say in what research was carried out. I was al-

ways told that they could not because the Department had not got a chief scientist. The problem was always to find a chief scientist. It was difficult to get a man of the necessary calibre to carry out the work. However, the Department has now an excellent chief scientist. I shall return to this point later.
Of course, the beneficiaries of a scientific or technical advance often lie beyond a commissioning Department itself. In agriculture, for example, the interests of individual farmers, growers, and food manufacturers have to be taken into account in any organisation which sets out to represent the "customers". It will not suffice if we are to replace the remoteness of the research council by the stuffiness of Whitehall.
The requirements boards and joint consultative machinery which the Departments have been setting up to guide them in choosing their programmes have an important responsibility to include these outside interests. The DTI, for example, is discharging this responsibility by having about six members of each board from industry. But a good Government Department should be able to act as the prime customer, or proxy-customer, on behalf of all the many interested individuals and organisations in the country. It is therefore right that it should be the organisation which pays for the research, and it is, of course, accountable to the public through Parliament for its use of the taxpayer's money.
What we are really saying is that there are a good many projects which are far beyond the capacity of an individual company to carry out on its own. This is where a good Government Department can commission research and then make the results readily available to the nation as a whole.
The Select Committee argued that there should be a Minister for Research and Development who would say what priorities were to be given to the research and development programmes of all Departments. My hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon has dwelt on this at some length today. After careful consideration, the Government came last year to the conclusion that this proposal would be inconsistent with the restructuring of Departments as coherent organisations with the means and ability to manage all


their own affairs, including the commissioning of the research and development that they need.
When a Department spends more on a research programme or a development project, it has less to spend on its other activities. This is a discipline for the Department and it is a proper discipline, since the Department must be accountable for the effective use, in all aspects of the Vote it receives for the pursuit of its tasks.
This is where the true judgment of priorities is to be found, in splitting a limited departmental Vote so as to achieve the right result. It makes sense to judge the amount spent on, say, research on health care against what we spend on the whole National Health Service. It does not make sense, to my mind, to judge health research against, for example, forensic research or fisheries research. What basis of meaningful comparison is there? More research for one Department should not mean less for another.
My hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon said that in this argument we were tending to strain at a gnat. But I do not believe that a Minister for Research and Development would really be as good a judge of the relative value of health research to National Health Service expenditure as the Secretary of State for Social Services. My experience of the Whitehall machine suggests to me that a Minister for Research and Development would find himself at a serious disadvantage compared to a strong departmental Minister. That is a factor that one must always take into consideration in these matters.
Finally—and this is equally important—to appoint a Minister with powers over all Government applied research and development would cut across the closer integration, in Departments of scientific and policy staffs. The inevitable effect would be to separate applied research and development from the rest of Government activities by making it something distinct.
The Government, nevertheless, fully share the Select Committee's underlying concern about three principles—the need, first, to set national objectives; secondly, to assess priorities; thirdly, to ensure cen-

tral co-ordination. There is indeed a central function in each of these three areas. Objectives and priorities are set by the Cabinet when the issues cannot be settled by Departments, and the Cabinet is able to draw on the advice of its Chief Scientific Adviser located centrally in the Cabinet Office.
The Lord Privy Seal has central responsibility for interdepartmental coordination of policy on research and development issues and at official level the Chief Scientific Adviser has a parallel responsibility. The Chief Scientific Adviser maintains a continuing liaison with departmental chief scientists, R and D controllers and the scientific community outside Government.

Mr. Arthur Palmer: Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the Cabinet Office as at present constituted has the strength, the machinery or the personnel to do this kind of co-ordination?

Mr. Prior: Yes. My experience in Government suggests that the Cabinet Office is a very powerful office. This means that it is necessary to have personnel who command respect and authority. Certainly one's experience of the Cabinet Office is that it does not lack the authority to do this work if it is right for it to do it. I do not want to be dogmatic about these matters. I think that we shall be discussing them for a long time. But hon. Members should not underestimate the power of the Cabinet Office in the Government machinery.
Although we have decided not to set up a Council for Science and Technology, it is, of course, open to the Chief Scientific Adviser—as indeed to Departments—to seek independent advice through the establishment of ad hoc groups to deal with particular matters or through consultation with suitably qualified individuals.
The Select Committee also recommended that the Government should provide Parliament with more information about their research and development programmes. The Government have accepted this and arranged for Departments to report annually. The research councils are considering how they can give a fuller and clearer picture of their


allocation of resources and the Department of Education and Science will continue to look at the budgets of the councils on a rolling five-year basis.
I turn now to the progress of the reorganisation. Arrangements are in hand to enable representatives of the customer Departments to be appointed members of research councils in whose work they have a substantial interest.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science will in future agree the appointment of the chairmen and members appointed by her with her ministerial colleagues principally concerned, consulting the President of the Royal Society as necessary.
The Government certainly endorse the Select Committee's view that it is important to have as wide a spread of interests as possible amongst the members of each research council, although the major consideration must be the contributions which individual members can make to the work of the council.

Mr. Dalyell: What is meant by the phrase "as necessary"? Why should the President of the Royal Society be consulted as necessary?

Mr. Prior: It is thought that before scientists are appointed there should be consultations with the President of the Royal Society, but for lay appointments the same considerations do not apply.
The Select Committee was worried about the transfer of funds before the customer Departments were perhaps ready. In the July White Paper we announced that funds would be transferred over a three-year period from the science budget of the Department of Education and Science to the votes of customer Departments to help meet their needs for commissioned research.
At the same time we said that we wished to avoid a further period of prolonged uncertainty about the funding of the research councils. Our feeling was that it would not have been in the best interests of the councils and their staffs or of Departments to have undertaken further reviews of resources and programmes for research before making the changes on which we had decided.
The Departments have informed the research councils that in the coming year

transferred money will all be ploughed back into the councils. This perhaps goes some way towards meeting the Select Committee's point. We did, however, emphasise that no transfers of funds would be made until the customer Departments had established their central scientific staffs, and the five Departments with major interests in research and development already have chief scientists in post.
Both the Department of Health and Social Security and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food have made new appointments of eminent scientists which have been welcomed by the scientific community. Indeed, we are fortunate in having in our customer Departments men who have made distinguished contributions to different branches of scientific knowledge.
The Department of Trade and Industry has reorganised its headquarters staff under the chief scientist into separate customer and contractor divisions. In the Department of the Environment no changes were necessary, since the Director General of Research covers the chief scientist function. Supporting teams are being built up in the Department of Health and Social Security and in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. All in all, I am satisfied that the principal customer Departments will have effective chief scientist organisations in time for the 1973–74 financial year. We shall, therefore, have discharged the undertaking on which transfer of funds from the science budget of the Department of Education and Science was conditional.

Mr. Leadbitter: The Minister has mentioned the ploughing back to the research council of funds going to the customer Departments. I am not certain how that would be effective in giving confidence to the scientists and the councils. What is the response of the research councils to this decision of the Government?

Mr. Prior: As far as I am aware, the research councils, having been worried about whether they would get sufficient resources, now feel a good deal happier. In the first year all the money which has gone to customer Departments is going back again into the research councils. Whereas one would not want to tie the customer Departments in any way for a period of years, all my information is


that the customer Departments will be looking to the research councils and their establishments for the major proportion of the scientific effort. We all recognise that the research councils and research establishments have done magnificent work and that they are the best people to carry out this work.
The whole purpose of the customer/contractor relationship is to try to make certain that the needs of the customer are more carefully and better defined, rather than to deny the research councils or research establishments the opportunity of doing the work. On that point the research councils will now be much happier than they were before.

Mr. Leadbitter: I assume that the Lord President of the Council is satisfied with the restoration of confidence, although I am not convinced. Will he bear in mind that there is additional concern about the growth rate of the financial provision of scientific research, which has fallen from 13 per cent. 14 years ago to 4 per cent. at present? It is estimated that by 1974–75 the growth rate will have fallen still further to 2 per cent. Does that indicate confidence? On previous statements made about funds there seemed to be some slight misdirection of confidence.

Mr. Prior: This is a matter of what the country can properly afford. It is not a reference to the rôle of customer and contractor but much more a question of the resources which the Government should allocate to research effort.
It is true that there has been some decline in the growth rate, but I do not necessarily believe that because one has a rapid growth rate, as we had for a number of years, one must automatically sustain it. We had better see how we get on with the development of research in the next few years. If it does a particularly good job, as I have every confidence it will, perhaps the Government will see fit to increase the growth rate, but one needs an open mind on that.
Before concluding my review of the progress made by Departments generally, I should like to say a word or two about the Department of Trade and Industry, which the Select Committee singled out for particular attention. My right hon.
Friend has replied to the Select Committee in his White Paper and I shall not repeat what is said there about, for example, the six requirements boards which his Department is setting up to implement the customer-contractor principle. But the Select Committee was concerned with the rôle of the industrial research establishment in innovation. We welcome the Committee's interest and share its view that these establishments have a part to play in providing certain research and development resources to supplement those of industry itself.
Looking to the future, we are confident that the new requirements boards will ensure that the work of the establishments is relevant to user needs which, in turn, will make it easier to exploit the results of their research.
Of course, an important way in which technology is transferred is through direct contract. An industrial firm may place a contract with, say, Harwell for work on high-temperature ceramics or with the National Engineering Laboratory for the design of components. Normally the firm will pay the full cost of the work and in consequence will retain the right to exploit the results.
My hon. Friend said that he thought that the research establishments should be more aggressive in their attitude to getting outside work, and should go in for advertising and proper marketing. I saw in the Financial Times recently an account showing by how much the outside work at Harwell is to expand over the next three years. I regard this as extremely satisfactory. The suggestion should be pursued further and I have no doubt that my hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping will take it up.

Mr. Neave: I am glad that my right hon. Friend has taken up this point. I was referring to the National Engineering Laboratory, the National Physical Laboratory, and the Warren Spring Laboratory. Harwell is doing a good job in advertising, but the others are not.

Mr. Prior: My hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping tells me that he will deal with that matter in his reply.
My right hon. Friend is happy to accept the Select Committee's view that it is important for both the Atomic


Energy Authority and the industrial research establishments to sustain the growth of this kind of contract work for industry and others. The Select Committee believed that transfer of technology to industry would be easier if the major research establishments were hived off into a new statutory authority. We shall keep an open mind on this; but for the moment we believe that the new policies are right and should be given a chance to work. For example, the agricultural Departments and the Agricultural Research Council will be advised by a consultative organisation which will be representative of the food and agricultural industries as well as the Departments, and will provide also for both scientific and economic advice. Their requirements boards for agriculture and food and for fisheries will decide what research and development should be commissioned in these fields.
Much research work is tied in with statutory duties. I carefully examined the arguments in favour of hiving off when I was at the Ministry of Agriculture. One matter that influenced me at that time was the fact that so much of the work carried out on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture is concerned with the implementation of its statutory functions, such as pollution in fisheries, the testing and reporting of mercury levels in fish, and so on. This would make it very difficult to have a "hived off" authority. Therefore, I should like the Government to keep an open mind on this matter.
Finally, I should not like to leave this part of my speech without a mention of the Advisory Board for the Research Councils and its distinguished Chairman, Sir Frederick Dainton. The board has taken the place of the Council for Scientific Policy and is playing a vital part in bringing about the desired partnership between the research councils and the Government Departments, and also in maintaining the support which the research councils give to the universities. The board is advising my right hon. Friend on her responsibilities for civil science with particular reference to the research council system and on the allocation of the science budget among the research councils and other bodies.
I wish to say a word about scientific manpower: the integration of scientific

and policy staff to which we attach such importance. It is essential to recruit scientific staff of high calibre and then to give them interesting and rewarding jobs and which make full use of their abilities. Our recruitment, promotion, training and other management personnel policies are now designed to achieve this. While most Government scientists are employed on scientific work in research laboratories, their normal career pattern will now involve increased managerial and administrative responsibilities.
We are therefore making a more deliberate attempt to provide young scientists with such training and experience early in their careers. This month the Civil Service College will be holding its first extended course for scientists, and other young specialists, before moving for two years to headquarters posts. This is the start of what we hope will grow into a new stream of career development for Civil Service scientists. It is our longterm aim that all future directors and deputy directors should normally have gained this type of experience. The House will be pleased to hear this because it is something we have all felt to be long overdue.
Another way of broadening the experience of scientists is to make it possible for them to spend a period outside the Civil Service—for example, in a university department or research council laboratory, or perhaps in a quite different environment such as sales or marketing in industry. Equally, a movement of scientific talent from outside into the Service can help bridge the gap between scientists in the public and private sectors. As promised in July, a task force has been set up to study the problems involved in interchange of scientific talent, and to work out and oversee a scheme to develop such interchange further. The Government are convinced that such movement should become a much more normal part of career development in future.
In addition to its four reports on research and development, the Select Committee has recently published a Special Report which contains the report by Mr. P. Docksey, to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, entitled "The Government Rôle in Developing and Exploiting Inventions".
I do not want here to enter into the substance of this, which is a matter for my hon. Friend the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping, but I do want to make one general remark. While I appreciate the considerations which led the Select Committee to take this action—I must say this to the House, which I know appreciates these matters—no Government can accept an automatic requirement either to publish the reports on inquiries or to make them available to Select Committees. It is Government decisions, not the advice given to Governments, that is subject to critical evaluation by the House. It could well be that such advice will not be so readily given, or delve so deeply into confidential aspects of the matters in question, if Governments do not retain the right to keep such advice confidential when they consider it right to do so. However, where there is public interest in a particular report the Government would always wish to give sympathetic consideration to its publication.

Mr. Ronald Brown: How does the right hon. Gentleman envisage a Member of this House being able to evaluate a Government decision if only the Government are privy to advice which they are being tendered?

Mr. Prior: The answer is that once the Government have put forward their views the Government must be asked to justify them. The Government must not always say, "We have taken a decision on the advice of Mr. Docksey" or somebody else. The Government must take private advice, stand by it, and be questioned on what is happening. It would be impossible for a Government to get eminent people to be prepared to give advice if every time they were giving that advice they knew that it was to be made public.

Mr. Palmer: Would it not be as well in such circumstances for publicity not to be given to the names of individuals who make reports, and for such reports to be treated as part of the normal departmental advice available to a Minister?

Mr. Prior: That is something which we should consider, and probably would

go some way to meet the point. It is not always easy to keep quiet as to the source of advice since certain people's styles or views shine through the written word. All these are matters which can be considered, but the House would not expect any Government, of whatever political complexion, to accept the view that all evidence given to it should be made public.

Mr. Dalyell: What has happened to the Prime Minister's promise about open Government? Would it not be a little more becoming and seemly for the Lord President to be contrite about this subject and to admit that there was an error of judgment in not publishing Docksey?

Mr. Prior: No. This has nothing to do with open government. There is all the difference between the Government publishing a Green Paper for discussion and then allowing the House and the country at large to take part in it, and the Government letting it be known what private advice they have received from somebody on a particular issue. In this case the Select Committee's view that the expurgated version of the Docksey Report should have been published by the Government has been noted, and I have tried to deal sympathetically with the views of the Select Committee. In conclusion——

Mr. Leadbitter: Before the right hon. Gentleman is allowed to get away with that, may I ask him about the use of the phrase "expurgated version"? I must remind him that the Select Committee on Science and Technology had the benefit of sitting under the chairmanship of somebody who was careful in the words he used; indeed, that Select Committee was unanimous in the support it gave to its chairman in respect of the Docksey Report. As I understand it, the "expurgated version" means the complete report with the exception of one or two matters of confidentiality. The Select Committee could see no reason why the Government should have taken the stand they did on the non-publication of the document.

Mr. Prior: I have noted what the hon. Gentleman said. He will disagree with what I said.
The Government believe that we are now developing the right kind of organisation to ensure that the very large resources—in terms both of money and of scientists of the highest quality—for which government research and development accounts, are used in the best interests of the nation. Naturally there are important details still to be settled. We shall be prepared to make adjustments, but I am sure that we are now generally on the right lines.
I have no doubt that constructive criticism from the Select Committee and from the House today and in the future has helped us and will continue to help us to ensure a strong and stable framework for Government research and development. The interest shown by the Select Committee will have been of enormous encouragement to scientific effort. Government science has been in a state of flux over the lifetime of two Governments and stability is certainly now needed.
We are entering a new partnership with the scientific community which must be harnessed for the common good. We owe it to our scientists and technologists to allow their talents to flourish in a stable situation. We look forward to a cool and calm period in which science and government can work together to enrich the quality of life for us all.

5.42 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn: I join the Lord President in paying tribute to the Select Committee for the work that it has done and for the reports it has produced. The working of this Select Committee is one of Parliament's great success stories. It has illuminated areas of great public interest which had previously been secret. The Select Committee has explained to the public as well as to Parliament issues which would otherwise not have been brought fully into the open and it has made Ministers and civil servants in a real sense accountable in a way which would not be possible at Question Time or in debate.
I say that as the first Minister to appear before the Committee—in fact before any of the new Select Committees—and I appeared before Select Committees more often than other Ministers.
The real point on which the Lord President began to show passion in a speech which was otherwise, and in every respect, measured and kind was on the subject of what should be secret and what should not be. This is the most significant part of the Select Committee's work. Whatever framework the Government may develop for the control of science none would or could be successful from the point of view of the public interest if there were not a continuing scrutiny of Government activity, whatever Government were in power, by the Select Committee.
The central theme of the debate inevitably rotates around the four reports and is linked, as the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) said, with Lord Rothchild's report. Like everyone else, I followed the correspondence in The Times when the controversy first began. In fact the proposal for a customer-contractor relationship appeared in the 1970 Green Paper, for which I was responsible. I do not believe that Lord Rothchild can either claim the credit or take the blame for having introduced the idea into the public arena.
Where the difficulty arose may partly have been in the vigorous advocacy Lord Rothchild brought to his subject and partly in the real difficulty to which the Select Committee has drawn our attention, namely, that the Government appeared to be endorsing the Green Paper at the outset. If Green Papers are to preserve the reputation they have acquired, it is important that Governments should not seek to pre-empt debate by pre-endorsement. Nor do I think that the Government have gained much by their initial endorsement, in that they could have produced their White Paper after the debate without any loss of effectiveness by not endorsing so early.
The whole debate, the Select Committee's recommendations and the Government's response, all in a sense revolve around the question whether central initiative and control or user initiative and control are to be dominant. Powerful arguments can be adduced on both sides. On the one hand, a central initiative and the retention of it in a form proposed by the Select Committee in suggesting a Minister for research and development can give the impression that there is to be some firm political grasp over research


and development which, because it is a Minister in the Cabinet accountable to Parliament, must therefore be more democratic than leaving the decisions spread in other areas. On the other hand, the argument may well be put and is put, and it has some force, that, apart from research designed to advance the frontiers of knowledge without any special application in mind, the real way we make science serve the community is to ensure that the community, in one manifestation or another, is empowered to acquire by contract some access to scientific manpower to solve its problems.
I do not just mean the crude market mechanism. I mean a market in which the Government are one of the customers who therefore modify and manage the market to see that science works for the community in that way.
The whole discussion, which is of enormous interest and importance, will not be fully resolved by a debate or discussion, despite the Lord President's final words.
In recent years the tendency has been for research, certainly on the industrial side, to move towards the user application. The Minister quoted as an example the division between the Ministry of Technology and the Department of Education and Science, both of which sponsored pure, as it is called, or applied science. The difference between the two was the different motive for funding it—one academic, the other practical.
Carrying it a stage further, the transfer of the Road Research Laboratory, of the Building Research Station, of the Water Pollution Research Station, and even the creation of British Nuclear Fuels, were all designed to anchor the research more firmly to the purpose for which it was intended. Although I had, and have, strong reservations about the proposed transfer of AWRE Aldermaston, that decision and the decision that the aviation establishments should go to the Ministry of Defence offer further developments of the idea of user control of science.
My Green Paper, which I believe reads well three years after the event, sought to carry the argument further and say that, except for funded pure research which the Government wish to be done,

the scientific community must establish its claims to be useful by meeting the customers' needs, through a BRAC.
In the early days of this debate the scientific community was very critical of the whole operation. It did not like it, in part because the further development of these ideas might appear to challenge the scientific community's claim to dictate how the decisions were made. The day has long passed when scientists could fear that the Minister would control them to the exclusion of their pursuit of truth, which was what Haldane was protecting them against. Today it is quite the other way round—the scientists are in a very powerful position. That is part of the problem that the community had to face.
We must consider the reality of our own experience. It is not in any sense to make a party point that I give some examples of the failure of the community to use science as well as it might. They are significant enough examples to make us wonder how things could be arranged better. First, despite all that is said, there is no necessary link between research and development and economic performance. Therefore, the argument for research and development cannot just be made on the grounds that we must think of the future, unless technology transfer arrangements in terms of people, or more organically, or in terms of financing, are also there.
I would go further and say that there is no necessary link between research and development and environmental protection unless it is specially provided that that link should be established. It is certainly true that the then existing arrangements led to the over-development of highly advanced technology at the expense of intermediate technology. We have never been slow to advocate intermediate technology to developing countries but we have been slow to learn that it has some relevance to our society. Looking back on the long list of cancellations of advanced projects under both Governments, there is no doubt that this owed something to the effect that our system of the control of science had had on over-glamourising and making over-complex our work on defence and perhaps even on civil aviation.
It is argued that the brain drain had something to do with this because people


were trained up and then when the project failed to survive, those people went to the United States. I heard it said by a distinguished Government scientist who must remain anonymous, of course, that in fact it was a "brain pump". A project was built up and then cancelled and these skilled people were "squirted" to California. Now they want to come back. But this development was a product of a failure to handle properly the use of science.
It is arguable—and I am sure that my friends at the Atomic Energy Authority will not object to my saying so—that the perhaps over-emphasis on nuclear research at an early stage due to the way this was handled, has something to do with decisions which, with the great benefit of hindsight, we might not always have wanted to take in that way. When I hear of the Government's putting a lot of money into the coal industry it makes me wonder whether there was some failure to get the correct balance of scientific expenditure in matters of energy research in the earlier years, and I do not direct that criticism at any particular Government.
In looking at the balance of expenditure quoted in the Government's White Paper between defence, aerospace, the AEA, industrial research establishments, the environment and the Department of Health and Social Security one can see that the balance of expenditure even today does not necessarily correspond with identified community need. I should like to give one or two examples.
We have neglected, until quite recently, research on surface transportation. All the highly skilled people tended to work on aerospace. The Lord President of the Council gave an example from his experience at the Ministry of Agriculture. Mine comes from my experience as the Minister of Technology where I felt that it would be very easy to get an advanced programme for another aircraft project; but because the people qualified even to define surface transportation projects were not available, the work could not necessarily get redirected into areas of greater and obvious need. Although the disabled are now the subject of great public interest, I wonder whether we have devoted enough to the application of research in what may seem rather mundane and unexciting spheres like the ease-

ment of the lot of people who are disabled, as against high medical technology. The environment generally may also have suffered by the way in which research was handled.
Was this because we did not have a Minister looking at the whole spectrum of research and development? That is, in a sense, the practical question we have to ask. I doubt whether that was the main reason. I think it was because the system of funding did not support the public needs that existed and convert them into an effective demand. Because the resources were not necessarily allocated in such a way as to meet that demand when that demand became formulated and funded by Government. Therefore, candidly, I found in Lord Rothschild's original proposals a great merit. They were sometimes put forward in a way which seemed calculated to stir up disagreement; but the idea that government concern themselves with need, that science has its part to play in meeting that need, and that government convert that need into demand by funding it, has substantial and important merit.
Other points arose in the course of the debate from both sides of the Select Committee which I should like to take up. There is the need for a stronger departmental scientific capability, particularly in fields like agriculture, to which the Lord President referred. There is also the need for more exchange of scientists and managers with people in industry and universities. That is most important, and I warmly welcome the proposal for Civil Service training designed to consolidate and develop this. There is the point about the five-year rolling programme designed to show what is happening—a suggestion infinitely more important than the idea that the problem could be solved by the appointment of a departmental Minister.
There was the point much stressed about providing more information. I read, as no doubt Members of the Committee read, the astonishing Executive Order 11671, issued by President Nixon in June 1972, in which he said that advisory committees advising the Government were to be opened to the public. When the Lord President says that no one will advise the Government if a breath of what they say is allowed to get out, he should read the interesting account of the man from Science News who turned up at


Houston at the first meeting of the Physical Sciences Committee of NASA after the President's Executive Order. He told the Committee, "I have arrived. The President says that advisory committees are open to the public." There was a little fluttering in the dovecotes and some rearrangements of business, because executive sessions were to remain secret. But in general he sat through two days of debate and he had the opportunity of listening. The more I think about the question of the control of science, be it in industry or in government, the more this question of secrecy seems to me to be the dominant one.

Mr. Ronald Brown: When the Docksey Report was finally published it contained only two minor amendments which were quite meaningless, so that the report could have been published without any offence to privacy.

Mr. Benn: My hon. Friend will realise that this is the central point of what I am saying. If decision making in this area of science is opened up to public examination, whatever system there is, there will be some real control over what happens. This is the heart of the matter. Of course, there is the tendency to say that national interest dictates secrecy but the trouble is that it is so easy to confuse the national interest with the convenience of Ministers and also with the preferences of officials.
I do not blame a Minister for wanting to protect the rival advice which he has received, so that when he publishes his own decision it sounds so much stronger, because it cannot be tested against the strength of the rival advice. It is also preferable for a civil servant not to be embroiled in the political arena because his advice has been made public. There are strict limits which have to be placed upon these matters. But I believe that this is infinitely the most important contribution that the Select Committee has already made, and that it can continue to make, by pressing for open decision making.
In spite of what the Lord President said about there having been a period of flux, urging that the scientists should now be allowed in peace and quiet and over a long period to get on with their

job, the fact is that science will always be in a state of flux because that state of flux derives from the changes that scientists make. Therefore, scientists should be the last of all people to ask for peace and quiet in which to get on with their business. This is bound to be a subject of growing interest.
Although the debate upon a Minister for Research and Development is well worth while, I can only say, as a Minister who was responsible for the research and development over a wide area of policy, that I found it had two great defects. Even having the wide range of executive power that I had, I was subjected to special pressure which I was unable to check in the way that a customer could and, secondly, the only real test that could or should be applied was whether much of this work met community need.

Mr. Neave: Will the right hon. Gentleman deal with one point about the Minister? Surely the question of the future of these large research programmes of advice to the Cabinet, is especially important? Should not the final advice come through a Minister?

Mr. Benn: I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman says and what the Select Committee has argued strongly. My own opinion, for what it is worth—and in a debate like this we are all acting like the other place, we are not representing party views in any sense—is that a Minister for Research and Development of Cabinet rank, and that is very high—to be in the Cabinet simply with research and development responsibility—would either interfere undesirably in the central policy—of which research was only a part—in every other Department or he would be a glorified, wholly ineffective and decorative superstructure hovering over the chief scientist operating within the Cabinet Office.
I am giving my candid view of what would happen. In his survey today, the Lord President—and I am not flattering him—from his vantage point, has given the House just about as much as we could hope to get from a Minister with high responsibility in this area but without actually seeking to do all that the Select Committee asks. I am not inviting the House to reject the report because


I think the debate about this is important. I am only giving my view. This is not just a problem of structure and we cannot solve it that way any more than we can solve the problem of space by having a Minister of Space, or the problem of peace by having a Minister of Peace. This is a more difficult problem. What really emerges from the discussion of it is that what is required is the most wide public debate.

Mr. Leadbitter: Before my right hon. Friend gives succour to the Lord President to any degree will he bear in mind that one can accept his personal views on the shortcomings of a Minister of Cabinet rank responsible for research and development, but those views are competent only as long as he bears in mind that they arise from his satisfaction with the present structure of Government? Those of us who support a different view on this are not satisfied with the structure of Government and the evidence shows that there is no co-ordination on research and development in any Department.

Mr. Benn: My hon. Friend asks me whether I am satisfied. Of course I am not. There are a number of defects which when analysed are pretty serious. I genuinely believe that the objective of this Select Committee, which is to make science serve the community, is best served by trying to take science closest to its application and seeing that each Minister with departmental responsibility can also bring into play as much research as he needs to meet his departmental objectives, rather than by supposing that a senior Cabinet Minister with co-ordinating responsibility can solve the whole problem.
I know that this is a controversial view and I put it to the House because I think it is the most important part of all. We are not really debating science today in the narrowest sense. we are debating the problem of how a community copes with a given situation at a time when mankind is re-equipping itself with a completely new set of tools. We are dealing with the problem of how to make the best use of these tools, how to create the best institutional framework. We recognise that science in a way controls the future, that the scientist is a valuable resource, and we must deal with the know-how he creates.
My recommendation to the House is that we cannot hope to find total and complete answers in any one form of government or structure of government. What we can and must do is to see that this area of policy does not remain within what is sometimes known as the "private ownership of knowledge", but is broadly shared and spread. Insofar as we can interest more people in the enormous importance of what we are discussing, we shall all learn by the mistakes that we have all made and are bound to make. We shall then improve upon that. I pay the warmest tribute to the Chairman of the Committee and his predecessor, my colleague, the hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer). They have pionered this Committee and in the process have done a great service to Parliament as well as to science.

6.6 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Warren: I am grateful for the opportunity, first, of addressing myself to the general subject of the Government's attitude to civil research and development and, secondly, to illustrating this briefly by looking at some of the points which the Select Committee came across in its detailed study of the British computer industry. One must start from the tables which the Government gave us. It was of interest in the evidence that we took to find that in 1971–72, for instance, £201 million of taxpayers' money was spent on what was called civil research and development.
It is essential at the start to cut through this with a sharp knife and discard the substantial section of what is called civil research and development but which is not really that at all. It is, instead, the application of taxpayers' money to two projects, Concorde and the RB211. Taking that money out cuts the amount spent on research and development in 1971–72 to under £100 millon. It is from that base line that we have to realise what is being done by Governments in terms of civil research and development.
It may have been the right amount to spend, but one of the trials we continually faced in the Select Committee was that we could never find out whether it was, because there was no absolute measure that we could apply to the evidence we were given. It is a pity that the Government have not yet been able


to see their way to accepting the fact that the structure of government should serve government, rather than that the structure should be inviolate.
Here I find that I cannot agree with the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn). It is the duty of government to devise a structure to serve society in the nation. The change in the demands on the structure of government is particularly rapid in science and technology where a generation lasts only five years—strangely enough, the optimum life of a Government.
It was interesting to hear the Lord President's proposals. If I understood him properly, there was a volte face on the part of the Government on the subject of deciding and setting national objectives for research and development. This is a welcome change, and when one makes a speech it is a bit difficult to compensate in mid-stream for the fact that a substantial rug has been pulled from under one's best debating points. I am all the happier—and I am sure that my colleagues on the Committee are happier—to find that despite all the evidence which Ministers gave to us they now appreciate that this recommendation of the Committee is not only pertinent but essential to the good application of the funds available for science and technology.
It is a pity this has taken so long because men and women engaged in science and technology are disciplined in the pursuit of precision. To them, nothing is accepted as "self-evident" and they must have found it very difficult to grind along under successive Governments with the old philosophy that Government with all their resources could not assemble options, analyse them and decree objectives and furthermore would not do so because they did not think it was necessary.
This extraordinary attitude was the only one put forward by the developed countries of the West which did not tie in with the assessment that every other Western nation had made. This is therefore a welcome change. It is interesting, if one looks at the research report produced by the Federal German Government in 1972, to see that it emphasises the move away from the rôle of scientists and technologists decreeing priorities to

one of finding the essential part fulfilled by the politician in the arena of decision-taking.
The West German Government, in this report for 1972, said that even with generous increases in research expenditure, because of the work to be done the material and, above all, personnel resources remain restricted, their optimum utilisation and distribution require political decisions.
The Government will find that the prime battle they have to face over the coming years in the European Community will be that the size of the programmes and the political battles that will be forced on us by the other member Governments will decree that eventually a Minister with access to the Cabinet must have responsibility for ensuring that the British point of view is not only put over but usually succeeds in the debates in the council chambers of Europe. We must not underestimate this problem. The responsibility for science and technology is moving entirely into the political arena of the large programmes which the Government must fund because they are the sole source of risk capital.
The tragedy which we, as a nation, have had in the application of our scientific knowledge is repeatedly paraded before us in a way which seems to indicate that the scientists have not understood that the end product of their work was not only to produce new facts but to apply those facts for the benefit of society. I have never understood why a nation which can produce people like Rutherford, Fleming, Watson-Watt and a whole cavalcade of Nobel Prize winners in the 20th century should find it so difficult to use their knowledge to produce products which will sell in the market place. Per capita we have a society of science and technology which is second to none in the world, and certainly our greatest national resource is the brain power of our people.
I hope that the Government will throw off the dogma that "it cannot be done". With apologies to the Lord President, who has left the Chamber, I rather sensed this in his speech this afternoon. It is essential that we continually examine the work which is being done, particularly in Government research laboratories, force it out into the market place and see that


it is sold. A tremendous amount of good work is locked up in the laboratories for which the Government have entire responsibility.
If I illustrate the problems which face the British computer industry, I think we might see why the Government still do not appreciate the scale on which they have to operate.
Earlier I referred to what the West Germans were doing, in terms of their attitude to science and politics. In our report on the computer industry we worked out that £50 million was the right order of expenditure for the Government's investment programme in that industry. It is encouraging to find, by referring to the West German programme, that they came up with a similar sum—£47 million for 1972. There is one vital difference. They have spent the money, whereas our recommendation has not been accepted. Indeed, from what I can elucidate from replies to Questions that I have put, we have been spending at only a third of the rate which the Select Committee on Science and Technology recommended as essential.
Looking at the way that the West German programme is to go ahead—it is essential that we look at this because, with the Japanese, they are becoming our chief competitors in computer hardware and software—we find that whereas in 1972 they spent £47 million, by 1975, in real terms, they will be spending two-and-a-half times as much, and their expenditure will be £120 million.
This is an example of expenditure on science which will be immediately applied and sold in the market place. This is something which only a Government can do to encourage investment. As far as I can determine, no adequate reply is likely to be forthcoming from the Government. Perhaps my hon. Friend will take note of the point and give us some hope tonight that there will be a faster rate of expenditure, commensurate with the demands of the industry in order to remain competitive.
I appreciate that the options open to the Government in investment are infinite. There is always somebody who has the best idea since the mousetrap. However, it is interesting to see the effect that £50

million would have on one industry compared with another.
The application of £50 million for research and development in the steel industry would have the socially undesirable effect of decreasing the number of jobs in that industry. Conversely, the application of £50 million for research and development in the computer industry would increase the number of jobs in that industry. With the application of that money we could expect to find employment for 5,000 newly qualified scientists and engineers and supporting staffs to a first order of accuracy.
The computer industry is a growth industry. It is labour-intensive as well as capital-intensive. In this it is unique. But it also acts as the fulfilling opportunity for many people who find themselves having had a good education of a kind that was not available in this country 30 or 40 years ago. Without doubt, investment in the computer industry is not only politically essential, but socially desirable. Whilst the computer industry is struggling along at the moment, I am afraid it sometimes thinks, "Thank goodness for the fact the ICL is in trouble, because that means at least £14 million is flowing into the industry in part exchange for the claim that the Select Committee on Science and Technology has tried to put to the Government."
Time and again in my daily life outside this place—I should declare an interest which I hope will not cloud the issue, but will add to the lustre of the debate—I have come across situations where, for the want of a few thousand pounds of high risk capital which cannot be obtained from normal banking sources, people have found it impossible to translate computer protoype work into hardware which can be sold. Frequently very small amounts of money will give the necessary momentum to achieve success.
On one occasion—happily under a Labour Government—when I was involved in leading a computer sales team in the United States and asked for a reference from the British Government that the company for which I worked was of high repute and a guaranteed supplier of good quality equipment to the Government, we were told that such a reference could not be supplied as it was against


current practice. Indeed, we had a British competitor launched into the battle against us in the United States where none existed before.
I quote this specific instance as an example of the need which I believe exists, and of which I hope the Government will take note, to probe processes and attitudes within Departments. In my opinion, co-ordinating committees and boards are no solution. They are too slow. The need in technology is for fast reaction. When a demand becomes urgent it has to be satisfied immediately or turned away. There is no time for lengthy deliberation, and a committee is not the way to solve a problem in technology.
I hope that the Minister will find it possible to have even a secret investigation into the attitudes and practices in terms of the departments of his organisation which are concerned with computers and the realities which the industry has to face on a day-to-day basis.
I hope that the Government will recognise that the kind of specific objective which the Committee set in terms of the application of £50 million of Government funds to one industry is not merely something to catch the headlines, or to act as a point of debate, but is intended to be a clear guide line of the scale on which the Government have to operate in future.
I hope, too, that today we have seen for the first time something which I have felt creeping into the debate from the Government Front Bench, namely, a beam of reality about science and technology that will cut into the darkness that has for too long pervaded the corridors of power. This is a welcome sight, and I appeal to the Government to regard this as the start and not the summation of their attitude towards the work of the Select Committee so far.

6.21 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Palmer: As the first Labour member of the Select Committee on Science and Technology to speak this afternoon, may I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave), the Chairman of the Committee in this Parliament, for the leadership that he has given us throughout, for the great independence of mind that he has shown and for the way in which he has dealt

so forcefully with his Ministers. That is a great talent in a chairman of a Select Committee, and the hon. Gentleman has been outstanding in that respect.
I was Chairman of the Select Committee in the last Parliament, so perhaps I may be allowed to say that the Committee was set up early in 1967 and that its activities can be divided into two classifications. We have, I believe, completed nearly a score of reports, which is a fair achievement in the time that we have been established—about five years.
There are two kinds of activity in which the Committee can engage and has engaged. One is the basic investigation. Some have said, unkindly, that it is a Royal Commission kind of investigation, but I do not think that it is. It is where the possible reorganisation or reform of an industry or Department has to be looked at, or where it is felt that in a defined field of policy an independent approach can come from a Select Committee—constituted as the Select Committee on Science and Technology is made up. We did that in respect of nuclear policy, defence research, population policy and a number of other areas. The other equally important activity is the short, sharp investigation of contemporary scientific events and developments.
Though the investigations were spread over some months, the reports that we are considering today come into that second category. We presented four reports, but it was only the second report of a sub-committee which I chaired which seemed to win more or less general acceptance by the Government. That was our investigation into the non-nuclear research activities of the Atomic Energy Authority. These activities are naturally based upon a consumer-contractor relationship, and that is why the Government did not quarrel too much with us on most of our recommendations.
There was nevertheless one recommendation of our second report which it is a pity the Government did not adopt, and that was that there should be established an industrial advisory committee to make closer and more realistic the relationship between the AEA and its industrial customers, which could use the research facilities which the authority has available. I am not impressed by the few sentences in the Government's comments turning down what seemed to most


of us to be a common sense recommendation.
I now come to the Rothschild theme. I do not think it can be doubted that the Rothschild Report has been one of the most devastating happenings in the politics of science and technology in recent years. I thought that the Leader of the House was deliberately being a little simple—at least I hope it was deliberate—when he talked about parity of esteem between Dainton and Rothschild. It is true that the two reports were contained in the same cover, but that is about all that they had in common, because Rothschild overwhelmingly overshadowed Dainton.
There are several reasons for that. The principal one is the personality of Lord Rothschild himself, though there is another factor to which I shall refer in a moment. Here is no shrinking violet who wishes to blush unseen. No one could accuse Lord Rothschild of that. He is a noble Lord, a research scientist with scientific achievements to his personal credit and an industrial leader of some eminence but he is also one of the most dangerous of people—the intellectual who writes militant common sense on his banner.
The Rothschild Report was unusual in the sense that there was no liberal nonsense about an open mind at the start. Lord Rothschild in advance assumed the, consumer-contractor principle. In short, he decided on his own conclusion, knowing that that conclusion was congenial to his own thinking and that of the Government, especially, I suspect, the thinking of the Prime Minister; that it, the Prime Minister's thinking of two years ago, which might not necessarily be the same as his thinking today.
It is that which perhaps gives me some consolation, because when highly placed individuals make dogmatic decisions one way they can easily change them to go the other way. I do not want to be contentious in a party sense this afternoon, but if the Prime Minister who was once firmly against the control of prices and incomes is now equally firmly in favour of their control, why cannot there be some dilution of neat Rothschild? I ask that because it seems that neat Rothschild comes from the political thinking at the advent of this Government in 1970 and not since.
My first contention in an attempt to influence the Government a little towards diluting neat Rothschild is that basically the Select Committee is right in asking for a national research and development programme with ultimate centralised responsibility. I am sure that we are right about that. I am sure, too, that the Select Committee is right in saying that research councils, and not Government Departments, are the best agencies for research and development in the various broad fields that we recognise. I am not sure that it is absolutely essential—and here I am a little more moderate than some of my colleagues—to have a Minister for Research and Development—although I believe that there is an arguable case for one—but it is essential that there should be ultimate centralised responsibility.
My second contention is that the Government are wrong in proposing to cram down the narrow administrative channels of individual Government Departments research and development decisions which must he taken either centrally or by those most closely in touch with opinion, advances and knowledge outside. Key decisions of scientific importance cannot always be crammed into the narrow departmental channel. If we are not careful, if that kind of method is followed too slavishly, we shall soon find ourselves back into the 1960 situation. That is more or less where we came in on this business, when all the emphasis was on means and not much emphasis was given to ends.
The assumption behind the thinking of Lord Rothschild and the Government White Paper is that if a Government Department has control of funds only relevant projects will be carried through and that wasteful projects will not be attempted because Departments are by definition customers. I have great difficulty in following that argument. The result is likely to be that mistakes will still be made. Up to a point mistakes are inevitable. Wrong decisions will be taken from time to time as before. They are not inevitable, but I think that they will be taken. Money will probably be wasted. If the departmental approach is followed we shall not necessarily gain advantages from it but we may have the great new disadvantage that the overall quality and inspiration of the effort will be inferior.
It seems that the Government themselves have some misgivings. Cmnd. 5177, which was the White Paper published in December of last year, has some interesting words. It says at page 6, Paragraph 10:
The question of the ability of Departments to perceive the importance of research and development to their work and to give it the right priority is, of course, crucial to the arrangements announced in Cmnd. 5046. This is why the Government attached so much importance to building up strong Chief Scientist organisations in Departments. They will have primary responsibility for ensuring that their Departments make full and effective use of research and development; and at the same time the Chief Scientific adviser to the Government is in a position to compare and advise on the general research activities of Departments.
Much of what is now proposed depends on that questionable assumption.
The figures of the sums now to be diverted from the direct control of the research councils back to the Departments also indicate that the Government have not been able to make up their mind. They were not prepared at the end to take the Rothschild suggestion any more than we were able to take that suggestion. Therefore, they have selected new figures. I am taking my figures from The Economist, which, I suppose, worked them out. The present budget of the Agricultural Research Council is about £19 million. Rothschild proposed cuts of about £14 million. The Government now propose diversionary cuts of £10 million. The Government accept Rothschild's figures relating to medicine. Rothschild proposed a diversion of environmental resources of about £7½ million, and the Government have brought that down to £4½ million.
The whole business is extremely hypothetical. One cannot be convinced that the Government know where they are going. The Leader of the House in his speech accepted the need for top co-ordination, and perhaps that is a start in the process of the dilution of Rothschild. I hope it is. But the Leader of the House is content to leave the matter to the Cabinet Office. I ventured to interrupt him and ask him if he thought that the Cabinet Office had the resources to do that work. He said rather hesitatingly that he thought it had. I see these things only from the outside as I have never been very close to such

altitudes. However, I never had the right hon. Gentleman's impression of the Cabinet Office. It is at times unable to take correct general policy decisions on, say, foreign affairs, and I see no reason for thinking that it is in a special position to take correct decisions on science and technology. I should have thought that it was about the last instrument, on the balance of probabilities, that could take the correct decision.
But that possibility does not worry Lord Rothschild very much. It is curious that a man of such great intellectual capacity does not seem to worry too much about the results as long as the lines of responsibility are right on paper. Provided that there is someone who is accountable and that the theory looks right, the fact that the decisions may not be particularly effective does not seem to bother him. However, the Government are now more realistic. They accept that there is still a need for co-ordination, but they will leave it hesitatingly to the Cabinet Office to do it.
The Government do not wish to adopt the Select Committee's suggestion. It may be that it is a little too rigid. I have expressed some personal doubt about the appointment of a Minister for Research and Development. Examples have been given of other countries, but we may not have to follow their examples. The Government should consider the strengthening of the position of the Lord Privy Seal. If we are to have smaller research councils with smaller budgets, why not take control away from the Department of Education and Science? I have never been very happy that the control of the research councils should be with that Department. I believe that the Labour Government were not too certain about it. Of course, it is argued that as the universities carry out much pure research it is a good thing that the research councils should be with the Department of Education and Science. I suggest that perhaps the view could be reconsidered and that smaller research councils, which have been watched carefully in the past, can be similarly watched in future but by the Lord Privy Seal. He would be not quite the Minister that we have been suggesting or the Select Committee has been suggesting, but he would certainly give much more expert and centralised control. It would also


strengthen the position of the Chief Scientific Adviser. That poor man will have his work cut out for him. He will need all the help that he can be given to handle the new chief scientists in every Government Department. They will not be easy people to handle. They will have all their jealousies and personal priorities. If the chief scientific officer is to remain more or less in an advisory capacity to the Cabinet I cannot see that he will find his position very easy.
The Government have tended to play down any changes brought about in British science and technology by the United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community. It is true that such has been the wide collaboration over many years since the war with continental countries, both official and unofficial, that no dramatic change can be envisaged. I should have thought that that was a reasonable assumption. Yet the EEC has recently proposed a comprehensive Community policy on scientific research and technological development with emphasis upon the social responsibilities of science.
I welcome that proposal as an engineer. I have not much patience with the anti-technology cult. I regard technology as man's tool-box. It is man's most powerful weapon in the endless uphill fight against poverty. Anti-technology and anti-science is a reactionary attitude. I am not necessarily referring to Europe in any immediate political sense, but since most Britons were born Europeans we must remember the cultural traditions of Europe and the European emphasis upon applied knowledge and upon the mechanical sciences. For that reason European science and technology generally, including our own, have special responsibilities to mankind as a whole and it is well that the EEC should recognise it.
If mechanical sciences started here, developed here, and then spread to the rest of the world, not only with their advantages but with their disadvantages, not only with the good they have brought but with the evil they have brought, Europe now has a very special responsibility towards the world generally to see that science and technology are put more in a general social setting with a greater sense of human responsibility. We cer-

tainly need science and technology to take a human face.
If the European Governments are to work together more closely in that respect in future, I think that there is a stronger case for the tighter knitting of British science and technology, not their spreading and diversification administratively but their being brought together in all aspects. I believe that that was the broad intention of the report of the Select Committee. That is what we were really after, but unfortunately, it seems that the Government are drifting the other way. However, I believe that, as a result of what has been said by so many people able to say it with knowledge since the Rothschild proposals were made, as a result of the reports of the Select Committee and of this debate, there are still plenty of opportunities for the Government to repent.

6.41 p.m.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: On an occasion like this, one feels an extraordinary weight of responsibility. This is a subject which one would like to deal with in a sense like Canaletto and paint in the greatest detail, thus making it recognisable and visible to all hon. Members, for it is such a vast, compresensive and important subject. But one feels inadequate in relation to it in terms of one's own scientific knowledge and knowledge of the wide range of subjects which have come before the Select Committee. One will be fortunate, therefore, if one succeeds in achieving something like Picasso's worst drawings—only recognisable to his best friends.
It is a rather sad occasion that, at this stage of the 20th century, when we assemble to discuss what my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) has rightly said is one of the most important reports of a significant Select Committee, when, as the hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer) has pointed out, the work of the Committee and the whole rôle of science and technology are of outstanding and growing importance, and when the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) has endorsed that view, there are at most perhaps a round dozen Members present in the Chamber. It seems to me to call for some comment—a comment


which perhaps all of us should make in some way or other.
Perhaps we should call it a "Rothschild dozen", because the more one thinks about it, the more one realises that this is in some ways a reflection of the lack of interest in, the lack of concern over, the lack of awareness about all that has been said this afternoon and, indeed, in the reports, at the highest level in Government and the State. I shall come to that aspect in a moment when considering the extremely important question of whether there should be a Minister of Research and Development.
In my humble opinion, service on the Select Committee has been one of my most valuable experiences. We certainly wish to see the Select Committee continue as such an instrument if this is an example of the way it can work and of the type of information which it can make available—information which is perhaps followed much more outside than inside the House and which is made available in the interests of the whole country.
Why is it so important? It is important in the first place because we are witnessing, we are being affected by, and we are involved in an information explosion of unprecedented proportions. Perhaps the most significant part of this information explosion is that which is occurring within the scientific community. Few people realise just how important this is and what a tremendous impact it is having on human life and the impact which it is inevitably bound to have on political life.
Secondly, we are experiencing and getting more and more evidence of what I have seen described recently as a "physical internationalisation". That is a terrible phrase but it can be defined quite easily, in that in a number of areas we are seeing the inter-connection of the human race by physical ways never possible before or which never existed before.
One thinks here of telecommunications, with satellites. One thinks of computers which now talk to each other via telecommunications from one major capital city in the United States to other major capital cities in Europe and also to Tokyo. One thinks of developments whereby the physical interlinkage of the transport system is becoming worldwide. One thinks of resource management. We

are involved here with the most fundamental types of resource management, which we are going to need and will have to improve in order to meet the political demands of human society. Resource management can only be effectively achieved and implemented on an international scale by international means. One thinks of environmental control. Here again, the spread of devices and policy making is becoming international.
I was given the other day an example which is perhaps very germane to this debate. Professor Salam, head of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, was giving evidence to a Congressional committee in the United States. He said that his institute would probably need in the next four years a 5,000 GeV accelerator costing 3 billion to 4 billion dollars. He developed a powerful case, which I cannot pretend to judge but which was convincing, that this was the only way in which the particular type of physical problem he wished to explore could be explored. As he rightly said, this is probably outside the resources today of the United States, the Soviet Union or Western Europe individually. Therefore, a world accelerator must be built, if one is to be built at all. It must call on and demand the resources of the whole human race. It is possibly the first example of its kind. There may well be others—indeed, there certainly will be. We see such completely new and profoundly important phenomena affecting the whole range of scientific policy and ultimately, therefore, of politics.
I return to the domestic problem which has been uncovered or at least emphasised by the Select Committee—the question whether one really can usefully aggregate research and development programmes and look at them in a sensible way as national policy. I want to look at this carefully because it is probably more important than it seems at first sight. One can take a simple analogy.
From time to time one can collect a basket of fruit. Different types of fruit grown on different trees are collected together to meet different tastes. One may ask "Can we put the fruit in a basket?" The answer is "Yes". One can then ask "Should we put the fruit in a basket?" The answer is "Why


not?". Then one may ask "Has the term 'basket' in this sense any meaning? It is a collective noun. Does it produce any sensible advantage in looking at these problems?". I think the answer is "Yes". But one should then say "Do we derive any meaning from putting together a whole series of research programmes and putting the research budgets together in an aggregate budget? Does this give us any meaning when we reach the total sum?". I think that the questions one must ask are as follows.
When one compares one's basket with other baskets—and, plainly, that is one of the main purposes of this type of aggregation—one asks whether it contains bigger and better apples, and that may be a useful question to ask. One may also ask whether it contains more apples than the other baskets of scientific development, and the answer to that, too, may be of some interest. It may be of some interest and significance to ask whether it contains any apples at all when all the other baskets with which it is being compared contain apples, and one could ask, particularly in scientific matters, whether it contains exotic fruits that the others did not contain, and that could be meaningful.
It therefore seems to help the processes of evaluation if one is looking at one aggregation of national scientific research and development to compare it with another aggregation of national scientific research and development. If it is done systematically and carefully, the comparison can be of significance.
I would like to illustrate this by a rather more scientific and less agricultural analogy. If on comparing our whole range of scientific expenditure with that of France, for example, we were to find that we spent absolutely larger amounts on semi-conductor research, that would be significant and interesting. If we were to find that we spent relatively larger amounts on semi-conductor research, that would be interesting and significant.
If we were to find that we were spending and the French were not spending, or vice versa, quite substantial amounts on research and development into a replacement or substitute for semiconductors, that would be immensely significant, and it would be the sort of

thing that we should know and attempt to find out about. If we were to discover that we were spending nothing at all in some areas where other countries had decided or chosen to spend a great deal of their resources, that, too, would be significant. But one cannot make this type of comparison unless one makes a local or national assemblage and produces what some people think is unnecessary or not very useful—a general analysis of the national research and development picture.
I come to the next question, which I believe should be "Who should do it?". The fourth report of the Committee contained in paragraph 22 a statement that I believe to be important:
Parliament and the country are entitled to have the information which such a system would reveal".
We can ask ourselves why this is so. First, it is true because the sums now being spent in this whole area are vast and form a significant proportion of our national expenditure, however that is allocated or analysed. Thus it is important. Secondly, the implications of success or failure are far-reaching, sometimes much more far-reaching than we like to concede.
We debate many great issues in the House, but the question whether Britain or the United States of America or France is the country, for example, to produce the successor to the transistor, which would form the basis of the next generation of computers would have an immense effect on the national life and welfare of this country and our trading position and so on. But, generally speaking it is not considered of sufficient interest or importance to bring into the Chamber the large number of Members on both sides of the House who on Wednesday will be brought in to debate the Government's current anti-inflationary policy, which is something we all understand and about which we can have a jolly good row and which appears to be of far greater significance but which is not; this subject is of much more significance.
I come to the next question. The choice between these areas is often political rather than scientific. Because the choice is becoming increasingly political, it is important that we debate it here. If


Parliament abdicates from consideration of research and development—and there is a sense in which I think that we are doing that—the significance of what is left to us must steadily diminish, and I believe that that is happening. The effects on the Community of the decisions which are made in one research and development policy as opposed to another are vast and are of great importance and they are not in any sense covered or embraced by that insipid, ineffective and often bogus activity known as Community politics, and it is not Community politicians who come here this evening to discuss these matters.
I turn to the subject of the appointment of a Minister of Research and Development. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East, referred to the proposal as likely to create an individual who in the Cabinet would be "a decorative superstructure". He may be decorative and he may be a superstructure, but would a Minister of Research and Development really weaken the links between the objectives of the Departments and the research and development necessary to achieve them? I am not sure that that necessarily follows:
In looking at this spectrum of policy we are concerned with emphasis, with duplication, with gaps, with co-ordination and with communication. Those are the weaknesses as I understand them and as I have seen them at present. I should like to quote some evidence given in Canada by Senator Grossard, Chairman of the Science Policy Committee of the Canadian Parliament. He said:
But we do feel that we cannot hope, in Canada, to use effectively our naturally quite limited resources for the funding of science and technology, particularly research and development, on the basis of what we have described as an existing pattern of diffuse, ad hoc responses to the claimants—and I am speaking only of the federal funding area—the claimants for funding and performing in science and technology on the public purse.
In general I think I would say that we have come out for a macro science policy in Canada, not to substitute entirely for, but to support and to rationalise in advance the hundreds and perhaps thousands of micro policies which have resulted in what in two or three places in our report we call 'Canada's science policy by accident.'
In some ways by operating a policy too rigorously and perhaps in a somewhat

doctrinaire sense we are in danger by subscribing to this concept of "no centrally-organised science at any cost" policy of adhering to a science policy by accident in the United Kingdom.
What are the essential differences between a Minister for Research and Development and a Chief Scientific Adviser to the Executive, the Head of the Government, whether our Prime Minister or the President of the United States, or anyone occupying a similar position? Is it in the power to examine, or the power to report? Is it in the resources available to a Minister, or to a senior civil servant, however eminent and however supported by a Department with resources to analyse? There may be significant differences in that connection, but I do not believe that they are vital.
What is vital is that a Minister for Research and Development may be called before the House of Commons and may be asked by any hon. Member what Her Majesty's Government are doing and why and how. He may be asked whether he has taken part in the great debates that we understand to take place in the Cabinet about why we spend more on aeronautical research and less on hospital research and development, or whatever it may be. He may be asked to explain how the debate went and why the Cabinet reached a certain structure of decisions in one area rather than another. At the moment no one may be called before the House of Commons, and, therefore, before the country, to be compelled to offer this type of explanation. That is the most fundamental part of the distinction.
I turn to the subject of Europe. It is important, and we ought to discuss it, and we now have time to do so. There has been a long and interesting series of reports on European science policy going back to M. Kapel, Mr. Maxwell, formerly of this House, Professor Reverdin, Mr. Flamig, the Smithers Report, made by a former Member of the House, the Aigrain Committee, the Cost Committee and so on. All of these reports dealt with the problems of European scientific co-ordination and policy in one way or another.
As I understand those reports, all have called for a radical reorganisation and improvement of European scientific administration and policy—without exception. They may have based their analyses


at different times on different series of information and evidence, but, without exception, they have come to the conclusion that if one looks objectively at the utilisation of science resources in Europe as Europeans—and this includes the United Kingdom—one sees that we are just not getting value for money. This is a conclusion which I believe to be inescapable and of the greatest and most profound importance to this House.
If that is so of Europe as a whole—and if it is, it must, at least partially, be so of ourselves—we face an even stronger obligation than we seem to have accepted so far to look at the fundamental way in which we are organising the distribution of our scientific resources.
One of the first things that strike us in considering this is the fact that we simply do not know how the R and D expenditure in Europe is being spent. This has come out very clearly in two or three of the most recent reports, and the former Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Sir Peter Smithers, has tried very hard to organise an inventory of the major scientific work in Europe. His request was not met in full, but the science policy unit of the University of Sussex is now doing some work on part of this project, the results of which will be very interesting.
If this unit does not know, and it is spending a considerable amount of time, energy and money obtaining this information, and if the science Ministries of Europe do not know—we do not have a science Ministry—and if those responsible for the expenditure of R and D nationally and collectively in the United Kingdom do not know how much duplication there is, where there are significant gaps and where there should be changes of some importance, the first thing that we must do is obtain this information and knowledge and make it available.
On the question of science in Government and secrecy, the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East referred to the taming of independent scientific thinking. He stressed, of course—I entirely share his opinion—that there were great dangers in this view. I should like to go a little further. I believe that there are great dangers indeed in allowing ourselves to develop a system in which virtually all science of great competence

or of great quality can justify its existence only if it can be related to the contemporary political interpretation of human need. This is a terribly tempting thing. Governments can then defend their allocation of national expenditure by saying "We are using these scientists, paying their salaries and providing expensive equipment so as to do this for you." The elector generally likes having his money spent in this way.
I do not know whether my assessment of the great saga of science is different from that of other hon. Members, but if we do not make a significant place in the whole of the scientific spectrum, if we do not allocate significant resources—I do not greatly care how they are allocated—so that the scientist of great distinction and great curiosity—he may not even be of great distinction; he may be a very young scientist of great curiosity and intellectual power, who may follow something which is profoundly interesting to him, wherever it may lead—we shall see a diminution, and a sad diminution, in the overall quality of our scientific life.
This is something which, however we look at the great challenge which is presented to us as administrators, as parliamentarians, in considering our national scientific policy, unless we maintain it as I would almost say an overriding priority, so that a significant proportion of our resources is always available for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, we shall make a considerable mistake.
This is a subject of far greater importance than the support for the debate would suggest. Perhaps, in future, one of the things that a Minister for Research and Development could do is bring more of us into the Chamber on an occasion like this.

7.6 p.m.

Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: The hon. Member for Portsmouth, Langstone (Mr. Ian Lloyd) several times regretted the sparseness of the attendance today. I agree with him, but I shall not labour the point. The only absence to which I wish to refer is that of the hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke), whom I have watched in this House for 28 years, whom I respect very much, and of whom I am very


fond. From these back benches, I should like to tell him that I hope that he will very soon be able to rejoin us.
Although I am not a member of the Select Committee concerned, I have found this fascinating debate, like the Select Committee itself, to be concerned with the inventiveness of the British people, how best it can be stimulated and how best it can be used for the benefit of these islands and, indeed, for the rest of the world. It is probably true that the majority thinking seems to be, and has been for many years, that British inventiveness has been pretty fertile—there is a great source of inventiveness in Britain—but that the development, production and marketing of the fruits of that inventiveness have been and still are deficient. I want to mention one or two examples which have come within my experience in recent years.
We led the way not so much in developing but in bringing to light the hover principle, but the development of that principle in recent years does not seem to have proceeded at the rate that it should. I believe that the production of hover grass mowers has been satisfactory and I hope that the production of hover mattresses for the easement of those who are paralysed in hospitals has gone ahead. We have had some success with hover transport, both across the Channel and to the Isle of Wight, yet we who took the lead do not seem to realise, as the inventor of the hovercraft himself fully realises, that the hovercraft is in the biplane stage. We seem to be content with what has so far been achieved, without pressing on and developing what ought to be achieved in the very near future.
When I was occupying a ministerial position somewhat similar to that occupied by the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping I found that industry was conducting virtually no basic research into hovercraft. It was for that reason that we established a research unit in the National Physical Laboratory specifically to do the basic research to see what the effect of sea strain was on the materials used and to find out more about what we ought to do to get sea-keeping qualities in hovercraft. Can the Minister tell us whether that research has produced some answers to the problem which faces the hovercraft industry and that the

difficulties in developing hovercraft along the lines we expected only a few years ago?
Whilst I am speaking about the hover principle, I mention also the question of the hovertrain. There is no doubt that the method Britain is using for the propulsion of a hovertrain—the linear motor—is greatly superior to the methods being used by our French rivals. Yet the French work on the experimental hovertrain seems to be attracting the attention of the world, while very little indeed is being heard from our unit in this country. It would be a tragedy if, on something which was devised and developed here, and in which at first we really had a lead over the world, we once again let our pre-eminence slip into other hands.
There is another field in which British research has done remarkable work but where it seems that development and, perhaps, production are still deficient. Most of us will have seen the Harrier aircraft. It is a magnificent military aircraft. But what now concerns me is that the jump-jet principle applied in the Harrier so successfully to Service needs is not yet being fully applied to civilian needs. There was a time, only about three or four years ago, when it seemed that this country was getting to the point at which we could begin the development of vertical take-off aircraft for civilian use. Indeed, about three years ago we asked the various concerns in the industry to produce systems of vertical take-off aircraft and to produce ideas in a form of competition, which we could then evaluate in the Department of Trade and Industry. I should like to hear what has happened about all this. We were so near the stage at which we could begin thinking in terms of civilian transport by jump-jet aircraft that we were proposing to reserve sites in the centres of cities on which aircraft could land.
In this matter we were at one time far ahead of the rest of the world, but in latter times we have heard very little about the civilian development. It is enormously important from the point of view of employment and the civilian aircraft industry in Britain that we should not lag behind once again in something where initially we had the lead.
A third example is the tremendous lead that we had at one time—and perhaps we


still have—in certain aspects of nuclear power production. One aspect that particularly interested me was the use of nuclear power to produce not only energy but fresh water from the sea. This is vitally important, because I believe that within the next 25 years the world will face an acute shortage of fresh water unless we can begin to draw on what is in the sea.
We have a system for doing just that, which at present is very costly—I hope that research is taking place to try to get those costs down—but it is a system which is better than any other system produced in the world. Yet when as a Minister I was touring South American countries and found that a number of countries were anxious to have these plants, there was not a single representative of the manufacturing consortia in South America. There was no attempt to sell this product of British research.
One more example is carbon fibre—a product of research work at Farnborough. In its application it has struck some difficulties, I believe, in the RB211 engine. Is research taking place to iron out those difficulties? What is being done to secure the utilisation of carbon fibre in other fields? Potentially it has an enormous advantage, especially in terms of weight, over the ordinary traditional metals. I strongly suspect, however, that here again is an example of first-class British inventiveness being followed by a lackadaisical British attitude about development and production.
What are the reasons why, sometimes, in development, production and sale, we fall behind our high standards of inventiveness? It may be in part organisation, on which we have spent a considerable time today. More likely is the fact that still not enough money is spent on development. For example, the United States can spend 10 times the amount of money on any one project that we can spend. That means that if we are faced with a problem in development we have to be fairly sure that the shot we back is the right one, whereas the Americans can take 10 shots and nine may be misses. We have to be on target with our spending. But even allowing for the fact that we are not such a rich country, not nearly enough of our resources are being devoted to development, as opposed to research.
A second reason for our poor performance in development, production and sale through the years is a certain conservatism in British industry. It has been found, to our regret, that the British machine tool industry could not prosper because the users of machine tools in British industry tended to continue using what did a reasonable job rather than he prepared to invest in what would do a better job. That, indeed, was the purpose of the pre-production scheme which I very much hope the Government will continue, in an effort to encourage the makers of machine tools to produce new and more up-to-date equipment and to encourage the consumer in industry to put that equipment into his factory.
I say that I hope the Government will continue with the pre-production scheme. In fact, I hope they will extend it, because in the industry to which I am closest—the woollen and worsted textile industry—we have suffered severely from conservatism among manufacturers of textile machinery. It is now almost impossible to get a loom made in this country which is at all comparable to those made in Germany and Switzerland. I hope that the Government will set about a pro-production scheme in the textile machinery industry and institute research in our own establishments, to try to produce equipment which is really needed in our industry, and to see that that equipment is produced in this country so that our industry can have the best tools that it needs.
I say to the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping, who is to wind up the debate for the Government: we must have more money. I agree profoundly with what has been said about secrecy. I hope there will be as little secrecy as possible in all that is being said and done about new ideas. I also believe that the Government must take an interventionist part, outside their research establishments. They have got to stimulate industry to see what is possible and to want what is possible, instead of being content with all that it has done in the past. I believe that this is vitally necessary if we are to stimulate employment in this country. Equally important, it is vital if we are to keep reasonably ahead of our rivals in the game.

7.23 p.m.

Mr. James Allason: I welcome the opportunity to intervene briefly in this debate to represent the views of some of my constituents on the subject of agricultural research. Rothamsted experimental station is at Harpenden, and here several hundred research scientists are at work, including 10 Fellows of the Royal Society. The standard of work there is of world renown. They have a brilliant record in agricultural research which is of value not only to this country but to the world.
There is, of course, a continuing need for an increase in agricultural production. Making two grains of corn grow where one grew before is one of the highest achievements of mankind, and this is the sort of thing which is achieved at Rothamsted. Therefore, it is very difficult to measure the value of the research which takes place there, but I am certain that for every £1 that is spent there the world receives an enormous dividend, and any suggestion of cutting back the work there is to be deprecated.
Advice proffered to the Select Committee on behalf of all those working at Rothamsted, which was very strongly against the proposals in the Green Paper, was based on hard experience. The "customer-contractor" principle is ill applied to agricultural research. This advice was accented by the Select Committee. Unfortunately, it has been totally disregarded in the White Paper. So those working at Rothamsted are profoundly disappointed. I have had no representations whatever in favour of the White Paper. All the representations that I have had have been against it. Therefore, I want to place on record the deep feelings of the staff at Rothamsted about the proposals in the White Paper.

7.26 p.m.

Mr. Ted Leadbitter: I think that one of the most remarkable experiences that a Parliamentarian can have is to sit on a Select Committee and, in particular—speaking for myself—to have the privilege of sitting on the Select Committee on Science and Technology. It has been a remarkably exciting committee to work on. It has been a very hard-working committee. Indeed, its impact on the community as a whole as

been outstanding. Because of the reputation that the Committee has made for itself the House should take serious note of the whole of its recommendations, because it is concerned with what is nothing short of a revolution in the approach to science, technology and research.
The point which worried us most—we knew at the beginning that there was much to be done—was the manner in which the Rothschild Report took shape. It had occurred to many of us for a long time that all concepts had to be put aside, that new challenges had to be met, and that there were new ways of dealing with them but when we wanted a base, a foundation, upon which constructively to work, we found, much to our surprise and concern, a Green Paper which appeared to be lacking in the area of consultation that the subject warranted.
I need only draw attention to the First Report from the Select Committee on Science and Technology, paragraph 11 of which states:
The Council for Scientific Policy, the Royal Society and the three research councils most affected by his proposals did not think that Lord Rothschild had consulted them adequately before producing his report…They did not feel that some of Lord Rothschild's assertions could be based on evidence provided by them…and they had looked in vain in his report for alternative supporting evidence.
From such a responsible source this is a very serious allegation. It is more. It is a very serious allegation which the Government must answer. Today, the Lord President of the Council has been trying to persuade us about a change of heart, or a change of view. Very quietly and gently the right hon. Gentleman tried to tell us that the mistakes of the past had been noted and that a new approach by the Government was now established. Unfortunately, in July of last year a White Paper was produced which, in the view of those of us on the Select Committee, did not take into account our work. It appeared to underline the concepts of the Rothschild Report which, as I have said, seemed to be based on a lack of supporting evidence from the sources that I have mentioned and on a lack of alternative sources of evidence.
Let me again draw the attention of hon. Members to the First Report of the


Select Committee—this time to paragraph 13:
Lord Rothschild's inquiry also had to cover a wider area than that of Sir Frederick Dainton which also took about six months.
We are dealing with a time scale of six months. There is very little evidence dealing with such an important subject to try to grapple, through that subject, with the challenging problems of the 1970s and 1980s.
In paragraph 14 of its First Report the Select Committee says:
We do not feel that Lord Rothschild's consultation with the Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress adequately covered the problems of industry. We were particularly concerned that the Green Paper contained no clear recommendations on the organisational means by which development should be carried out by the Government and applied to the national advantage by industry.
That is the considered view of the members of the Select Committee.
We say in paragraph 15:
…the Rothschild Report is far from comprehensive. We regret that Lord Rothschild gave such cursory attention to two of the most difficult problems for Government research and development, namely, determining which programmes are most worthwhile and what should be spent on them, and ensuring that the results are exploited to the greatest public benefit. We endorse the criticism of the Science Research Council among others that disproportionate attention was devoted to the Science Vote of the Department of Education and Science in a report which purports to be concerned with all Government research and development.
I consider that to be a condemnation of the whole of the Government's preparatory work, in addition to which this report, started in this way, unfortunately had the support of the Government in making statements accepting its principles even before this House or the Select Committee had had a chance to examine them. Therefore it seems to me that any assurances given at the moment have to be scrutinised with special care.
Since Rothschild the Government have had an increasing propensity to deny to Parliament debate on matter of great public issue. More than one correspondent in the responsible national Press has stated clearly that the country should bear in mind that perhaps we have gone a long way along the road towards totalitarian government. It is this worry, with the apparent weakening of the Parlia-

mentary system and the strengthening of the Executive, which causes considerable concern among those of us who feel the need to take advantage of the total inventiveness of our people, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) said earlier.
When the Rothschild Report seeks to deal in practical terms with the research councils, we come to a situation which strikes fear in the minds of those who have worked on those councils for a considerable time. I need only refer to the well-known Table 4 in the report. If I quote paragraph 149 of the Select Committee's First Report in connection with this famous Table 4 the House will understand the significance of what I mean when I say that the research councils are very worried. It says:
These misgivings were supported by the Royal Society which thought that if Table 4 were implemented in full both the Agricultural Research Council and Natural Environment Research Council 'would cease to exist as effective bodies' and that although the Medical Research Council would survive 'many of its activities in universities would be seriously impaired'.
I do not know the extent to which that impresses the House, but it was the subject of considerable questioning by the Select Committee. As my colleagues and I understand it, the application of the customer-contractor principle has a fearsome all-binding effect. It is quite different from the language used by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East earlier when talking about the customer-contractor "relationship".
The implication in Table 4 is clear. Rothschild's formula is to hive off a considerable percentage of the financial support for the research councils to the Departments on a customer-contractor principle in such a way that a great deal of the work of the research councils, in the judgment of those councils, would be affected seriously. We ought to bear in mind, perhaps, that even if the argument from the Government's point of view is right, its timing is wrong.
When the Select Committee considered the research and development and science policies in the Departments we came to the vexing conclusion which appears in paragraph 176 of the First Report, that
What clearly emerged was an absence within each Department of a research and development policy. However the individual


research programmes of departments are divided, they have a responsibility to examine their research activity as a whole and to plan its future.
There we have it: a policy on the basis of a rigid application of the customer-contractor principle to the research councils, hiving off the valuable work—to such an extent that the viability of the councils themselves appear to be affected—to Departments on the basis that there is some area of co-ordination and cooperation or of policy making and decision, when the whole evidence before the Select Committee clearly led us to the firm conclusion, without hesitation, that there was an absence in each Department of a research and development policy.
That is why the Select Committee came to the conclusion that we should attempt to impress upon the Government, on the basis of the evidence before us, the importance of a new approach. Hon. Members have talked about exploiting the native ingenuity of our people by seeking to finance and support the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. We have spoken in terms of ramming home the development of our natural inventiveness with financial support. Yet—irrespective of what the Lord President of the Council has said—we are still left with the impression that we have not really got hold of this problem of the lack of a co-ordinated policy and decision-making in Government Departments.
The Government's responses to the new way have ranged from disappointment because we were so active, through a state of reluctant acquiescence to an assurance, today, that things will be better from now on. But we must get down to details.
The Select Committee has worked for nearly two years, sometimes meeting twice a week. It has met men of great professional standing, both in Government Departments and from outside, a variety of scientific bodies, the research councils and the industrial research establishments. The members of the Select Committee are the only people who can claim to have a comprehensive knowledge of the trends of scientific behaviour and activity. Yet the Government say, without any convincing reasoning, that our conclusions on the major issues are un-

acceptable. The major issue is that we want a Minister with responsibility for science and research development with a place in the Cabinet. I have read carefully the objections to that proposal and the Government's view that their refusal to accept that proposal automatically disposes of the need for a council for research and development, but I am not convinced. It is not good enough, purely on the basis of the present structure of Government, to draw such conclusions about recommendations which are related more to the 1980s than to the historical growth of the Departments.
Many of us believe that what is needed is a good, hard look at the practices within Government Departments. Government Departments are rusty and out of date. They succeed more in confusing Ministers than in producing clarity of approach. The Departments have inbuilt inhibitions which deny to Parliament what Parliament wants to do on behalf of the people. In certain quarters there is an excess of privilege. Those who want to hold on to their privileges and hold back Parliament should do themselves a good turn by presenting themselves to the electorate and giving us a rest.
I forecast that in about two years time we shall have a Minister responsible for research and development, because Parliament has an intrinsic propensity to cause things to be done in the course of time, whether or not Ministers like it. The tide of events shows that the Select Committee's recommendation makes sense.
When I was in Brussels a few weeks ago with other hon. Members we had a long discussion with the Deputy Director-General of Science and Research—the titles imply a military operation, and there are military titles. I left behind some questions, the answers to which I needed for this debate, to support the view of myself and my colleagues that a Minister responsible for science and research should be created. I will quote one or two answers to those questions, with the assurance that I leave out nothing that would distort what I am seeking to convey to the House. The questions were:
What is meant by the Commission view that there must be explicit recognition in all fields of scientific research? What place in


science and technological development will the member States of the Community have for themselves?
The answers were:
In order that the Commission would be able to make in the field of research and development all proposals which may appear useful to cope with observed needs
—the needs of the Commission—
or to reach objectives
—the objectives of the Commission—
of common interest the field of its investigations should not be restricted in any way.
The House must understand the implications of that statement. The next part of the answer which is relevant states that
Any common research and development effort must leave plenty of scope—in some sectors a predominant amount—to the free initiative of national public establishments, universities and firms.
I note a reluctance there which is similar to the normal Common Market language in the Treaty of Rome, in an attempt to be all things to all men while getting on with the major objectives. If the Common Market intends to behave in this way it is highly important for us to have a Minister with responsibility for science and research to speak on behalf of the Government at the levels the Common Market is talking about.
Further questions were:
What is meant by giving the Community information and the means to exercise its powers effectively? What powers does it expect to have?
The answer was:
The Treaties did not formerly provide for scientific research and technological development outside the fields of nuclear energy, coal, steel and agriculture to be covered by the Community. In view of the intrinsic importance of scientific and technological research and its economic and social repercussions, it became evident the Commission felt the need that this area had to enter into an enlarged responsibility of the Institutions of the Community…it will be possible for the Community institutions to ensure co-ordination of national policies and to define and implement projects of common interest … the Commission will present its proposals to the Council, whose decisions will be binding for the member countries and the Community.
Therefore, it is important that we have a Minister who has at his command a complete picture of research and development and all the responsibilities that go with it so that on a European scale

Britain's interests can be enhanced and defended.
Those of us who served on the Select Committee know that there is not a single Minister whom we can call to the House of Commons—never mind Brussels, which is quite another matter—to answer adequately in this House questions on research and development. The Minister concerned may think that he is answering questions on those subjects, but we have no Minister to give to the House of Commons a clear picture reflecting the totality of research and development implications upon this country and upon Europe as a whole. I forecast that the Select Committee's recommendations on this matter will be implemented in a much shorter time than some people think.
I should like to make one small reference to the conduct of the Government. I shall not make these comments in terms which are calculated to incite angry responses. I shall say what I am about to say because I believe it to be of vital importance to the future conduct of any Government. I emphasise "any Government" because the great question mark for Great Britain today is: how strong is this House of Commons? This is a matter of great public issue, and poses the following question: should the conduct of any Government be allowed to go so far as to deny a Select Committee a report which that Committee feels is essential to its work? Indeed, should a Government be allowed to deny to the House of Commons a full debate on a subject which is of great significance to our country's future?
The Lord President of the Council introduced this matter in his speech and must take the consequences. I remind him that a Select Committee has the power to sit in public or in private. I cannot recollect any reluctance by the Select Committee to consider the implications of the Docksey Report or to insist on such examination being in private if it was thought to be against the public interest to make any part of the report public. I hope that Government Ministers will have learned their lesson. They must realise that their tenure of office is the most temporary thing in their lives. It contributes nothing to the strength of democracy if they seek to back certain officials who do not wish to let the


House of Commons know what it ought to know. I tell the Lord President that this sort of practice should never be allowed to happen again.
I have read the Docksey Report. It contained nothing which was against the public interest. I should like to read its terms of reference, so that they are on the record. They are:
To advise on the exploitation of inventions resulting from public research and on support by the National Research Development Council for the development and exploitation of inventions from other sources.
In other words, the terms of reference dealt with how best to consider inventions arising from public research. The Lord President must not be too unhappy when the House does not respond to him in the way in which he expects us to respond when he seeks to make an apology on this score. He must convey to his colleagues our feeling that no Government should ever again treat the House of Commons or its Select Committee on Science and Technology in such a manner.
The whole question of science research and development has not even yet been brought out into the open, and there are one or two matters of which we should take firm note. First, there is a great need to get rid of the cobwebs in the system. There must be some rationalisation of function. Departments should have the ability to understand not only what is going on in their own Department but what other Departments are doing. There is a great need for Parliamen to take a firm grasp of the issue and to force Government to provide the necessary funding, so that all the potential of scientific research and development can be developed.
The Lord President gave figures of the expenditure, but the Government, who talk so much about growth, albeit after devaluation, should accept that it is wrong that the funding of this important area of the economy should fall from 13 per cent. growth rate four years ago to 4 per cent. today to an estimated 2 per cent. in 1974–75.
The Government should accept that the Select Committee has done a good job. The Government would benefit from studying the four reports again—

certainly the First Report this year—and review their preconceived notions and consider whether we are devoting the right proportion of the gross national product to research and development.
The Government should do much more to secure the distribution of this work. The special areas do not get a fair share of scientific and research and development activity. The North-East needs much more of this work to underpin the general growth of industrial activity—of which there is still such little sign—and to secure the general drive and incentive to educational standards which will produce in the areas where they are most needed the graduate qualities which give assurance of more work for skilled and unskilled labour.
I should have dearly loved to see here today the hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke). I hope that when he reads the reports of our proceedings he will be pleased that, much as we regret his absence, we have tried to put over the views that he holds dearly to a Government who, I hope, will be receptive.

8.3 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Brown: I pay tribute to the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave), for the way in which he presided over our work and brought our reports to fruition.
I propose to concentrate on two issues that greatly concerned me during the course of the Select Committee's work. In paragraph 40 of the First Report we state—
An excellent example of the failure to deal with an immediate and dangerous scientific problem which was clearly identified by the number of deaths and injuries involved, is the apparent self-combustion and exclusion of expanded foam plastic which in turn emits toxic fumes.
In paragraph 47 (c) we say that one of the functions of a statutory council for science and technology should be
to anticipate and to provide the necessary research and development to deal with any hazards which may threaten the community".
The object was to ensure that we anticipate events rather than follow in their train.
The question of expanded foam plastic is crucial. Numbers of people die every week. Despite my constant harassment


of Ministers, nothing is done. I pay tribute to the Government for having conceded one aspect of my argument during the course of the Select Committee's proceedings for having granted a small sum for special research into foam plastic.
There have been extraordinary vacillations on the part of Members from which have flowed disastrous consequences. I began arguing the case about foam plastics in 1968, after the fire in Glasgow in which 19 people died. The deceased were members of the union for which I am parliamentary adviser. The one thing which emerged from it all was that working with foam plastic is very dangerous.
On 17th December 1970 I
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services (1) what investigations he has instructed to ascertain the proportion of bedding used in the hospital service containing highly inflammable foam filling; how soon he proposes to replace such filling with flame retardent foam; and if he will publish the findings of such investigations; (2) what instructions have been issued to geriatric establishments to ensure that, where foam filling is used in mattresses, that it be of flame retardent material".
The Minister's answer was:
None at present, but hospitals and authorities will be informed of the results of current research into the advantages and disadvantages of flame-retardent foam as soon as possible."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th December 1970; Vol. 808 c. 420–1.]
On 10th July 1972—the day after the fire at Coldharbour Hospital, in which many people died, I
asked the Secretary of State for Social Services (1) what material were specified in the tenders for mattresses and other upholstery…in the Winfrith Villa Wing of the Coldharbour hospital; (2) what materials were used in the fillings contained in the mattresses ….
The Minister replied:
Polyurethane foam or interior springs with various types of topping for the mattresses and polyether foam with a range of covers for the chairs were both specified and used.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th July 1972; Vol. 840, c. 247.]
Even after the great disaster in July 1972 the Secretary of State took no action. I look forward to the report of the inquiry into the disaster at Coldharbour Hospital. No doubt the inquiry will blame the fire on somebody smoking, or an electrical fault, but it will not be the real cause, the expanded foam plastic. In December 1970 I warned the Member of what would happen. On 9th July it

happened. The Member should therefore have been able to take action.
Although in this country bedding with polyurethane foam is still being used the United States have taken a very different attitude and have issued a standard. On many occasions I have asked for regulations to be made to ensure that bedding containing foam meets a satisfactory standard. On 1st December 1972—the last occasion when I asked such a Question—the Minister's answer was that he did not consider that we needed regulations.
From June 1973 no mattress manufacturer will be able to sell his product in the United States unless it passes a high standard. There will be a heavy penalty if mattresses are sold which do not meet the standard of non-flammability. The fine will be about £2,500 and/or one year's imprisonment. Powers have been taken under the regulations to ensure that any manufacturer can be told to stop selling a product and withdraw it from the market. If the manufacturer wilfully violates that instruction he can be fined £2,500 per day for every day that his product remains on the market. There is a whole range of other issues of great importance to do with mattress standards, but the Americans believe this to be the important one. They have carried out two years' work and have produced regulations for both domestic and foreign manufacturers.
Yet our Government continually assert that we do not need to take the same action. One wonders what would have happened if we had this standard for the beds at the Coldharbour Hospital, or for the hospital at Durham where, on 27th January 1972, an 81-year-old patient died because his bed caught fire. How long will it be before the Government decide that these deaths must stop? They have some responsibility for ensuring that standards are maintained in order to cut down the number of deaths which occur.
I took this matter up with the Home Office in connection with the dangers encountered when cigarettes were dropped on to bedding, and asked what was the risk of the foam igniting. On 20th October 1971 I had a reply from the Minister saying that tests had shown that neither plastic nor rubber foam ignited


from a cigarette falling upon them. He said that the hazard presented by such foams was insignificant compared with that presented with carbon monoxide, which was produced in almost every fire in a dwelling where neither rubber nor plastic foam was present. It is interesting to contrast that with the view of the Department of Employment, which says, in its Technical Note No. 29,
The feature that particularly distinguishes foam plastics from most other combustibles however was the production of hydrogen cyanide and isocyanates. These were evolved in amounts fully comparable in toxicity to the carbon monoxide. They represent an important additional hazard which may not previously have been properly recognised. This may help to explain the fact that in some factory fires employees and firemen appear to have suffered long-term effects from inhaling smoke and fumes which did not seem to be characteristic of exposure to carbon monoxide alone.
The Home Office tells us that this is all rubbish, and that their advice is that it is no more dangerous to have foam burning. But the factory inspectorate produced its report in 1971. That showed that the toxicity was derived from fumes known in World War I as phosgene.
In December I put further Questions to the Department of the Environment concerning bonfires and the Department's attitude to caretakers who are called to them. Furniture which is thrown on to bonfires often contains polyurethane foam. In addition, children standing around the bonfire inhale the phosgene, and the result is that they are taken to hospital believed to have inhaled ordinary fumes and are treated accordingly. It is not realised that they will suffer permanent lung damage, for there is at present no possible source of a cure. The Minister's answer to those questions was a simple one. He said that he had been advised by the Home Secretary—that was the chap who advised me—that there was no danger. Yet the Department of Employment's Factory Inspectorate has said that there is a serious risk. We therefore have the situation where two Departments are in turn making contradictory statements. I would prefer to take the advice of the Factory Inspectorate, because it is aware that we are facing an extremely serious situation.
On 17th December 1970 I put a Question to the Department of Employment

calling the Minister's attention to an incident where a teddy bear had a flame passed beneath one arm and within two seconds was wholly ignited because of the high flammability of the foam filling. I asked, as the use of candles would be prevalent in the coming weeks, whether the Secretary of State would take steps to warn parents and children of the danger of fire involving the stuffing in soft toys. The then Minister of State, Home Office, replied:
The fire hazard presented by soft toys depends, in the main, on the ignitability of their outer fabric rather than the flammability of the filling material. I understand that the British Standards Institution will shorly be publishing an amendment to the Code of Safety Requirements for Children's Toys requiring such fabrics to pass a flammability test. My right hon. Friend does not consider that any public warning about the flammability of foam fillings in toys is necessary."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th December 1970; Vol. 808, c. 417.]
In Crewe, on 13th December 1972, two children died from a teddy bear catching fire. It had been stuffed with foam. I consider that the Minister should be held culpable for this, because in December 1970 I begged him to issue a warning about toys stuffed with foam. The answer I have just read out shows a wilful refusal to appreciate the dangers. Two young children, among many others, have died from the source of danger which I asked the Minister to point out back in 1970. The teddy bear was stuffed with polyurethane foam.

Mr. Neave: Since this is a subject which the hon. Member feels concerns hazards to life and health, might I suggest to him that since various Government Departments are conducting research programmes in this direction he should invite my right hon. Friend the Lord President to tell these Departments that they should make special reports to the House on this question? That would seem to be an aspect of our recommendations that he should follow up. I hope that he does not mind my suggesting that.

Mr. Brown: I accept what the hon. Gentleman says. What I was trying to establish was that during the consideration of this subject by the Committee there was no suggestion that Ministers were aware of what was going on in each other's Department, or of what the state


of research was at any time. It has been said that the Questions that I put to departmental chiefs were pretty mundane, but large numbers of people are being killed and injured as a result of the use of this foam. It affects all departments of Government—social security, hospitals, local government, education, and the Department of the Environment. They are all involved, and not one was aware of the problem. Our recommendation for a Minister of Research and Development could repair that situation. One such Minister would certainly understand what was happening in other areas.
The second issue to which I want to turn arises in the Second Report at paragraph 30, where we talked of the extent and possible scope of nuclear and non-nuclear research and development. I came to the conclusion that no evidence had been given to the Committee of any research and development taking place into the safety aspects of nuclear reactors. I was most discouraged by the answers given by some of the witnesses. It appears now that the Government are preparing to ditch British technology in the shape of the steam-generated heavy water reactor and go American.
It is the same old story. I sometimes suspect that with high technology Government advisers are happy to make this country the 53rd state of the United States. We just rely on the Americans to give us all we want. It now emerges, I understand, that the Government are being persuaded to buy American light-water reactors mainly on the grounds of cost and availability. A big question mark hangs over the safety aspect of these reactors. I raised this subject during our sittings, yet we had no evidence of any programme of research and development being undertaken to evaluate standards of safety which are built into the light water reactor—the PWR or the BWR.
In the absence of any research we must assume that the Government will have to turn to the Atomic Energy Commission of America for advice. This prospect certainly frightens me. The House will recall that for some years American nuclear reactor manufacturers have not only been supplying their own country with the light water reactor but have been moving increasingly into Europe. There has

always been a doubt about the safety of such a reactor. The United States Atomic Energy Commission has always maintained its faith in the safety of this reactor. This faith is based on model tests and simulations. Its judgment was challenged some years ago by a group of scientists called the Union of Concerned Scientists—a small and tight-knit group which published a survey on nuclear reactor safety in July 1971. This was updated in March 1972.
The burden of the argument in that survey was that reactor manufacturers in America and the Atomic Energy Commission were both using questionable methods and data to evaluate the emergency core cooling system. This system was necessary to protect the nuclear plant and the health and welfare of people within its vicinity in the event of a failure in the main cooling flow. It is common ground that unless the emergency system works there will be an uncontrollable accident, with appalling consequences. As a result of this survey the Atomic Energy Commission was forced to hold public hearings on the subject. They commenced in January of last year.
The story of these hearings is fascinating, and I urge hon. Members to read it. The hearings produced some strong condemnation of reactor manufacturers and the commission. They were accused of producing examples of industrial research at its most misconceived and dishonest. When it is realised that the hearings produced a transcript 30 feet thick—I am told—we can begin to appreciate its importance.
Even so, a whole chapter was deleted on security grounds. It was headed: "Major accidents: Causes and Consequences." No one is satisfied with the reason why it was deleted, although it was published in the original survey of the scientists' group. The only answer that was given when the issue was raised was that it was said to deal with the allegedly unlikely event of any such catastrophe happening. I raise this point because I believe that the Granada Television team, which produces "World in Action" is at this moment screening a documentary dealing with these hearings. It is highlighting a fascinating situation. It shows the lengths to which the interested parties will go to suppress information.
I hope that the sub-committee of the Science and Technology Committee can have this film screened. I am advised that it shows men who were employed in various aspects of the nuclear reactor business and who are quite satisfied that there is an inherent danger in this light water reactor. They say that the safety measures for this emergency core cooling system upon which the AEC has placed such reliance, together with other European countries—and which our own Government may rely—are nonsense. The film apparently shows the lengths to which certain people were prepared to go to discharge others from jobs and accuse them of being militants and even Communists. Perhaps some of these people could be invited to give evidence about safety standards before anyone in this country is allowed to purchase these reactors. The AEC is now very much involved in trying to change the standard. I understand that it has not yet stopped the increased growth in the size of the output levels of these stations, but the New York Times recently published a statement saying that this matter has been taken seriously and that regulations are coming out shortly to reduce output levels.
If we have no research and development in this country to evaluate the safety standards of the light water reactor, the only body or persons to whom the Government can turn will be the Atomic Energy Commission of America and the manufacturers who have come out so badly in this report from the United States.
It will be seen from the two examples that I have mentioned, on safety to the community, that I am seriously concerned about the Government's failure to ensure adequate research and development into safety before disasters occur. It is no use having a disaster like the Torrey Canyon and asking why it happened. It is important to try to see into the future. We are responsible for advanced technology. Let us somehow try to anticipate possibilities and make arrangements to research and develop antedotes to them before they happen.
The Government should be seriously worried about deaths and injuries caused by foam fibre. My own union—the Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades Union—

and the British Safety Council are doing a tremendous amount of work. It is time the Government decided to introduce regulations on this foam. If it cannot be regulated they will have to decide to ban its use. It seems that the Government must either establish research into this material with more urgency and a greater sum than the £40,000 that they granted as a result of my questioning in the Select Committee, or be responsible for all the men, women and children who are likely to be injured and killed in future.
As a nation, we seem to be satisfied to take any kind of platitude as an excuse. I asked the Minister to produce statistics showing the number of fires, including those involving polyurethane, which had taken place. He refused. We cannot get any statistics because we have not got them. Yet we find in every coroner's report on death from fire that inevitably there is foam in the home. If a child is involved, it is said that he must have got some matches from somewhere and somehow set fire to the foam. In the case of an old person it is said that he must have been sitting in his chair and fallen asleep while smoking, and the lighted cigarette set fire to the foam. Neither of these propositions can be proved. I have quoted examples, and the Minister has said that foam cannot be ignited by a cigarette end. The Americans are using the cigarette test as a means of determining whether foam is inflammable. Therefore, the Minister cannot ignore these matters.
We should not be satisfied, as coroners and fire officers so often report, with giving the public a rational answer that they are prepared to accept. Children do play with matches, and old people probably do go to sleep whilst smoking, but in my view, neither of these propositions cause fires with foam. I believe that it is a question of the material itself, and that the sooner the Government take action, irrespective of all the vested interests who are trying to stop the investigation into it, the better.

8.34 p.m.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: I should like to associate myself with my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) and others who have sent their best wishes for a full and speedy recovery to the hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke).


Indeed, it is on one of the subjects in which the hon. Member is particularly interested, nature conservancy, that I should like to ask my first question.
Incidentally, it should be said that the Lord President of the Council has set an excellent example by his attendance. I am not carping. I am just a little surprised that during a debate, part of which is on Rothschild, there should be no representative of the Department of Education and Science present.
My question on nature conservancy is whether the Department of Education and Science is sure that, by this separation of the major part of nature conservancy from the laboratories, it has arrived at the best structure. It may be true that structures depend on people and that form here is not the most important thing. Nevertheless, it is a genuine question which arises out of the Select Committee's report, and I should have thought that someone from the DES might have been present.
The truth is that we are having a rather inebriated and desiccated debate precisely because it is six to nine months too late. All this should have been discussed not even in October last year but in June or July at the latest, and preferably in March or April when the rest of the scientific world was having its controversial discussions on Rothschild.
If the Leader of the House can do anything to make House of Commons debates more topical I am certain that that will be to the benefit of the Government machine as a whole. This is especially so when the subjects being debated contain no great party content. Topicality maximises their value, and I shall say hardly anything at all about Rothschild issues, simply because there is no point in doing so. It is past, it is stale, it is something that is all decided. One cannot alter things by saying something about them. Why, therefore, make speeches about things that one cannot alter?
Although it is hurtful and a bit sad-making for men like Sir Gordon Cox of the Agriculture Research Council, it may be true that the right hon. Gentleman's experience as Minister of Agriculture was valid and that the farming community felt that it had not had sufficient value from the ARC. All I say is that it has

been put to me by people in the ARC that perhaps the NFU in particular and a number of other bodies did not formulate their requests as clearly as they might have done. But all this is water under the bridge. As regards the ARC, I hope that the new relationship works. It should be tried, and we should wish it well because there is a balance of evidence on the right hon. Gentleman's side.
Coming to the Medical Research Council, may I repeat the question that I put during an intervention in the right hon Gentleman's speech. In all the discussions and in all the letters to The Times it has not been shown that there has been any single significant major occasion on which a request was made from local health authorities, from hospitals or from the Department when it was the Ministry of Health in response to which the MRC has not done its best to help or at least given reasons why, if its research was unsuccessful, it could not be done.
In this context the right hon. Gentleman said that he would keep an "open mind". Many of us have asked our friends in the MRC to monitor the new system. I grant that a certain amelioration has taken place. It is not as bad as many thought. Nevertheless, for some of us this will be a subject of maximum interest over a two- or three-year period and if it so happens that the scheme works less favourably than the right hon. Gentleman suggested it would we shall raise the matter again in the House in the hope of getting changes made. I hope, therefore that it is understood that the new arrangement of medical research is very much on probation and is no fixed scheme for eternity.
The next issue that must be raised again is that of Docksey. I have asked many questions, at business time and on other occasions, about the reasons for the non-publication of the Docksey Committee's Report. I and others understand that if evidence is given on a basis of confidentiality that confidentiality must be respected and that the issue of a breach of faith is involved. I am not suggesting that there should be a series of breaches of faith.
On the other hand, can it be argued, as I thought was implied by the Lord President, who will interrupt if I have misunderstood his argument, that distiguished people who give evidence to


Government Committees like Docksey would give different evidence in public to what they give in private? I do not believe for one moment that that is true. I do not believe that on any significant scale the kind of people who give evidence to Government science committees will say one thing out of one side of their mouth in private and another thing out of the other side of their mouth in public.

Mr. Prior: I am not saying that such people say one thing out of one side of their mouth in private and another thing out of the other side of their mouth in public. However, they may well find themselves unprepared to give as much evidence or information when it is known that it will be published as they are prepared to give if it is known that it will be kept confidential.
The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) mentioned President Nixon's directive that there should be much more open government. But President Nixon also said that the committee in question could sit in executive session. That means that it could go into a secret or private session. It is my guess that it passes the time of day in public and only gets down to the nuts and bolts in private. That is exactly what should be avoided if possible.

Mr. Dalyell: I accept that I may misunderstand the Lord President. As I understand it, it is his argument that they would be more reticent in public than in private. Maybe a balance has to be struck.

Mr. Benn: We would certainly settle for an executive order like President Nixon's to see what happens. The truth is that this country is more secretive about scientific decisions than many other countries.

Mr. Dalyell: It is that secretiveness that bothers me. When I was listening to my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreditch and Finsbury (Mr. Ronald Brown) it struck me that one could have judged his argument far better had the Vinter Report been published. There are difficult issues of commercial secrecy but the Government might well have considered the publication of the Vinter Report.

Mr. Ronald Brown: I put that question to Mr. Vinter, and the Minister kept trying to cut him short. Mr. Vinter wanted to reply, but the Minister argued that it was a policy decision. I do not concur with that view. I do not agree that advisers would be so reluctant to face questioning as is pretended.

Mr. Dalyell: There is the further argument that there are many people who are reticent about giving secret evidence to a Government because their colleagues may be wondering precisely what evidence they have given. Therefore, there is a real issue of swings and roundabouts. Some witnesses might speak more freely if they knew their evidence could be published.
It will be within the recollection of the Lord President that at business questions I asked him about the Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Bill which we should have debated on Thursday and which has been put off. It is unnecessary for the Ministry of Defence to say "You request to go to Aldermaston before the Bill comes up to see for yourself what happens on the ground. There is no point in your going to the non-classified area of Aldermaston." It may be that the visit would not be worth while, but that is up to me and my colleagues to judge. The denial of the visit to the non-classified part of Aldermaston when a measure that specifically concerns Aldermaston is to be raised in the House seems to be questionable. I throw in the remark that I wonder how much of Aldermaston needs to be classified after my right hon. Friend the then Prime Minister, who is now the Leader of the Opposition, referred at the party conference in Scarborough, I think, in 1967, to the civilian work that was to be done at Aldermaston. That is the kind of thing that back-bench Members should be able to evaluate. Did the Lord President wish to intervene?

Mr. Prior: Mr. Prior indicated dissent.

Mr. Dalyell: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will send me a reply.
There are three points, two minor and one major, to which I want to refer. As one who represents a few constituents working at the National Engineering Laboratory at East Kilbride. I think that


the Select Committee has been a bit harsh on them. It is all very well telling the NEL to be more aggressive, but precisely how does it become so? It goes to some effort to let industry know what it is doing. If there is fault here it is fault on more sides than that of the NEL. I think that the NEL has been treated pretty roughly, and it is incumbent on those who say that laboratories must adopt a more aggressive sales policy to say precisely what they mean. I shall be convinced by this kind of argument once it is spelled out properly.
There was another point in the right hon. Gentleman's speech which is very important—the whole question of the career structure. It takes us back to Lord Rothschild's appearance before the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee. I failed, despite the questioning on that occasion, to get any very clear idea where all these managerial jobs for scientists who were over 35 or 40 were to be found. There is quite a Civil Service problem here. Many grades of civil servants do not fancy the idea of plum jobs and key jobs—we are talking about these by definition—going to those who have been scientists and hitherto have been on rather different career structure lanes.
The question of jobs for the Civil Service in key positions is extremely difficult for any Government. I wonder precisely what is meant by saying "We are going to make it possible for those with scientific training to have key managerial jobs in the Civil Service." If it is meant simply in terms of directorships and deputy directorships of scientific establishments, that is one thing, but I seemed to detect in the right hon. Gentleman's speech that he was going wider and expressing the hope that many of the key positions in the Civil Service would henceforth be occupied, perhaps along the lines of the Fulton Report, by those who have had scientific training. I would welcome this. All I say is that it is a very difficult problem to implement, granted that there are career expectations by many administrative and executive class civil servants. I would welcome any clothes which the Minister might put on this argument.
I must confess that I agreed with the right hon. Gentleman on the question of a Minister for Science and Technology in the Cabinet. We must all speak person-

ally on this. I speak for no one else when I say that I think that this was an unrealistic proposal by the Select Committee and that such a Cabinet Minister would perhaps be batted around by the heads of the great Departments of State unless he occupied one job, perhaps the very important job of Lord President of the Council.
It may be true that if the Select Committee's recommendation were ever to be adopted by the Government a Minister, unless he was to become the creature of other Departments and have a very unhappy life, would have to have a senior pivotal job in the Government—which brings us back to Lord Hailsham and the kind of job he had. I say "kind of job he had" because I am aware that it is not a direct parallel. If this is to be a job at all as opposed to a non-job, it has to be occupied by someone who also has very important relationships with the Prime Minister in particular and with his Cabinet colleagues in general; otherwise it simply will not work.

Mr. E. S. Bishop: I was persuaded this afternoon by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) of the problems of having a Minister with these duties within the Cabinet. But I am uneasy about the recommendation of the White Paper that each Department should report to the House independently, presumably on a Vote or on the Consolidated Fund. Some of us who have heard the debate are anxious about how the job will be done without someone having the main responsibility and with the dangers of fragmentation. Has my hon. Friend any comments on that?

Mr. Dalyell: We are all extremely concerned that science training and science in general should be close to the centre of decisison making. On that we are agreed. The only difference is how to go about it. I am all for the whole structure of the Chief Scientific Adviser being discussed. I happen to think that the system now operating is operating pretty well, but that is merely a personal and perhaps an ill-informed opinion.
All I would say at present is that I do not see that a political Minister with these responsibilities will bring about the ends on which we may all be agreed.


It is merely a difference about the means rather than the ends. We all will the same end, but we are sceptical as to whether the Select Committee's suggestion will achieve the end that the Committee willed.
I come to what some of us regard as the crucial and urgent decision before the Government and Parliament. I return to the question that some of us raised at Question Time today concerning the post-Apollo programme. As I thought that this debate would collapse early, I gave notice to the Department of Trade and Industry at 4.15 p.m. that I proposed to raised the subject on a second Adjournment debate, and I hope that the Minister has had some opportunity to discuss it with his advisers.
We want to know what discussions took place with our European partners during the Christmas Recess. The scientific Press gave the impression that we were as much at odds as ever, that there were certain differences that could not be glossed over, particularly between ourselves and the French. I invite the Minister to say what he can about the factual basis on which discussions have taken place. What discussions has he and the Under-Secretary had at Washington and elsewhere in the United States?
I was surprised to be told at Question Time that the Americans had not asked for a date by which we should come to a decision on whether to take any part in a post-Apollo programme, for example, in relation to the sortie module, or, anything else in which Europe might conceivable participate. My information—and I hope that I shall be told that I am wrong—is that unless we decide by 1st July, or 1st August, they will give us up and the options will be closed.
Speaking personally—I have no business to speak for my party on this subject because I am not in any sense an official spokesman, but simply someone who hopes that we shall not be left out of this project and that we should keep our options open—I believe that this means committing fairly substantial sums, and I invite the Minister to say what sums have been discussed. Is he in a position to tell the House on what basis and with what guidelines these crucial discussions have been taking place?
It may be that we are starting, rightly or wrongly, on something of the order of Concorde. On the other hand, I should like to know whether some serious evaluation has been made in the Government machine of the price of not taking part in a post-Apollo project.
These discussions are taking place. Can we be told on what serious basis of decision-making and of information the British Government's attitude is being formed? I hope that the Minister will tell us as much on post-Apollo as he reasonably can.

8.55 p.m.

Mrs. Renée Short: I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) that we should have debated these matters some time ago. We are grateful to the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) and his Committee for having given us the opportunity to have the debate today.
Several of us have often asked when we would be able to debate the Rothschild proposals, but we have had no chance to do so until now. Although we are not united on some of the proposals in the Select Committee's reports the House is united, I think, in wanting to discuss Rothchild proposals and in supporting the contention in the Committee's First Report that the Government should not have prejudged the whole issue of the organisation of research by introducing a document welcoming and endorsing the Rothschild proposals when they did.
I support the Select Committee's proposal for the appointment of a Minister for Research and Development. This is supported by the Committee, which looked at all the evidence, but not by this side and, I suppose, not by the Government side. It is opposed by the Government principally on the grounds that the Minister in charge of a Department is fully accountable.
On page 6 of Cmnd. 5177 two naive questions are put. The first is paragraph 9(b), which asks
Are the executive Departments not sufficiently good at perceiving their own research and development needs, and in giving due weight to them when allocating resources to their functional tasks?
The other is paragraph 9(c), which asks
Are any areas of nationally important research and development likely to be neglected


without such a Minister to bring them to the Government's attention at a high level?
I know a large number of scientists working in several Government research establishments, and over the years I have been able to discuss with them the way in which Departments are organised, the proposals of successive Governments, my own included, the Rothschild proposals and the work of this Committee. The evidence seems to point to the conclusion that, unfortunately, Executive Departments are in most cases not the right people to determine research programmes, because they are too deeply engaged in the shorter-term priorities and too exposed to day-to-day pressures. This is absolutely true of a Minister. Executive Departments are unable to look forward very far.
Their problems—this is true, perhaps even more so, of industry—are today's problems, yesterday's problems and—the furthest in the future that they look—tomorrow's problems. What they should be looking at, as my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreditch and Finsbury (Mr. Ronald Brown) said, are the problems of 10 years hence. They should be anticipating the kind of difficulties which are likely to arise and make proposals for them.
The question in paragraph 9(c) of the White Paper leads me to give just one example of a nationally important matter which, although it required research and development work, has been neglected. This is a matter about which the Leader of the Opposition spoke to great point in his speech in Scotland at the weekend. I refer to North Sea exploration and exploitation. This has been possible not because of our own knowhow but because America has perfected the technique of offshore underwater operations.
Two questions arise here. First, why was not British research and development energy allocated to this work in good time? It has been advocated for many years by, among other groups, the Institution of Civil Engineers. That institution advocated this at least 10 years ago. Why was nothing done? Secondly, underwater exploration is now moving out into the deepest parts of the North Sea. We are moving away from the immediate offshore vicinity, and neither we nor the Americans possess the necessary technologies. Responsibility

for this research could be divided between the Department of the Environment, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence. Probably there are other Departments that right hon. and hon. Members could suggest. Which Ministry is to be responsible for work on this development, if we do any? Had there been a Ministry of Research and Development one would have expected that this would have been something to which it would have given its attention some years ago, and we should not have been in the position in which we now find ourselves.
The Rothschild Report, at paragraphs 49–55, discusses the Haldane principles. Lord Rothschild believes that these principles are no longer valid. He said in evidence to the Committee that an organisation was needed that was
competent to do what you ask.
Who is asking the questions? It was not clear from the evidence who is asking the questions and what questions are being asked. If the questions are concerned with the immediate problems, I suggest that they are not the correct questions to ask. They ought to be the long-term questions. For this purpose, for it to be done adequately and in the national interest—that is the important thing—we need an independent approach and an independent organisation.
I suspect that the real reason why the Government are not particularly anxious to appoint a Minister for Research and Development is their refusal to admit they were wrong in dismantling the DSIR in 1962, because the establishment of a Minister now would mean that they would have to eat those words, among other words they have eaten, and admit that they were wrong. But since the General Election they have eaten their words and stood policies on their heads on many occasions. Why not in this case?
The Rothschild Report sets out the customer-contractor principle. Lord Rothschild says that the customer says what he wants, the contractor does it if he can, and the customer pays. How does this apply to Government research centres? The name implies what work is paid for, and strictly speaking this is not so; it is rather misleading. Policy directorates lay claim to the effort of the research directorates in any Department


for research programmes that it wants to pursue. In any Government Department—this applies to the Department of the Environment and others—it is the policy directorates that are the customers; the contractors are the research stations, sometimes the universities, and sometimes industrial research organisations.
The Government have set up a vast network of research requirements committees. This has all happened fairly recently. I am speaking now from the point of view of scientists who are having to see beyond the effect of what the Lord President described at the end of his speech—to see how it works when one looks at it from the point of view of those scientists working in Government research establishments. There is a vast network of research requirements committees from which the universities and industry are excluded. These consider the research programmes that are put up by the research establishments, the intention being that policy directorates would be more likely to apply the results of research programmes in the formulation of which they have taken an active part.
The proposals of research requirements committees are then vetted by the programme revision committees in the Department, headed by the Chief Scientific Adviser for the Department, and he then submits these to PESC.
Two things stand out in this procedure. First, the hope of increased application of research results by Government Departments has yet to be proven. We have no evidence that this is the way it is working. In any case, if one looked at the research programmes at several of the establishments under different Governments one would see that it was an open question whether the research actually carried out was in the best interests of the nation; if it really was what the nation required, and not what the Department and the scientific adviser to the Minister required. The two things are not necessarily compatible.
There has been an increasing shift in responsibility for research programmes from the directing staff of the research stations—high-powered scientists who have been appointed as directors of our research establishments—to the research committees which exercise not merely an

advisory function, which was the intention originally, but an executive function. Under the present system this trend will continue, with more and more responsibility being taken away from those scientists who are directly responsible for carrying out research programmes. This is a thoroughly bad development. The idea that research can be directed by large committees, some of which are overlapping and treading on each other's territory, and composed of civil servants with little or no research background, each pushing its own limited directives, is nonsense. This will not work.
If the Minister would discuss these problems with some of the people actually working in the research establishments, I am sure he would find that there is this concern. We have some very high-powered scientists working in research establishments. They are highly respected in our industry and they have a great international reputation. In setting up their research programmes they are expected to look ahead. The responsibility for setting up the programmes and for stopping them when it is felt that they ought to be stopped should be theirs alone, and not that of the departmental committee. Individual responsibility, as any scientist will agree, is of enormous importance in scientific work.
I believe that our industry in general, and the Government, are bedevilled by the diffusion of responsibility through masses of committees. Our Government research stations were an exception, but they are now being interfered with at an increasing rate under the Rothschild organisation, and the responsibility is being taken away from the directors of the research establishments.
The other important aspect which I find most disturbing is the fact that there is a virtual exclusion of industry from the work of the research establishments under the new arrangements. The conclusion was that once the Government accepted the thesis of Rothschild that the research establishments should work mainly for the Government, industry would come rather far behind. But in the end industry is the user of the research that is done in different research establishments, and in some industries in the past when there was closer contact between research establishments and industry—when they were working very closely


together on advisory committees, for example—there was still an enormous time lag between the results of the research carried out in Government research establishments and their application in industry. The building industry is a prime example where the time lag is about 10–15 years. No wonder the building industry is so far behind.
By adopting these proposals the Government have to some degree endangered the Government research organisations. Recruitment to the centres is now subordinate to the Civil Service committees. I believe that in the long run this will become less attractive to young men and women of talent. Recruitment has been taken out of the hands of the research establishments and has become a function of the civil servants; it is they who do the advertising for staff, and the interviewing. This is nonsense. It should remain the responsibility of the staff of the research establishments.
The machinery has become intolerably slow, and in his reply the Minister should give an indication that he intends to look at it urgently and to return this responsibility to research establishments. In my view the Government should re-examine the very sensible proposals contained in the Select Committee's reports that they should consult industry again and swallow their words, as they have done so many times in the past. In that way morale in Government establishments would improve.

9.10 p.m.

Mr. George Lawson: I must apologise for seeking to speak in this debate because, through no fault of my own, I was late in arriving here and have missed most of what has been said. However, I intervene for a few minutes to strike a note of concern about one aspect. It is the Nature Conservancy and the decision to abolish it as it has been known over the years and instead to set up what is to be called the new Nature Council.
At the outset I ought to declare an interest. I have been a member of the Scottish Committee of the Nature Conservancy for a number of years. It is an unpaid job. It is a matter of interest. I want to see the Nature Conservancy go on from strength to strength.
In paragraph 55 of Command 5046 one reads:
There is…a duality in the Nature Conservancy in its present form, which has caused stresses difficult to resolve within the present framework. The Government believes that, if the original purposes of setting up a Nature Conservancy in 1949 and of…a Research Council for the environmental sciences in 1965 are both to be fulfilled, it is necessary to make a fresh start.'
The fresh start, in effect, means putting the Nature Conservancy in a position where it will manage the nature reserves and the staff to run them.
The first note that I wish to strike draws attention to the peculiar characteristic of the Nature Conservancy as it has been. It was a research organisation as well as an organisation concerned with the managing of reserves. If one refers to the same Command Paper and to the various reports that we are discussing, the point is made that most scientists come into Government service because they wish to pursue scientific careers. But what will be the position of the new Nature Council if it is to be an organisation which virtually manages nature reserves, perhaps giving a bit of advice here and there? There might be a danger of its becoming a glorified park-keeping organisation. If that happens I doubt whether the new Nature Council will be able to recruit the kind of people who have made the existing Nature Conservancy possibly the most outstanding example of such an organisation in the world.
The British Nature Conservancy has been outstanding and unique in this connection. If I understand it at all, part of its power and of its high standing has stemmed from the fact that it is both a research organisation and an organisation managing reserves.
A further point worthy of consideration is that the purpose for which the Nature Conservancy was set up has been extended rapidly. If the Leader of the House cares to read the report of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs he will see that it recommends an extension of the powers of the Nature Conservancy.
We see the Nature Conservancy as one of the most important organs in the countryside in managing reserves and increasingly offering guidance in all the new ideas we have about the environment. It is concerned with living things


as well as with what can be seen. If the Nature Conservancy is stripped of its research work it is in exceedingly great danger of being stripped of its personnel. Perhaps this will not happen in the year or two ahead, but further ahead an organisation that does not do this kind of work is unlikely to attract the sort of people who have given the Nature Conservancy the high standing which it enjoys.
The Nature Conservancy is capable of doing much more than its present resources permit. The line we should be taking is to add still further to the resources of that organisation so that it may better carry out the work for which it was created.
The process that is going on is of the carving up of the Nature Conservancy. There is a tremendous amount of unhappiness and uncertainty among the people who make up the organisation. They do not know what is happening or where they will go. This matter must be settled. It should not be allowed to go on month after month but should be settled quickly. I associate myself with the plea made by the right hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke), who is unfortunately unable to be with us, when he asked why it was deemed necessary to make this carve-up. It is necessary to decide the issue quickly and also for Parliament to be given a clear understanding of the pros and cons of the issue.
My association with the Nature Conservancy over a number of years leads me to say that it would be a great loss to the nation if we were to do something which might read all right on paper, might seem all right in theory but would destroy an organisation of such high standing. It could become a much bigger organisation whose standing would grow if it had the personnel. I doubt whether it can possibly recruit personnel if it is not permitted to engage in extensive research work.

9.18 p.m.

Mr. E. S. Bishop: I had not intended to intervene from the Front Bench tonight, but I will make a short speech because we have to look at the prospects of research and development work in the years that lie ahead. I am

prompted to intervene at this stage following the question which I put this afternoon to the Minister for Aerospace and Shipping about a statement on the post-Apollo programme, and I am also prompted by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell).
I could say much about the report, and much has been said on both sides of the House in this useful debate, but all I want to do is to lift the corner of the curtain about the kind of research and development that is to take place and the impact of post-Apollo on our programmes in the next decade or two. I am particularly concerned, as I am sure are the people in management and the employees of the British aircraft industry, about the kind of work they can expect in the years ahead, in view of the shortage of work to follow the major programmes of Concorde and Rolls-Royce.
In July I had the good fortune to visit Cape Kennedy and see some of the work in the post-Apollo programme. I saw the space tug and simulator and viewed the Apollo 17 project which has now been successfully landed on the moon and has returned. Anybody who visits Cape Kennedy has his eyes opened to the prospects for the future. When one returns to this country one shares the concern felt throughout the British aerospace industry about British participation in the post-Apollo programme.
I was told today during Question Time that the Minister attended the European Space Conference on 20th December and that the conference gave general approval to the sortie laboratory element of the post-Apollo programme to be carried out and managed within a European framework. When we realise the immense opportunities which lie before us, we can only feel concerned at the lack of any information from the Government on this matter. If the Government were to take the opportunity which we on these benches have sought to give the Government, it would reveal a story which would give new confidence to those in the aerospace industry whose future lies under a question mark.
There are two main points which I wish to make. I should like first to refer to the image of the industry in this country, which thinks of it in terms of putting a man on the moon—in other words, as


a concept far in excess of anything in which Britain can be involved. The second is the lack of any realisation of the exciting prospects and possibilities of how the post-Apollo follow-up can be used to improve the ordinary, every-day lives of millions of people. We must recognise that a great deal has been learned from the experience of the post-Apollo programme. I refer to all that has been learned in terms of navigation, weather forecasting, the packaging of food, safety, and the use of new materials which can be adapted for use in so many ways. I refer to crop control, medicine, agriculture, oceanography, astronomy, and many other ways, such as the assessment of mineral resources. All these possibilities show that in the next few years there will be dramatic changes in our research and development programmes.
We have heard comments about the work of the Rothampsted Research Station in agriculture and all the rest. We know that in many fields of science and technology and in terms of our own research and development programme the results of the post-Apollo programme can make a dramatic difference to the direction of research in opening up new avenues never before dreamt of and most important to the lives of ordinary people. This can add to the quality and dimension of people's lives in ways which they have never experienced, and it is the post-Apollo programme and work which has been carried out in the United States which has given us some indication of what can happen.
These aspects of the subject indicate the use of new tools for mankind. I was in the aircraft industry for over 20 years before I became a Member of this House, and I know the sort of optimism which would abound if we were let into the Government's thinking on this or on other occasions. I have spoken to people in the United States about possible United States involvement in the United Kingdom programme, but as the months have passed I have seen the options gradually being closed. Britain certainly can play her part in a European context. Although enormous costs may be involved, I do not believe that they will be in the region of the costs of the Concorde project. A great deal can be done if we share the workload and responsibility with our European partners.
At Question Time this afternoon I was told that each country was left free to decide whether it would participate and, if so, the size of its financial contribution. That is all very well as a soup course, but we want to get at the main meal. We want to know to what extent the Government have thought about the matter and how Britain can participate. We want to know how we can participate in the sky-lab, the sortie module and in other ways. We want to know whether we shall be able to use the launching facilities which must come from the United States to keep down costs and to avoid duplication. We also want to know about the financial contribution. Already the British Aircraft Corporation, Hawker Siddeley and others have made a notable contribution with INTELSAT and other satellites.
The Government should give the House more information about their thinking, because there is a gloom over the industry about these exciting possibilities which may slip from our grasp unless the Government recognise that we have a contribution to make and know where their initiatives can be employed. By their answers tonight and by their statements over the next few months the Government can restore confidence to our aircraft industry and open up to the British people and our allies the exciting possibilities which space development and research can bring to raise the standard and quality of everyday living for millions.
I hope that the Minister will give us some information to dispel some of the gloom and give a new sense of security to those who depend on Government thinking now and in the next decade or two.

9.25 p.m.

The Minister for Aerospace and Shipping (Mr. Michael Heseltine): This has been a debate of almost bewildering breadth, and that is inevitable on a subject of such complexity.
I join hon. Members on both sides in paying tribute to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) and the hon. Member for Bristol, Central (Mr. Palmer) for the considerable reputation they have earned for the Select Committee in dealing with this subject. I say that with some trepidation


because I have already appeared before the Committee twice and I do not look forward to repeating the experience earlier than necessary because my hon. Friend and the hon. Gentlemen are persistent and perceptive.
I add my personal words of pleasure at the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) is recovering. I know that my hon. Friend would have loved to take part in our deliberations. We are sorry that he has not been able to do so.
I suppose everyone will agree that the most emotive question that arises from the various debates we have had on this subject and which has surrounded a certain amount of the public dialogue is the question of secrecy, whether Governments should make as freely known as evidently President Nixon had it in mind to do tile deliberations and advice which enable them to reach their conclusions.
I have been personally involved in one such area of controversy; namely, the one that surrounded the Marshall Report in an area of discussion in the aerospace industry. There have been a number of such areas, such as the Docksey Report. There are issues of principle and expediency which make it difficult to give a clear answer in hypothetical situations about what any Government can he expected to do.
I felt unwilling to publish the Marshall Report. Sir Robert Marshall is a very distinguished civil servant in my Department and at that time was answerable to me for a part of my responsibilities. It puts a Minister and his Permanent Secretary in an invidious position if the Permanent Secretary has given his name to a report making recommendations which the Minister is then unwilling or reluctant to accept or, in the reverse case, then accepts. It is the Minister who is answerable for policy. If it is based upon a report associated with a civil servant, it brings into question the whole constitutional authority of ministerial responsibility.
My view is that it is the Government's responsibility and individual Ministers' responsibility to be answerable for policy decisions and not the responsibility of civil servants. A whole range of ques-

tions flow from the idea that civil servants should be expected to be answerable in public for reviews which they carry out at the behest of Ministers.

Mr. Leadbitter: I have already stated that it was competent for the Select Committee to deal with the matter in private if Docksey or any other source felt that should be done. The Minister mentioned principle and expediency. Does he not recognise that there is nothing in this report which he could quote in terms of principle or expediency? However, there are other matters of merit which show that there was no clash of the public interest. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry used an unfortunate phrase in evidence; he spoke about a report which clashed with the Government approach.

Mr. Heseltine: The position is clear. I was talking about not the Docksey Report but the Marshall Report, which concerns the internal civil servant producing a report which I was asked to publish. The Docksey Report was different because the issue was not one of principle. It was whether the report contained confidential information which it was felt by the Ministers responsible, of which I was one, it would not be right to publish. We were able to reach an agreement about a shortened, abridged, expurgated—call it what you will—version and the Docksey Report was made available to the Select Committee. That is one way in which it is always possible to accommodate a Select Committee.
If people who draft reports are aware that there may be bits of the reports that might be left out they have to raise in their own minds the agreements they reach with Ministers before submitting the reports knowing that only certain parts may be passed on for wider public discussion.

Mr. Leadbitter: The hon. Gentleman cannot get away with this point about the abridged or expurgated report. The Docksey Report as it came to the Select Committee was not abridged in the sense the Minister is implying. It complied with the normal form of any report which comes to a Select Committee when an author feels that in his or her judgment there is an issue of commercial confidentiality at stake. The report that


comes to the Committee is a full one, not abridged.

Mr. Heseltine: But the principle that arises from this is still valid. In this case we were able to deal with the Docksey Report, and I was glad to be associated with the agreement that was reached. There could easily be a situation where that might not be the case. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House is absolutely right to question the sort of freedom with which people would give evidence to such inquiries if they knew that there was the possibility of publication on a subsequent and unknown date.
One can too easily think of examples. Consider those being asked about their employers, their trade associations or their opinions of other organisations with which they do business. In human terms they would have to give opinions that were either qualified or inaccurate, or decline to answer, or take a personal risk which we could not expect them to do. I realise that I am dealing with hypothetical circumstances, and I do not think there is purpose in pursuing these objections. The dangers and difficulties exist.

Mr. Palmer: Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that it is, therefore, important that the civil servant or other individual giving advice should remain anonymous? The difficulty arises when names are mentioned.

Mr. Heseltine: That again raises questions. It is perfectly right that people judging a report and the evidence upon which it is based should know something about the people who actually gave evidence. One can think of the most obvious circumstances. One relies on the integrity, quality, background and experience of people giving advice. If we do not know who they are we might say "Who was it who gave this anonymous information so detrimental to a particular cause?" Wherever we look there are difficulties.

Mr. Benn: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for recognising that this is the central theme of the debate. May I ask him to look critically at the argument he has put to the House? The argument he has used against publication of Docksey or Marshall or Vinter was

the same argument tabled with enormous force by Whitehall against having a Select Committee at all, on the ground that if we exposed a civil servant to cross-examination he might be asked to say something with which his Minister might later disagree. A man giving evidence might be asked to say something about his employer's attitude towards Government policy. The arguments that will always be used in favour of secrecy need to be looked at critically because a Minister can benefit by wider and more intelligent discussion of the issues upon which he has to decide. It is not always to his disadvantage that others should recognise the complexity of difficulties when they come to consider his recommendation.

Mr. Heseltine: I agree absolutely with the right hon. Gentleman. There is certainly great merit in many areas of policy formation in being able to publish a report and test the water to see that nothing has been omitted. I know of an example myself concerning noise at the third London airport. I considered that this was such a crucial issue and the advice that I was being given was so specialised that it was right to make it publicly available for a given period to make sure that no arguments had been overlooked. For the reasons that the right hon. Gentleman has outlined, therefore, I thought it right to advise the Secretary of State to publish the report, which he did. We are all glad that we took that precaution, even though the original conclusions stood. I would be the first to argue that we should try to use this as a method of procedure wherever possible because there are benefits in having the widest possible dialogue. It helps to keep people interested in the subject, and that is most important.
I shall now move on to the general question of secrecy in the monitoring of the various work that is done in the research establishments and in the work now to be done by the requirements boards and in the whole area that we are now discussing. The Government have stated their intentions that all Departments with a research and development activity should publish an annual report on those activities. We stated that in the White Paper. The intention is that the reports should be published in each summer. Perhaps I may cover briefly the grounds which my Department in-


tends to cover in the reports that it will produce.
First, we shall want to see in the report a statement of the total research and development expenditure for the Department. Then we shall want to see the amounts and objectives of research expenditure on separate projects. We would obviously have to have in mind the extent to which confidentiality might be appropriate. Then we should want progress reports which would highlight the successful projects and give reasons for any change in programmes which will be a continuing part of the development. We should want a report on the machinery for developing and matching the various R and D programmes to requirements and resources, and I believe that that will be an important part of the continuing information available to the House and to the public. It is fair to say at once that these annual reports will not try to replace the very detailed technical appraisals of projects which are part of the information available to the scientific community through the more familiar public dialogue conducted in this House.

Mr. Neave: Does my hon. Friend remember the point I made when I said that these reports should be separate documents? In paragraphs 40 to 46 the White Paper seemed to suggest that they should be lumped together in some consolidated form. I hope that that will not be so but that they will be separate documents available to the Select Committee.

Mr. Heseltine: Certainly they will be available to the Select Committee, and we shall look carefully at the suggestions put to the House as to the precise form of publication. There may be various ways of doing it, but the crucial point is that they should be available for the Select Committee and for the House, and that is undoubtedly the case.
The Select Committee's Report was more specifically directed at the three multi-purpose establishments—the National Physical Laboratory, the National Engineering Laboratory, and Warren Spring—where there is a range of programmes which has now been reorganised or is in the process of being reorganised under the requirements board

system. The Committee suggested that the industrial research establishments would be better able to transfer their technology to industry if they were more independent, and, broadly speaking, that was the argument that led to the proposal that there should be a research establishment authority. The Select Committee will realise that this idea has been considered over a period of time. It was proposed in 1970 in the Green Paper put forward by the previous Government, and the same sort of case was argued there.
Our view is that we can go a long way—the desirable part of the way—without the dramatic surgery that would be involved in a procedure of this kind. Our view is that there is a close relationship between the funding of research and development which is carried out in the research establishments and the policy issues which the Government Departments responsible for these programmes have to administer. We believe, therefore, that it is necessary to keep the close relation ship there, but we are fully in sympathy with the view that one has to find ways of bringing industrialists and universities into as close a partnership as possible to try to maximise the exploitation of the research and development that is carried out. That broadly reflects the functional approach to Government research and development to which reference has been made.
I should like to refer to a matter which is the responsibility not of an independent authority but of the Minister. Many hon. Members who have spoken have experience, as I have, of operating with responsibility for these programmes not only in Britain but across the European frontiers. Therefore, we are aware of the mixed situation which exists and the way in which, if we have particular questions on space matters, with which I shall want to deal, we are dealing with Ministers who often have specific responsibilities for space matters but do not have across-the-board responsibility for research in the countries in which they have ministerial rank.
I support the view put forward by my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council that to put a Minister with a small secretarial department into the Cabinet to speak for this vitally important sphere of national endeavour and to


separate him from the big spending Departments which have the policy responsibilities for the industries within which the research and development is bound to be locked would be a prejudicial act to the research and development activities. Indeed, it is in conflict with the arguments that we have put forward on the need to extend the relationship between industrialists and the Government funding research and development. There would be a fundamental conflict there. So it is right that individual Ministers should be responsible not only for the industries which they sponsor but for the research and development in those industries.
It is arguable, and it has been argued with some logic this afternoon, that the need is not only to pursue the sort of relationship which comes from the Minister but to have some method of comparing research in one sphere with that in another. The reality is that research is probably related to the scale of commitment industrially of the country in any particular sphere. All who have worked in Government, particularly with the allocation of resources aspects, are aware that in the last resort, however theoretically desirable it may be, it is extremely difficult to find constant means of comparing where we should devote our national resources. It is difficult to know whether we are right to put money into roads or into public transport. There is no absolute standard of measurement. We can make political judgments. There are large areas where political judgments have to be made in the allocation of research and development budgets, in support of industry, or whatever it may be, just as there are in the whole gamut of political activity on which we are constantly making judgments.
The arguments go back to allowing Ministers to be responsible for the total range of the industrial spectrum under their control. There was a completely non-party approach on the issue. My view is, therefore, very much on the side that the Government have put forward. But I am absolutely clear that those who argue that we must be sure to exploit—in the proper sense of that word—the research and development which has cost a great deal of public money, are absolutely right. That is why we have introduced the requirements boards system. I

believe that people watching their development—they are in a very rudimentary stage at the moment—will come to the view that a real attempt is being made to create a partnership between industry, the universities and the Government.
The House will be aware that we have set up five boards, and there is a sixth to come. We have experimented with the chairmanship of the boards. We have had civil servants and responsible academics, and industrialists in charge of them. The proposal is that the chairman of each board shall sit on a committee—a chairman's board—under my chairmanship. We will act as the co-ordinating body of the requirements boards to steer them in the directions in which they are attempting to go.
The boards will have a real say in executive decisions relating to the programmes and budgets which they administer. This is an attempt to ensure that the customer—the industrialist, in many cases—knows that industry is being consulted. An industrialist on the board may be responsible for the report which will come through every year and be available to the Select Committee and to the House. He may be responsible for reports of programmes and policies in areas for which he is responsible.
When I was interviewed by the Select Committee I remember being probed about the allocation of resources and about how one made decisions on what programmes and policies should apply in any area. The Select Committee made the point that a policy is needed before setting up the board and committing funds. My view is that the board is created and one then gets it to do the detailed survey and analysis work for which it has responsibility. The board is told what money is available. It is told the parameters within which it should allocate its programmes and decide its policies. That will be the basis of the reports put forward and published, which the Select Committee and the House will have a full opportunity to examine and consider.

Mr. Ronald Brown: How many of the people on these requirements boards will be trade union representatives from one or other of the trade unions affiliated to the TUC?

Mr. Heseltine: We have not seen the purpose of the boards as that of having representatives from a group of people. The boards will consist of people who have specialised knowledge of the areas in which the boards operate. It is wrong to try to see it as necessary to have someone from a particular part of the country or region, or from the employers' side or the trade union side. Employers will be on the boards not as employers per se but as experts in particular fields. There is no hard and fast view about this. One can look at it if there is an argument for it, but no representations have been put to me on that issue.
Perhaps I may move on from the question of the requirements boards to that of research and development in Europe. This question was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, Langstone (Mr. Ian Lloyd) who said that we were not getting value for money on a European scale. That, happily, brings me to the question of the post-Apollo programme. Space matters, for which I have a responsibility, provide a clear indication of the lack of value for money in European terms. I think that if I try to set the scene for space matters and deal with post-Apollo I shall answer the points raised by many hon. Members.
We in Europe are spending about one-sixth as much as the United States in the civil field, yet I do not believe that anyone taking a casual glance at the results would say that we were getting one-sixth of the benefits or achievements of the United States. The reasons are obvious. They have one Government, and one agency. We have a proliferation of Governments and programmes. There is no certainty that the efforts of Europe are co-ordinated, or that the industrial capabilities of Europe have been planned. There is much more evidence that various countries are competing with each other in Europe to try to maintain capabilities and be sure that they can bid against other countries or industries for parts of particular programmes.
That being the case, we in Britain have looked at the whole of the European field and not only do we see that; we see a situation in which there is a conflict of judgment about what policies various European countries want to pursue in the civil field. The launcher issue is a clear

example of an issue upon which there is no agreement. We have told the Europeans that we believe it would be a helpful step to establish a European space agency, and phase into it the national programmes of the various countries that make a contribution in this field.
I do not need to spell out the advantages that come from that. We are left, however, with a number of problems, including the problem of what happens when one group of countries, or one country, wants to do one thing and the other countries do not. That means that there has to be an a la carte approach to the plans that are pursued. However, at least one knows that the agency will be monitoring the situation and that a central approach can be fed in to the maintenance and creation of industrial capabilities.
The second problem is the level of the budget in with which one is prepared to become involved. This country is willing to see its resources better deployed, but it is not prepared to see its resources increased in terms of commitment in space.
That brings me specifically to the post-Apollo programme. There is the argument—which we have not yet had to resolve—about whether the technological opportunities in post-Apollo are sufficiently attractive to this country's industry, so that we, as a Government, should commit ourselves.
In the post-Apollo programme there are areas of technology which are vastly exciting but in which our participation is not possible. It is conceivable that they might have been open to us two or three years ago, when the offer was first made. If we had had the industry in Europe which was sufficiently rich and powerful to take immediate action we could have had a fairly substantial part of the post-Apollo programme. But time has gone on. It is symptomatic of the European space effort that we were not able to respond with the clarity and speed which would have enabled us to have a substantial part of the programme.
We are now in a situation where we are dealing with the possibility of participating in the NASA programme. It is our view that whilst there may be arguments for being involved in that the priority in


Europe is to bring about a single European space agency. Until we get that right we will never get the industrial strength in Europe with which to participate in major partnerships. It is important not to approach the wrong question. The right question is the need to create the framework. If we get that framework, in the context of the progress which we make in achieving that, we consider that our position in the post-Apollo programme has been made clear. The right priority is to get the industrial and political framework which is necessary to put Europe into the space business. That is the position as I have explained it to my European colleagues, to NASA and to the main contractors, McDonnell-Douglas, who I was able to see on my last visit to the United States.

Mr. Dalyell: We are most grateful to the Minister for the serious way in which he has dealt with our questions. However, will the Minister say something about the discussions which he has had with the American Government? Are they showing lack of patience?

Mr. Heseltine: I think that the American Government fully understand the situation. There is no indication of lack of patience. The courtesy which was extended to us did not indicate that. They understand the background which we have put forward. They are aware that the European Ministers, meeting in December, took a decision in principle to establish a European space agency. The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) will be familiar with that. They know that if the agency is established the Ministers agree that it would be perfectly correct for it to manage or carry on the work within post-Apollo, if individual countries wanted to go ahead. One or two countries have indicated that they do, but at the moment the United Kingdom has not done so.
That deals with the post-Apollo programme in the limited time which I am able to give to it. I hope that what I have said will add to the knowledge which the House has on the subject.
One or two questions were raised by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) which I may mention briefly. The Harrier aircraft is undoubtedly a most remarkable piece of

technology. However, the difficulties of achieving a suitable pay load, together with the noise factor, make it unthinkable at this stage for this development to appear in the civil market Undoubtedly it is making a contribution in the military field which is highly appreciated. That cannot be disputed.
The question of nuclear power tot desalination was also raised. The reason that no sales have been made in South America is that we are unable to produce a system of sufficient power to enable us to sell it. However, the importance of the system is understood if we can make it work. Research is going on in this country.
The next question concerned carbon fibres and the RB211. The original carbon fibres did not stand up to tests because of bird damage, and we had to replace them with metal technology.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) raised the question of the ARC at Rothamsted and made the point that his constituents had represented to him their anxieties about the Green Paper. Some period of time has now elapsed between then and now, and I think that the anxieties in the research councils are of a different order of magnitude from what we heard today from the hon. Member for the Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter), who gave some quotations surrounding earlier uncertainty. When we go in for changes in any area there is an element of uncertainty, and representations naturally take place. That process occurred in this case, and the dialogue has been interesting and important. But now there is a great deal more understanding of what the Government are trying to do.
I remind my hon. Friend of four points which I think will help in his case. The first is that the transfer of funds from the ARC to the Ministry of Agriculture. Fisheries and Food is to be spread over a period of years. Secondly, there is the assurance that in the first year the funds transferred will be spent through the ARC itself. Thirdly, the departmental view as to where work will be carried out in research and development will be decided not only on the basis of which laboratory is to carry out which work but with a view to maintaining certain levels of employment so as to avoid


violent fluctuations. Fourthly, the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is a distinguished ARC scientist himself. I hope that these four points reassure my hon. Friend that the anxieties which were put to him some time ago ought now to have been allayed.
I turn now to the question of the Nature Conservancy and the question of the NERC. The Nature Conservancy was in existence before the NERC was created. It thereafter became involved within the framework of the NERC and had two broad functions—research and management—in the various activities concerned. The crucial point is that when the Department of the Environment was set up it was rightly understood that it would be the major weapon in the environmental battle which everyone supports and that it was right to give it the widest possible opportunity to co-ordinate activities. At that stage the Government, having considered the evidence about what should be done, had to make a decision. The evidence put to them was totally conflicting. The Government were advised to do diametrically opposed things—to leave the situation as it was, with integration under the Department of the Environment, or to have integration between the two. In the end it seemed sensible to transfer the Nature Con-

servancy's management areas under the new Nature Council to the Department and to leave the research in the NERC, The Nature Council to be set up will have the ability to conduct expenditure on research through the NERC. I believe that that should help to allay some of the anxieties.
I repeat that I am aware that I have been able to cover only a few of the subjects raised in the debate. I hope that I have covered them in some detail, because they merit it. The House, I am sure, agrees that this has been an extremely valuable debate. I hope that I have been able to leave the impression that we are as concerned as the Select Committee, which has done, I believe, a remarkable job. Although we look forward to a period of stability in research and development, we will keep a very close watch on the day-to-day operations being set in motion and will exercise a degree of flexibility within the general policy of trying to have a period of calm.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House takes note of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Reports from the Select Committee on Science and Technology in the last Session of Parliament and of the relevant Government Observations (Command Paper Nos. 5176 and 5177.)

Orders of the Day — SEA FISH INDUSTRY BILL

Not amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Motion made, and Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time, put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 56 (Third Reading), and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — FISHING VESSELS (GRANTS)

10.0 p.m.

The Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Anthony Stodart): I beg to move,
That the Fishing Vessels (Acquisition and Improvement) (Grants) (Amendment) Scheme 1972, a copy of which was laid before this House on 13th December, be approved.
It is wholly appropriate that this scheme should follow immediately after the final stages in this House of the Sea Fish Industry Bill. I should like to thank the right hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) and his hon. Friends as well as my hon. Friends for their help and co-operation in making such rapid progress with that Bill. I suspect that the length of its Committee stage must qualify it for a place in the Guinness Book of Records, if the authors of that volume are not too busy doing something else at the moment.
I say that it is appropriate for this measure to follow that Bill because it seeks in relation to fishing vessel grants to achieve what the measure we have just deals with aims to accomplish for vessel loans, which is, of course, a closely related area of capital support to the industry.
The effect of the scheme can, like that of the Bill, be stated simply. Its purpose is to extend the availability of grant assistance to applications approved by the White Fish Authority or the Herring Industry Board during 1973. This in itself could not be more straightforward, but I should perhaps explain briefly and by way of background why it is we need an extension in our grant arrangements just now and why this is being achieved through a scheme.
It arises because, in common with these items of support such as loans and subsidies which feature in the Bill, our powers to make grants available to the industry were originally set in 1962 for 10 years as recommended by the Fleck Committee. As a result, they were due to expire at the end of last year.
The effect of this scheme will be to extend them for a further year, and just as this same aim was generally welcomed in the context of the Bill, so I believe the House will agree that this is the right course to take here. This point apart, I think the scheme hardly calls for any detailed explanation.
The scheme maintains the present administrative arrangements governing the approval and payment of grant. This, too, is consistent with the approach adopted in the Bill, and I think it is the right course in all the circumstances. Certainly the indications are that the existing scheme is fulfilling its purpose and that the rate of capital renewal in the various sectors is running at a satisfactory level.
The House may like me to give two brief examples of this last point. First, there is the number of approvals issued by the White Fish Authority for deep-sea vessels—those over 80 ft.—and for the smaller inshore vessels. In the first six months of the present financial year—in other words, between 1st April and 30th September last year—11 approvals were given for deep-sea vessels and 75 for those less than 80 ft. This compares with annual averages—I stress those words—over the previous 10 years of 10 and 82 approvals respectively. On that basis we are well up to past performance in the white fish sector, and the same pattern emerges for herring.
In the first nine months of 1972 the Herring Industry Board approved no fewer than 18 grant applications for vessels, compared with an annual average of 10 during the previous decade. The scheme will help to maintain this trend during 1973 while leaving open the provision to be made thereafter.
As one who has listened on many occasions in his parliamentary life to speeches by the right hon. Member for Workington, I can say that one policy of which he is a strong advocate is the gospel of flexibility.
At this moment when in certain parts of the fishing seas our men are enduring the most appalling conditions and are showing the most splendid spirit in resisting them—an episode in which I cannot have been more grateful for the support shown by all sections of industry and both sides of the House—I hope that this scheme will commend itself to all hon. Members here tonight.

10.6 p.m.

Mr. Fred Peart: The Minister mentioned our attitude towards the Sea Fish Industry Bill. It was right to allow it to proceed as it did. After all, it was supported by both sides and I see no reason for delay or talk if we are to have something which will help the industry. I am glad that we allowed it to go through, and I am grateful for what the hon. Gentleman has said.
The instrument itself deals with grants as distinct from loans. The Minister has been nostalgic about 1962 and the Fleck Committee. I remember the distinguished chairman of that committee, a distinguished chemist who worked for ICI, a man whom I knew personally. His report helped the industry considerably.
We are tonight dealing with grant arrangements and the Minister has given us examples and figures dealing with deep sea vessels. He said I had always accepted that we should be flexible. I am glad he appreciates this, since Ministers are often too doctrinaire. Although he has never been doctrinaire on fish the Minister has been so on agriculture—but I will not go into that now. I would say to my colleagues that I am flexible. I would love to have a debate about our attitudes on other matters, but I should be out of order. We have had questions today.
I accept what the Minister said. The industry has been facing a difficult situation and our seamen deserve our support. Fishermen from all our ports are affected. I hope that we shall have a peaceful solution to the cod war but I want to help the industry and I believe that this instrument will do so. Therefore, I hope we shall proceed with it quickly.

10.9 p.m.

Mr. W. H. K. Baker: I do not wish to comment on the remarks of the right hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) except to endorse what he said

about Iceland. I wish to raise two points with the Minister concerning two fishermen in my constituency.
The first point concerns the grants for glass-fibre-hulled fishing boats. There are obvious advantages in having glass-fibre hulls—for instance, ease of maintenance and cleaning the bottom—and there is also the possibility that the danger of electrolysis, which has an adverse effect and can create havoc with copper piping in vessels, may be alleviated.
I understand that the White Fish Authority, in approving grants for vessels, will not allow glass fibre hulls to be used for vessels over 45 ft. in length. I do not know the reason for that, and perhaps my hon. Friend could tell us, but it should be looked at in detail and at some length, because if advantages were to accrue to our inshore fleet in that manner we could only become more efficient, and that is exactly the purpose of the scheme.
My second question is about the payment of grants. As the House knows, there are six instalments in paying for fishing vessels. There is a first instalment of 10 per cent. of the contract price, which is paid with the order. There is a second instalment of 10 per cent., paid when the hull is laid. The remaining four stages, each of 20 per cent., are paid on completion of framing, completion of planking, on launching and finally on completion of the vessel. The first two instalments are payable by the prospective owners, and it is only at the third stage that the White Fish Authority, the Herring Industry Board or, indeed, the Highlands and Islands Development Board comes into the picture. Before any payment can be made by any one of those three statutory bodies, all the papers relating to the building of the vessel have to be signed by all who have any share in the vessel.
One particular case has been brought to my attention where a one-sixteenth share owner failed to sign the requisite documents, and the boat had been hulled, framed and planked. The boat builders had outlayed £33,000 on the vessel in about a six-month period, and no grant could be paid by the WFA because this one-sixteenth share owner had not signed the papers. There was no statutory power available to the WFA to get these signatures and the boat builder was consider-


ably out of pocket, having to find a great deal of bank interest to keep himself going.
It would be possible to tell the boat builder to lay off and not to continue further working until the money had been paid out, but that is not looking the facts in the face. Before another instrument is laid before the House the Government should take a further look at this. Although it is an isolated case, it could conceivably happen again. If there is to be another instrument of this nature in a year's time, which I devoutly hope there will be, perhaps this point can be looked at.

10.13 p.m.

Mr. James Johnson: I have never known such a pleasant occasion, when the Minister and the Shadow Minister at the Dispatch Box have spoken so modestly and for so short a time, setting such a good example to back benchers.
The Minister has said that the scheme is a somewhat mundane effort. By definition it must be. But it is extremely important to deep sea fishing fleets in Hull and elsewhere. It is vital that we should have confidence for next year and the year after, and we have here a definite assurance that we can look to the future and build our vessels.
The Minister said that in the last six months 11 deep sea vessels had been given the go-ahead in the sense of finance. I do not know how many of those are in Hull, but I assure the Minister that our firms have confidence. They are building vessels, and they look to the future with a good deal of confidence.
Fishing is a hunting industry. The future is unpredictable, at least for a long span ahead. We live from year to year. We have had, however, at least two good years if not a third good year in the industry.
Regarding the Hull deep sea fleet, although the Minister has given us hope in the scheme that we can go ahead with building, nevertheless, when I talk to firms, skippers and others in my constituency I find two big question marks. Perhaps the Minister will deal with these when he replies. First, I hope I am in order in asking whether we shall be able, next year at this time, still to fish in

Icelandic waters. I know that the Minister is not a fortune-teller. This is very important, particularly if 30 per cent. or 40 per cent. or even more of our catch is coming from the Continental Shelf off Iceland. This is so important that I shall be obliged if the Minister will say a word about it later.
My other point is this. We have this sum of money, whatever it is—30 per cent. or 35 per cent.—which is being given for building a new vessel. But we in Hull are perhaps in one of the oldest and most difficult docks to work in. I am thinking of the members of my own union, the bobbers and filleters on the dock. We are thinking of moving in next door from St. Andrew's Dock into the old commercial dock, the Albert and William Wright Dock. Perhaps the Minister will give a hint of the Government's view on this, because we shall need some help in moving.
We come back to the same question: what is to be the level of the fish stocks in the North-East Atlantic? It may be that despite building these magnificent new vessels, costing well over £1 million each, we shall have to go beyond the Equator and into the South Atlantic, to South Georgia and elsewhere. We face severe competition. Even with this instrument enabling us to build the finest of modern vessels, we face intense competition from Soviet Union, Polish and Japanese vessels. This is a most competitive industry and this scheme is therefore vital to us. We welcome it in order that we may modernise our fleet.
Mention has been made of the Fleck Committee. The 1962 Act did not work, and it must be said that the measures following Fleck were the work of my own party when in government. The industry has taken advantage of this instrument and welcomes it. Our deep sea fleet in Hull has increased confidence. We have increased efficiency, and the only fly in the ointment in the debate tonight is the position of the White Fish Authority. We all welcome its move north to Scotland. It could not come to Hull, where it should have come, but it went to another good place, Edinburgh. Nevertheless, not all the staff are going north.
This is a good measure; we welcome it, and on both sides of the House we give it our support.

10.18 p.m.

Mr. Michael Shaw: I too welcome the scheme which carries out much the same objects as the Bill we have already passed. While we have had support for it from the distant water fleet, I support it from the point of view of the inshore fleet. The prosperity of both fleets is much more interdependent than is often recognised. For the first time we have a measure of stability and prosperity for the inshore fleet and a very welcome expansion in that fleet arising from the confidence that now exists in the fishing community.
Great tribute should be paid to our negotiators in the Common Market negotiations in making sure that our limits were preserved. This has——

Mr. Peart: Baloney.

Mr. Shaw: The right hon. Gentleman says "Baloney". That shows how little he knows about the fishing fleet.

Mr. Peart: Vast sections of an industry not dealt with in the Bill—the inshore industry—have expressed deep concern. The hon. Gentleman has taken up the argument from me, and he is right to do so. But I assure him that there is concern.

Mr. Shaw: I spent the best part of last week with constituents of mine who are concerned with the inshore fleet. Of course there is anxiety. This is one of the reasons for the Bill which we have just passed. However, I repeat that there was a great deal of increased confidence and satisfaction at the fact that the limits were preserved. It is because of new factors which have arisen that the feeling of instability has returned. It is therefore very desirable that we should make sure as far as we can that the conditions under which prosperity and confidence had been built up are maintained until the future can be seen more clearly.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) spoke about Iceland. I shall not refer to it in detail. But undoubtedly until that question is resolved there is bound to be considerable cause for concern not only in the distant water fleet but in the inshore fleet as well, since what happens to the distant water fleet to some extent affects the future of the inshore fleet. So until we get these problems sorted out we must

welcome wholeheartedly the introduction of this scheme following as it does so closely on the Bill we have just passed.

10.22 p.m.

Mr. Kevin McNamara: If I may take up one matter referred to by the hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Mr. Michael Shaw), in my view the inshore fleet would be building on sand if it did not realise that all it has under the Brussels negotiations is no more than a derogation for 10 years, after which there is no certainty about what will happen——

Mr. Michael Shaw: There is certainty for 10 years.

Mr. McNamara: Yes, but 10 years is a short time in the lifetime of the average fisherman and such a period holds out no hope for posterity. The hon. Gentleman should watch carefully what he says about the Brussels agreement.

Mr. Ted Leadbitter: May I remind my hon. Friend that it is a terribly short time in view of the fact that, especially for inshore fishermen, the capital investment in vessels presents a great deal of uncertainty if they have no more than a 10-year security of tenure?

Mr. Michael Shaw: The figures which my hon. Friend the Minister of State has given indicate that there must be increased confidence. Vast sums are being spent on the inshore fleet in the purchase of boats, which indicates the underlying confidence that exists.

Mr. McNamara: I make two points in response to the hon. Gentleman's intervention. The first is that this is partly a reaction to the uncertainty that existed before getting the guarantee of 10 years. Secondly, it might be described as an investment of achievement. Having got a 12-mile limit, those in the inshore fleet think that they will have a favourable time for 10 years. These two factors affect a situation where in the past investment had been slow.
I take up one other point on the general fishing situation. In common with other hon. Members, I deeply regret that people regard the proposal for a 50-mile limit purely and simply as a fishing issue. It is not. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) knows that the fishing industry


is the core of many other industries concerned with frozen food and its derivatives. Many of our vegetable markets have come to Hull, Humberside and other fishing areas because of the all-the-yearround freezing facilities which have been said down for fish. Therefore, what prosperity we have in those areas would go if the frozen fish were to go.
There are people who are foolhardly enough to regard the Icelanders as having a case of some sort. They take the view that it is a big nation against a small nation. However, they do not understand what it at stake not only from their own food prices but for the prosperity of large parts of England and Scotland, quite apart from the actual terms of the blackmail adopted by a small Power against a large Power. However, I shall not take the point too far, otherwise I may get out of order.
I want to put a number of points to the Minister of State. First, can he give us a guarantee that with the transfer from London to Edinburgh of the White Fish Authority there will be no delay in the processing of applications for grants, whether they be for the deep sea fleet or the inshore fleet? We have been concerned about reports that we have read that for quite real and personal reasons people have decided not to move from London to Edinburgh. Obviously this will lead to difficulties in the processing of applications and in the work and efficiency of the White Fish Authority. We accept that there will be teething troubles, but may we have an undertaking that they will be overcome as rapidly as possible?
The Minister of State has given us an approximate number of orders which have been received for vessels seeking approval under the scheme. He spoke of there being 11 from April to September of last year. Is the Minister in a position to give us this information in terms of capital investment as such?
Will the Minister also say how the picture has developed since September last when the cod war started to intensify? I believe that trawler firms are still placing orders, but I wonder to what extent the capacity of the catching fleet has held out, not so much because we have kept the ships in the sea but because of the number of vessels that have been going through the survey which are per-

haps 20 years old, or older, and which in the past might have been sold. I would understand it if companies were hedging their bets, but I nevertheless regard this as an important point.
The Government are carrying through a policy which was hammered out with great difficulty by my right hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) and my noble Friend Lord Hoy in the other place. The way the subsidy system works at present is sensible, but on some occasion—perhaps this is not the right one because we do not know what will be the outcome of the dispute with Iceland—we should have an indication of the Government's contingency planning for the future of the deep sea fleet and what hopes there are for other areas.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West mentioned the South Atlantic, but we know the attitude of many of the Powers in South America and the way they are pushing out their limits. This again is not the right time, within the confines of this narrow scheme, but we should like to have some information on how the Minister sees the Law of the Sea Conference going in a year or so's time. It will obviously be of importance to our industry and to the employment of our people in Hull and other areas.
I hope the Minister will emphasise that it is wrong for the people of England to regard the present situation simply as a fishing dispute. There is more at stake for the future of our fishing industry, not only in regard to the state of international law but also in terms of the price of food, the future of our food industry and employment prospects for our constituents.

10.30 p.m.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: While welcoming the scheme, which extends the existing provisions for a further year, I must express disappointment that the Government have not seen fit to give effect to the cogent submissions made to them by the Scottish Trawlers Federation to the effect that the existing loan scheme for vessels of 80 ft. and longer should be improved and that they should qualify for facilities of loans from 25 per cent. to 40 per cent. of total costs, and with loans of 35 per


cent. repayable over 15 years at a reasonable rate of interest.
These arguments were put forcibly on behalf of the trawler fleets based at Aberdeen and Granton but no adequate reason has been given by the Government for turning them down. This is important for these trawler fleets because, unless arrangements of this nature are forthcoming in the near future, the industry will face considerable difficulties in renewing its fleet.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) has said that we have a guarantee under Community arrangements for only 10 years. This again emphasises the need to carry out renewal of these fishing fleets. If encouragement were given to the building of vessels of 80 feet and over as well as those under 80 feet, there would be every prospect that the fleet could be more adaptable to fish in places where fishing is open to it.
I strongly press the Government to think again about this matter and to come forward with orders which will give effect to the arguments which have been put to them by the federation and by others.

10.33 p.m.

Mr. Ted Leadbitter: I hope that this scheme will pass rapidly through the House and become effective. There is concern in the industry and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) has mentioned the difficulties of those who fish with vessels of 80 feet or longer and the representations made on their behalf by the federation. Some years ago I was a member of the Estimates Committee which investigated this subject. I recall the concern of the fishing industry generally in terms of the Government's attitude to subsidies and financial control.
I have a deep suspicion that when Governments indulge by fits and starts in any proposals for grant, fears are created in the minds of those who are affected in ways which politicians perhaps cannot fully appreciate. The large fishing units which deal in deep freezing and which fish at long distances for long

periods of time do not perhaps face these problems to the same extent as do the inshore fishermen; it is the inshore fisherman, the small man who helps to make up the character of the fishing industry, who has not the accountancy facilities and legal advice behind him. Indeed, this is often the sort of fleet in which father hands the trawler on to son, and the son in his turn hands it on to his son. These are the people who face all the problems involved in the procedural requirements of making grant applications and the rest. A year in the life of this industry is not long.
There are no apparent differences between the two sides in this debate, although if we were allowed to go out of order we might find some differences. When I served on the Estimates Committee I was made very aware of the fear felt by fishermen with limited capital investment. Such men must meet what is to them even now a great capital outlay on modern, sophisticated navigational equipment. Although a year is a blessing at this stage, it must be seen in the context of the worry that the vast majority of fishermen have.
Hartlepool has a substantial and effective fishing industry, although compared with other ports it is relatively small, because to the north there is North Shields and to the south there is Redcar. These small ports are part of an industry which renders a remarkably good service to the consumer; or, to use the vernacular of my area, the fish and chip shop is still a very good supplier of good food at a very reasonable price, although in my area that price appears high because the level of wages is relatively low.
In this harmonious debate I make two appeals to the Minister. First, the Government should present a White Paper about the fishing industry, outlining the generality of the problems as they affect in particular the smaller and the inshore fisherman. Secondly, the White Paper should set out the Government's long-term policies, thus allaying the fishermen's fears arising from the fits and starts of annual instruments on this subject.

10.37 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Stodart: I thank the right hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) for the support he gave to the scheme and I certainly agree with him in describing


the late Sir Alexander Fleck as a very great man. My hon. Friend the Member for Banff (Mr. W. H. K. Baker) raised one or two slightly technical questions which included the machining of bottoms and glass fibre hulls. Those are both matters for the White Fish Authority and the other bodies concerned, including the Herring Industry Board, and I shall pass on to them my hon. Friend's comments. I cannot give him any undertaking that I can interfere in the decisions they reach.
I was naturally pleased to hear, and I agree with, the views of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) and also my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Mr. Michael Shaw) about the confidence which exists in the industry and which it is the Government's duty—and in the case of Iceland the duty of the whole House—to foster. This is being done splendidly. As for the docks at Hull, I believe that that goes a little wide of the subject of grants for fishing vessels. All I can say therefore is that, as the hon. Member probably knows, I have been having talks and I hope that those talks may bear some fruit.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) must have been desperately unhappy throughout this evening's debate because I recall his saying during the course of a fishing debate some time ago how much he detested bipartisan approaches to subjects because this made him feel uncomfortable. He asked about the possible effect of the move of the White Fish Authority to Edinburgh and whether this would cause a delay in the processing of applications. There has for some time already been a staff there which has serviced the Scottish and North Sea Committee of the authority and I am confident that there will be no delay as a result of the move.

Mr. James Johnson: Does it not disturb the Minister, as it disturbs me, that there are a number of first-class men who do not feel able to go north of the Tweed? This is a great loss of expertise for the authority.

Mr. Stodart: That is a matter of great sorrow to me, particularly as the offices are not far from my constituency. But

I can understand that people are a little hesitant to pull up their roots and move 400 miles. That particularly applies to wives and we must face the fact. I am sure that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) will support me in saying that in other spheres of activity, particularly the motor car industry, there may have been misgivings to begin with but that once they are there people realise that Scotland is the marvellous place that it is. I am very sad that quite a lot of people have not moved north, but I can assure the House that the efficiency of the organisation will not suffer.
I was asked about capital investment. About £10 million in total capital or approximately £3 million in grant is accounted for by the 11 deep sea vessels. For the 75 inshore vessels the figures are about £6 million investment and about £1,500,000 in grants. These are fairly good figures. If I can get them I will give the figures since the Icelandic episode blew up. These figures were up to September of last year. The Icelandic difficulties were then in full swing, because I went to Iceland for the first round of negotiations in July. If I can I will find out whether later figures show any tailing off in investment.
I was also asked whether I could predict the result of the Law of the Sea Conference. Again that is just a tiny bit wide of fishing vessel grants. I hope that the conference will come to a conclusion that will be satisfactory to all concerned, if that is not being too optimistic.

Mr. McNamara: I am grateful for those undertakings. The point I was really concerned about was that while I want as much expansion as possible, I wonder to what extent people are selling off their old vessels which they may have kept in commission or putting them in for extended surveys, which has therefore tended to inflate the figures unrealistically.

Mr. Stodart: I cannot give that information now. I will if I can, include it in the letter I will send. The hon. and learned Member for Leith raised the question of the availability of loans from the White Fish Authority or the Herring Industry Board for new vessels and the representations that had been made by


the Scottish Trawlers Federation. This is a facility which in recent years has been available only for vessels of less than 80 feet, with larger vessels having to rely on more broadly-based loan guarantee arrangements operated by the Department of Trade and Industry. Fishing interests in Scotland have for some time been urging that direct loans should again be made available for all vessels, irrespective of length. I assure the hon. and learned Member that these representations were given careful consideration. There is little or no evidence that the availability of either White Fish Authority or Herring Industry Board loans has been a key factor in determining the actual rate of building.
The rate of building and the level of grant do not coincide as the figures over the last 10 years show. By the same token reliance on the Department of Trade and Industry does not appear to have inhibited trawlermen. What is significant is that the differences between the direct loan and the loan guarantee are a good deal less than is sometimes supposed because, for example, the lower interest rate applicable under the latter scheme compensated at least in part for the shorter periods over which the loans have to be repaid.
The hon. Member for the Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter) raised the question of family firms. I am sure we would not go far wrong if we said that they were what we mean when we speak of "The fishermen of England." The inshore section is more confident and has been, relatively speaking, getting a better return. Who would blame it? I certainly would not. I regard fishermen as being among the hardest workers in the world. They thoroughly merit a jolly good return for their efforts.
I conclude, with great caution, on the subject of Iceland. I was asked "Shall we be fishing in Icelandic waters next year?" I do not think it would be advisable for me to say anything off the cuff in a debate like this, particularly when the negotiations are being conducted primarily by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; but we have offered catch reductions of 25 per cent., and no one can say that that is an insignificant offer or one that lacks good will.
I have been to Iceland. One night I went out with the Minister of Fisheries who is often portrayed as not perhaps the easiest of persons. I got on famously with him, telling him various heckling stories that had come my way. I really felt that if we had had another half-hour together we might have had an agreement signed. We must realise that the Icelandic Ministers are perfectly ordinary, genuine people like ourselves. I am firmly optimistic enough to think that common sense will prevail and that an agreement will be reached without taking the ultimate step, which nobody within the fishing industry wants, of having to use force by sending the Navy in.

Mr. Leadbitter: Mr. Leadbitter rose——

Mr. Stodart: I should like to conclude these remarks on Iceland. Within a fortnight we hope to have not only the interim ruling but the final ruling of the International Court. That is yet another reason why I should not put my foot too deeply into Icelandic waters tonight.

Mr. Leadbitter: Unfortunately the Minister has put his foot into Icelandic waters, and I am surprised that he has introduced the subject at all on this scheme. But, having done so, arising from the nice little meeting which he has described of ordinary people, the Fisheries Minister of Iceland and himself, may I ask whether that sort of tête-à-tête is how the Government arrived at the very pertinent action of sending a tugboat to defend our fishermen up there? Or was there another reason for it?

Mr. Stodart: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not sneer at the sending of a tugboat, which I believe——

Mr. Leadbitter: I am serious.

Mr. Stodart: I am sorry if perhaps I took an implication which I should not. The hon. Gentleman should not deprecate the sending of a tugboat—I saw that tugboat off from Leith on Saturday afternoon—because I believe it may prove to be the answer to this very difficult situation. I do not know, but I am hopeful. It was rather scornfully described the day before as a baby being sent to do a man's job. I think that, with its 11.500 horsepower, it may do an extremely effective job. I hope that no one in the


House will give the impression that these people are going off to do something which is not worth while, because I think they have a great job to do.

Mr. Leadbitter: I think that the Minister has got this wrong. I was quite serious about a very serious matter. I warned the hon. Gentleman that he should not have introduced the subject. Nothing less than tact is required on this subject. The Minister used the word "scornfully" when referring to outside reaction. In fact, it was the fishing industry expressing its very deep concern about the Government's action. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman would make a useful contribution to this subject by saying no more.

Mr. Stodart: That is all very well, but I have always felt that it is courteous to the House, if points are raised by the hon. Gentleman's colleagues, that I ought——

Mr. Peart: No.

Mr. Stodart: The right hon. Gentleman must allow me to make this point. Two of his hon. Friends have raised this matter in considerable depth. The Chair having allowed the matter to be raised by hon. Gentlemen opposite, it would have been discourteous of me if I had not attempted to give what I hope was a diplomatic reply. If it was not diplomatic, I am sure that in the morning I shall get a severe rebuke from my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I shall leave it at that.
The last thing I wish to do is to end this debate on a discordant note. As I have been accused of putting my foot in it I had better bring the debate to a rapid conclusion by saying that a fishing debate always finds both sides of the House very much in unison. I believe that fishermen and hill shepherds are the salt of the earth, and they deserve all the support that this House can give them.

Mr. Peart: With permission, I should like to comment on the hon. Gentleman's speech. He should not rebuke my hon. Friend the Member for the Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter) who merely responded and put a point of view. I understand the difficulty. I do not propose to deploy arguments about whether a tugboat is better than a fishery protection vessel. I

shall not embarrass the Government in any way. If they think that this is the right course, we shall help them, but it cannot be acceptable to certain sections of the industry. That is all that my hon. Friend was saying.
There has been joint agreement about this scheme. We are here to help the industry. Hon. Members have gone rather wide of the subject under debate, but that is not their responsibility. I understand the Minister's difficulties. Having said that, I hope that we can approve the scheme.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That the Fishing Vessels (Acquisition and Improvement) (Grants) (Amendment) Scheme 1972. a copy of which was laid before this House on 13th December, be approved.

Orders of the Day — ADJOURNMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fortescue.]

Orders of the Day — BLUNDELL HARLING LTD., WEYMOUTH

10.57 p.m.

Mr. Evelyn King: I am fortunate to have the opportunity to divert the attention of the House from Iceland to Weymouth. First, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, may I say that I am a determined supporter of the Government's policy in the matter of wages and prices. The Government have behaved with determination and resolution, and nothing that I say is intended to weaken that statement. I am, however, a little concerned about the implementation of that policy in the sense that it cannot succeed unless there is a great deal of flexibility and imagination in the execution of it.
With that beginning I turn to the major scene that I want to set. First, there is the date for which, in a sense, I apologise. I should have liked to raise this matter on 18th December. Indeed, I tried to do so. I realise now that it is a little out of date, but there is still enough in it to merit my not withdrawing it.
Secondly, there is the place. I represent South Dorset. Within South Dorset,


the biggest town in Weymouth. As the Under-Secretary—my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton (Mr. Emery)—knows, Weymouth is an area of high unemployment and low wages, the sort of area that one finds all too frequently within the West Country and parts of the country leading to that area. The local authority has for many years sought to provide trading estates and to attract light industry, and my hon. Friend knows that that is difficult to do.
I now turn to the particular industry that I have in mind. The firm concerned is Blundell Harling Ltd. which makes drawing instruments, slide rules and scale rules and is also a contractor to the Ministry of Defence and constructs specialised calculators for use in defence systems. It is an employer on a fair scale, and if it has difficulties—and it has some which I shall illustrate—these are caused not by not having full order books but by over-loyalty to Government policy and to CBI directives.
The firm has done something which is perhaps unusual. It has been guilty of under-charging. We have heard a great deal in recent weeks about over-charging. Too little has been heard of the many firms in my constituency—and they are the majority—which are moderate and responsible and do not over-charge It would be no bad thing if sometimes we had praise for them.
I now quote from a letter written by the sales director of Blundell Harling on 10th November 1972. He had no idea he was going to be quoted and he did not write for that purpose. However, the letter puts the position as clearly as anything can. The letter dated 10th November was written following the announcement on 7th November. It says:
The present Government announcement has presented our company with a serious problem.…For many years it has been our practice to issue a nett price list of our standard products once a year. We find, however, through maintaining our prices for the year April 1971 to March 1972 in accordance with the CBI initiative that our trading profit was reduced to a dangerous level. It was decided that in future we would issue new price lists at approximately six-monthly intervals…in an effort to keep increases to a minimum.…However, when our half-yearly accounts to the 30th September 1972 showed a trading loss of"—
I shall not give the figure but it was tens of thousands of pounds—

we immediately checked costings of those items not increased in price in July, and found urgent action was necessary. A new price list was drafted to take effect from 1st November.
The dates now become important. The letter continues:
… but, due to delays, it was not received from the printers until the afternoon of 2nd November. In the interests of economy it was decided to distribute the price list with the monthly statements which were due to be posted off on Tuesday 7th November".
The following is of vital significance:
…except for some which were sent by post to our largest distributors on Friday 3rd November.
My hon. Friend will recall that the Government announcement about prices and increases was made on 7th November. Blundell Harling was placed in a difficult position. The price list had been printed and some lists had been posted but others had not. Then the announcement, which was not a law, was made in the House. The firm did what it should have done. The directors spoke to me on the telephone and came up to London. I immediately telephoned the Department. Clearly this was a case where there was a doubt. I spoke to the private office of the Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs.
As a result I was able to write to Blundell Harling thus:
I have been in touch with Sir Geoffrey Howe's office and I am assured…that if there is evidence that prior to 3.30 p.m. on the 6th November 1972 a decision by your firm to vary prices had been taken and the day on which the prices were to be varied were to be made known in writing outside the office, then you will be in order to stick to the decision you have taken.
I took the precaution of sending a copy of that letter to the Minister's office. As I understand it, there is no dispute that I wrote accurately what I had been told on the telephone. The firm believed what I wrote to be the position.
However, on 28th November—I will not quote the whole of the letter—there was received a lengthy letter from the Department, of which only two sentences are of consequence. It said:
I am afraid I am now writing to tell you the issue was not as clear cut as I imagined.
It goes on to give four points, only one of which I will quote, which says:
Where increased prices have been announced, or a price list published before 6th


November, this will not entitle those prices to be changed.…
So we get a position where a firm has behaved properly. It is a firm which has a record of sticking loyally to what the Government sought to do. The firm was in difficulty and it went to its Member of Parliament and he took the matter straight to the Minister. The firm sought to do what the Minister said and then it suffered in the way I have described.
This is wrong on three counts. First, it puts an hon. Member in an impossible position when in good faith what he says does not turn out in the end to be true.
I accept that we all make mistakes. Anyone can make a mistake. All Government Departments make mistakes. I make no criticism of that. But I suggest that when a Government Department makes a mistake of this character which is not of international significance but affects only a small firm but is vital to it, the Minister and the Government should stand by their mistake. I am afraid that in this case the Minister has not done so. That is my first and biggest point.
I do not want to make too much of my second point but it is a fact that this directive and the letters to the firm and to me were given without sanction of law but were based only on a directive or statement by the Prime Minister in the House. The Bill had not been passed at the time the second letter went out. It is doubtful whether in law the Minister had any legal power to do what he set out to do. That makes his case weaker still. I will not put it stronger than that.
Lastly, here we have a firm which is selling its product at less than it costs to produce. It employs in my constituency sufficient people to be of consequence to the economic life of that constituency. But I now go wider than my constituency. While this is a small point affecting a small firm, on the national scale decisions affecting many other firms are now likely to be taken every day and it is important that when an unwise decision is taken by a Minister it should receive criticism, because if the Government's policy is to work, as I want it to work, nothing in the world is more likely to spoil it than a misjudgment of the kind I have described.
I was impressed by the fact that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, on television and radio last week, used the one word "fair" again and again. He said that the Government must be fair, because only if they were fair would their policy succeed. I accept what my right hon. Friend said. But I find it a little hard to accept that the Minister in the case I have quoted and in the circumstances I have outlined has in fact been fair. If my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State is able to persuade me otherwise, no one will be more pleased than I.

11.8 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Peter Emery): I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Mr. Evelyn King) for the support he has made clear for the Government's policy on standstill on prices and incomes. For myself, I thank him for the immensely reasonable way he has presented his case tonight. It would have been possible for him to have done so in a bombastic, aggressive manner. But he has marshalled his facts fairly and reasonably. As a West Country Member myself, I have sympathy and understanding for his approach as far as his constituency is concerned and for the problems of his area in Dorset. I well understand them, as I think he knows.
I do not in any way wish to argue with any of the facts my hon. Friend has stated. He has put them clearly and I see no point in adding to the detail. My Department acknowledges the real and substantial embarrassment caused to the firm by the incorrect advice it was given and the fact that that advice was not immediately detected and withdrawn.
As has been made clear to the House on other occasions, the Government introduced the standstill measures only when it became clear that it was not possible to reach agreement on the methods by which the objectives of economic management which had been agreed between the Government, the TUC and the CBI should be pursued. We could no longer delay taking quick and effective action.
In order to deal effectively with the public's questions and complaints, the Department set up an organisation to give rapid advice to inquirers. This


centred upon a specially established prices unit in London, supported in a most important way by regional officers throughout the country. It does not make the error more acceptable, but it puts it more into ratio if I illustrate the whole gamut.
It serves to illustrate the pressures under which this organisation was working at the beginning if I say that more than 8,000 calls were handled during the first week, of which nearly 5,000 came to the prices unit in London. In the second week more than 14,000 calls came in, of which the prices unit handled 8,000. These calls were supplemented by a large volume of written inquiries, and business is being maintained still at a high level of intensity. The unit in London and the regions has received more than 36,000 calls and I am pleased to say that in very few cases has incorrect information been given.
The question put to the Department by my hon. Friend centred upon the effectiveness of prices increases which Blundell Harling considered itself to have implemented before 6th November 1972. Hon. Members will appreciate how crucial this was because if it could be demonstrated and accepted that price increases had been implemented before the standstill, no breach of the standstill could have been involved in their continuation.
The incorrect advice given was that the higher prices sought by Blundell Harling would be regarded as having become effective when the firm first said they were to be effective—that is, on Friday 3rd November when it sent out notification of new prices to some but not all of its customers. On that basis the increased prices would have held good throughout the period of the standstill.
The true position however, and one which shortly afterwards became widely disseminated, was that for a price to be effective before the standstill began, it had to be demonstrated that sales had actually been completed at the higher price. That was the judgment of whether one was on one side of the line or the other. In the case of the sale of goods, the point at which sales would be regarded as completed would generally be the despatch of the goods.
The background to this in terms of the Act is that it is necessary in deciding whether the standstill has been infringed to compare the price of a transaction effected after 6th November 1972 with the price of a transaction of the same description before 6th November. It is important to emphasise that the issue of a price list indicating an intention to charge higher prices before 6th November is not of itself an effective transaction and cannot therefore be regarded as an implementation of a price increase before the standstill.
When the initial error was discovered it had to be considered as to whether the Government should have stood by the first advice given and allowed the price rise. Whilst in some ways there can be an argument mounted to support that line of action—indeed that is my hon. Friend's criticism of the error made—I have to reject it. Two wrong actions would confuse rather than help the situation, and it would certainly have been quite unfair to other traders, who might have been in the same position but who were not given this advice.
The incorrect information was relayed to Blundell Harling through my hon. Friend, and some two weeks passed before a correction was notified to him. In this period Blundell Harling continued to attempt to pass on, in good faith, its increased prices. Arising from that action, two of the customers complained to the Department.
Apart from the action taken on its behalf by my hon. Friend, Blundell Harling had written to the Department almost at the outset of the standstill describing its position. Guidelines had been drawn up by the time that letter arrived which set out the precise information required for consideration of an application for approval of an exceptional price increase during the standstill. The company was accordingly invited to supply detailed information on which its case could be considered.
On 6th December, after the incorrect advice had been recognised, my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs met Blundell Harling's sales director and the company secretary. He explained to them, as they had by now already learned, the criterion which had been adopted for the


establishment of price increases to be effective before the standstill. He felt it would be indefensible for him to uphold the wrong decision given to them earlier. To do so would have been to extend to Blundell Harling a favoured accommodation during the prices standstill which was denied to other suppliers in a similar position. This also comes back to what I accept is the main criticism of the Government's decision.
My right hon. and learned Friend invited the firm, if it wished, to supply the information required for further consideration of its case for approval of an exceptional price increase during the standstill. The company replied in a letter to the prices unit earlier this month expressing its thanks to the Minister for the meeting and saying that it did not consider it worth while pursuing the matter further.
This is the background to what I readily admit is an unfortunate case, against which we are debating the Government's prices policy. The central plank of that policy is already well known to the House, and it is based on the desire to be fair to all. It might even be considered more dfficult for a Government to admit a mistake, as we have done, than to hush it up. We wanted to ensure that there was no favouritism. The central plank is that prices during the standstill should not exceed those charged in transactions of the same description before the standstill began.
We have been at pains to apply that policy as fairly as possible, while acknowledging that it would bear more harshly on some suppliers than on others, particularly those who had implemented price increases just before it was introduced.
We have been prepared from the outset to consider applications for approval of exceptional price increases, especially from firms which consider themselves quite unable to absorb increased costs for the period of the standstill. The Government have not disguised the fact that such applications will be considered in the light of many factors. These must include an assessment of the applicant's ability to absorb increased costs. It is right that they should be based on detailed information about the business being pursued.
It is still open to Blundell Harling to develop its specific argument, though I am pleased to be able to say that I take it that the firm has accepted our policy, as it has indicated so far that it does not wish to do so.

Mr. King: I am grateful for the courtesy of my hon. Friend's reply. This started in early November. We are now in mid-January. If the firm was to produce facts and figures to justify the need for an increase, it already would have been, for three months, selling at a loss. Whatever the decision might be, how long would it take for the Department to give a decision?

Mr. Emery: I do not know what my departmental brief would be, but I give my hon. Friend the assurance that if an application was made, because of the error the Department made originally, I would ensure that it was dealt with as a matter of immense urgency as soon as was humanly possible.
It is, perhaps, a measure of the widespread acceptance of the Government's policy by commerce and industry that only 1,760 applications for approval of price increases have been received. These are rather relevant figures. Only 230 of these have been approved. Therefore, the Government have made it plain that the policy of the prices standstill is intended to have effect as such only for the period of the standstill, whether it was for 90 or 150 days. It is not surprising, therefore, that I shall do everything possible to maintain this policy, with a fair consistency, until the succeeding programme, which has been outlined by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, comes into effect.
Therefore, in conclusion, all that I can say is that I regret that this error should have been made. I should like those regrets to go out publicly to the company. They have been conveyed in private. We realise the embarrassment this is causing, but I only hope that the company understands, from my explanation, that it is right and proper that we should be fair overall, even if it means harshly having to correct an error that we may have made.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-three minutes past Eleven o'clock.